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ST CYPRIAN ON THE CHURCH

I

By THE ABBOT OF DOWNSIDE

BISHOP OF CARTHAGE from about June 248 till his martyrdom in September 258, St Cyprian was a great ecclesiastic and a prolific correspondent and pamphleteer, though not a great speculative theologian like his 'master' Tertullian. His treatises and letters, which make up a large volume in the Vienna edition of the Latin Fathers, afford us a welcome insight into the practical life and administration of the Catholic Church at that time. More than half a century was still to elapse before the Church, relieved from persecution, had to face the new and dangerous difficulties of living in harmony with a friendly but still dictatorial government. But already the power of the Church as a (still illicit) organization was such that Cyprian himself could write of the Emperor Decius that the pretensions of a rival to the purple caused him less anger than the appointment of a bishop of Rome.¹

My purpose in the following pages is to examine what the Church (*ecclesia*), as revealed to us in Cyprian's writings, in fact was, and what he believed it to be. At a time like the present, when the nature of the Church is a 'live issue' far beyond the borders of the Catholic Church itself, it may not be without value to discover what were the facts and beliefs about it in the Catholic Church of the third century, from which all modern forms of Christianity descend. And Cyprian is a good witness for his own time and was an important influence after his death. Before the end of the fourth century a collection of his letters in a single volume was on sale at Constantinople. 'Translated in part into Greek, continually copied in the West, appreciated by all readers, the works of Cyprian often serve as agents of transmission for works of Tertullian, Novatian and other anteniceans. They are invoked by the Council of Ephesus, used by Theodoret, placed immediately after the Bible and the Councils in the Gelasian decree, and exploited by the canonical collections even in Syriac and Armenian . . . The personal merits of his work are the principal cause of this immense success.'² In

¹ *Ep.* lv, 9.

² *Patristique et Moyen Age*, II, pp. 203f. J. de Ghellinck.

the first part of the following study I propose, in the main, to eschew the evidence of the treatise on the Unity of the Catholic Church (*De catholicae ecclesiae unitate*).

The word *ecclesia*³ occurs with great frequency in Cyprian's writings. It sometimes means the local church of a city or a township, presided over by a single bishop. Thus Cyprian writes:

You must know that the bishop is in the church and the church in the bishop, and that anyone who is not with the bishop is not in the church.⁴

This meaning makes it possible to use the word in the plural of a number of such local churches. Cyprian can speak of all the churches throughout the world linked with us in the bond of unity.⁵

But often, too, the word, in the singular, means the world-wide Church in which the local church finds its place. A striking example is the following:

Unless you esteem as a bishop a man who, although a bishop has been consecrated in the church (sc. of Rome) by sixteen fellow-bishops, yet strives through intrigue to become a false and alien bishop (of that same church) by means of consecrators who are deserters (from the Church), and whereas Christ has distributed ONE CHURCH THROUGHOUT THE WORLD INTO MANY MEMBERS, and one episcopate made up of a harmonious multiplicity of bishops, this man (sc. Novatian, pretender to the See of Rome and founder of the schism called after him) despite the existing divine tradition and the UNITY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH LINKED UP AND EVERYWHERE CONJOINED strives to make a human church.⁶

³ It is of course a word transliterated from the Greek, like *episcopus*, *presbyterus*, *diaconus*, *hypodiaconus*, *acoluthus*, *baptisma*, *eucharistia*, *catholicus*, *haereticus*, *schismaticus*, *apostolus*, *evangelium*, *laicus*, *cathedra*, *clericus*, *exomologesis*, *martyr*.,

⁴ *Ep.* lxvi, 8: *Scire debes episcopum in ecclesia esse et ecclesiam in episcopo et si qui cum episcopo non sit in ecclesia non esse.*

⁵ *Ep.* lxvi, 7: *ecclesiae denique universae per totum mundum nobiscum unitatis vinculo copulatae. Cf. episcopos plurimos ecclesiis dominicis in toto mundo divina dignatione praepositos (Ep. lxiii, 1); ecclesiarum istic (sc. in Africa) consistentium (Ep. xlviii, 2); in ecclesiarum statu . . . componendo (Ep. xxxii).*

⁶ *Ep.* lv, 24: *Nisi si episcopus tibi videtur qui episcopo in ecclesia a sedecim coepiscopis facto adulter atque extraneus episcopus fieri a desertoribus per ambitum nititur, et cum sit a Christo una ecclesia per totum mundum in multa membra divisa, item episcopatus unus episcoporum multorum concordi numerositate diffusus, ille post Dei traditionem, post conexam et ubique coniunctam catholicam ecclesiam unitatem humanam conatur ecclesiam facere.*

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Similarly, Cyprian can write to Cornelius, whom he recognises as the true bishop of Rome:

Since we share a SINGLE CHURCH and a harmony of mind and inseparable concord, what bishop would not rejoice in the good name of his fellow-bishop as if it were his own?⁷

And to a subsequent bishop of Rome, Stephen, reminding him of a bishop's responsibility even for members of the Church who do not belong to his local community, he writes:

Though we shepherds (i.e. bishops) are many, still we tend a single flock and ought to gather together and to cherish all the sheep which Christ purchased by his blood and passion.⁸

Thus the multiplicity of bishops does not mean that there is a multiplicity of flocks of Christ; nor does the immediate responsibility of a bishop for his local church absolve him from all concern and duties towards the rest of the Church.⁹

Again, Cyprian's insistence that there is only one baptism, that which is conferred in the one Church, implies that the many local churches are yet but 'portions' or 'members' of the universal Church. For instance:

Only if that man could be saved by water who was not in Noe's ark, can a man now be made alive by baptism who is not IN THE CHURCH, TO WHICH (Church) ALONE has baptism been granted.¹⁰

It will have been noticed that Cyprian uses (*Ep.* lv, 24, quoted above) the phrase Catholic Church, *catholica ecclesia*. The epithet 'catholic', as applied to the Church, was of course no novelty in Cyprian's time. The first recorded instance of it is in Ignatius in the second decade of the second century.¹¹ Cyprian has it frequently, and I have the impression that he uses it specially when writing to Rome or when the thought of Rome is in his mind. Referring to

⁷ *Ep.* lx, 1: *Nam cum nobis et ecclesia una sit et mens iuncta et individua concordia, quis non sacerdos in consacerdotis sui laudibus tanquam in suis propriis gratuletur?*

⁸ *Ep.* lxxviii, 4: *Nam etsi pastores multi sumus, unum tamen gregem pascimus et oves universas quas Christus sanguine suo et passione quaesivit colligere et fovere debemus.*

⁹ With multi pastores . . . unum gregem we may compare: sacerdotes (i.e. bishops, as regularly in Cyprian) in ecclesia (*Ep.* xlviii, 4); de ecclesia recedere . . . episcopis derelictis (*Ep.* lii, 4); non sic tamen . . . in ecclesia Dei . . . fidei robor elanguit, ut non supersit portio sacerdotum quae minime . . . succumbat (*Ep.* lxxvii, 8).

¹⁰ *Ep.* lxxix, 2; *Si potuit . . . salvus per aquam fieri qui in arca Noe non fuit, potest et nunc vivificari per baptismum qui in ecclesia non est, cui soli baptismum concessum est.*

¹¹ Smyrn. viii, 2, where the 'universal Church' is implicitly contrasted with a single local church.

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Novatian's consecration as pretender to the see of Rome he writes to Cornelius, whom he recognizes as legitimate bishop of that see:

Envoys of Novatian have come to us. Disturbed by the iniquity of a consecration which was unlawful and done **CONTRARY TO THE CATHOLIC CHURCH** we decided that they must at once be refused communion with us.¹²

And later in the same letter he states that these envoys are trying to win over adherents in Carthage:

Here too they are striving to draw away the members of Christ to a schismatical faction and to rend and tear **THE CATHOLIC CHURCH'S BODY**.¹³

In both these passages it can be asked whether the object designated by the phrase *ecclesia catholica* is the universal Church, or a local church considered as a part of the universal Church.¹⁴ But there are of course instances where the idea of the universal Church is uppermost. Thus, in a letter to Antonianus, a bishop who has been hesitating between the rival claims of Cornelius and Novatian, Cyprian writes:

I received your former letter, dearly beloved brother, in which, firmly maintaining **THE CONCORD OF THE EPISCOPAL COLLEGE** and clinging to **THE CATHOLIC CHURCH**, you indicated that you were not in communion with Novatian, but, following our advice, were in agreement with our fellow-bishop Cornelius. You further asked me to send a copy of that letter to our colleague Cornelius, so that laying aside all anxiety he might henceforth know that you were in

¹² *Venerunt ad nos . . . missi a Novatiano . . . Inlicitae et contra ecclesiam catholicam factae ordinationis pravitate commoti a communicatione eos nostra statim cohibendos esse censuimus* (Ep. xlv, 1).

¹³ *Ibid.*, 3: *Hic quoque in schismatis partes Christi membra distrahere et catholicae ecclesiae corpus suum scindere ac laniare nituntur*.

¹⁴ The same question can be raised in regard to the following passages: Ep. xlv, 1 *Ut ad catholicae ecclesiae unitatem scissi corporis membra componerent* (cf. later in the same paragraph: *contra sacramentum semel traditum divinae dispositionis et catholicae unitatis adulterum et contrarium caput exptra ecclesiam fecit*; here again the Novatianists are in view); Ep. xlvi, 1: *contra institutionis catholicae unitatem* (the letter is addressed to some Roman confessors); Ep. xlvii, to Cornelius: *ut ad matrem suam, id est ecclesiam catholicam, revertantur*; Ep. xlviii, 3, to Cornelius: *singulis navigantibus* (sc. to Italy) *nos scimus hortatos esse ut ecclesiae catholicae matricem et radicem cognoscerent et tenerent*; Ep. li, 1, to Cornelius: *exultanter excepimus Maximum . . . et Urbanum . . . ad ecclesiam catholicam regressos esse*; cf. also Ep. lv, 7 (*catholica unitas*), 21; lix, 5, 9 (bis); lxxv, 5; lxxix, 1; lxxi, 1f.

communion with him, that is WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.¹⁵

It almost looks as though, in face of the attempt of Novatian to build up a world-wide counter-Church over against the communion that recognized his rival, the Cornelianists (so to call them) were emphasizing the claim of their own communion to be the authentic Church by the reiterated assumption of the epithet *catholica*.

A casual survey of the ecclesiastical situation in A.D. 250 might suggest that we are faced with a federation of local churches, which agree to deny to all Christian communities outside the federation their right to exist. But is the word 'federation' adequate either to the facts or to the interpretation placed upon them by Cyprian and his contemporary churchmen? If by a federation we mean a group of bodies, severally autonomous, like the United Nations, which combine in pursuit of common aims while each preserves its individual sovereignty, then the description is not adequate to the Church as Cyprian presents and conceives it.

In the first place, baptism, as he repeatedly emphasizes, is 'one' for the whole Church universal. And baptism is the door of entry into the Church. In other words, this initiatory rite, though normally performed by or on behalf of the bishop of a local church, makes the recipient a member not simply of the local community but of the universal Church. The local communities are not simply a number of *thiasi*, to one of which a man may belong without belonging to the others. Christian citizenship is not multiple as the local communities are multiple, but single like the universal Church. It follows that a visitor from some other locality, if he is 'in communion' (*communicat*) with his own local church, is admitted to the communion of the church of the locality which he is visiting. and on the other hand, a man who is not in communion with his local church will not be admitted to communion as a visitor in another local church: *a communicatione eos nostra statim cohibendos*

¹⁵ Ep. lv, 1: *Accepi primas litteras tuas, frater carissime, concordiam collegii sacerdotalis obtinentes et catholicae ecclesiae cohaerentes, quibus significasti cum Novatiano te non communicare, sed sequi consilium nostrum et cum Cornelio coepiscopo nostro unum tenere consensum. Scripsisti etiam ut exemplum earundem litterarum ad Cornelium collegam nostrum transmitterem, ut deposita omni sollicitudine iam sciret te secum, hoc est cum catholica ecclesia, communicare.*

esse censuimus (*Ep.* xlv, 1, quoted above; the Roman excommunication of these Novatianist visitors to Carthage is not stated, but it may be presupposed).

Again, a local church is an organized entity, consisting of a *plebs* (the laity) and a clergy (*ordo clericorum*), the whole presided over by the bishop, who appoints, or inherits from his predecessor, the other clergy. But the bishop himself, though it is desirable that his acceptability should be publicly affirmed by the local body, is actually made a bishop (*facere, ordinare*) by bishops of other (usually neighbouring) local churches. It is thus that he becomes a member of the *collegium episcoporum* which tends the universal flock of Christ (*Ep.* lxxviii, 4, quoted above, p. 4).

It is therefore not only the mutual recognition and mutual hospitality and almsgiving, but what we may call the sacramental principles of third century Catholicism, that emphasize the radical unity of the universal Church, a unity which is in principle prior to the existence and unity of the local communities.

We shall see that Cyprian's central interpretation of the fact of the Church, with its strong insistence on the priority of unity over multiplicity, is in full harmony with the sacramental and historical facts. Facts and interpretation alike affirm that the universal Church is not a (logically subsequent) combination of local churches each preserving, as of inherent right, its radical autonomy. Still less is it an agglomeration of individuals whose several redemption is in some way independent of the Church which they subsequently comprise. The universal Church is logically prior to the local churches¹⁶ and to individual Christians. The local churches derive their legitimacy and their quality as 'churches', their right to exist, from it. And the individual Christian only exists as a Christian by spiritual derivation from the universal Church his 'mother'.

There is, it is true, a frequently repeated assertion of Cyprian which, if pressed to its logical conclusion, would threaten this whole conception of the Church. He often affirms that a bishop is responsible only (it would seem) to God and his own conscience. This

¹⁶ Possibly an exception should be made in the case of the 'local' church of Rome. It is possible that there are traces in Cyprian's writings of a notion, whether consciously held by him or not, that the Roman Church is in some sense identical with the universal Church

affirmation comes most frequently under his pen when he is advocating his own view that converts who had previously been 'baptized' by heretics must be baptized 'again' on admission to the Church. For instance:

In this matter we too do not impose constraint or lay down the law for anyone, since each prelate in the administration of his (*or* the) church has free control of his own will, and WILL GIVE ACCOUNT OF WHAT HE DOES TO THE LORD.¹⁷

Plainly, such absolute autonomy of the local bishop, whether or not it might prove compatible with a preservation of the inter-communion of the local churches, would be destructive of the concept of the radical unity of the universal Church. The problem involved in these passages, which are so hard to reconcile with the general drift of the Cyprianic evidence, has been dealt with by Father M. Bévenot, S.J.¹⁸ In an important article he argues that the idea of the complete autonomy of each local bishop is peculiar to Cyprian; that he may have derived it (erroneously) from the opening lines of *Ep.* xxx (a letter from the Roman clergy to Cyprian at a period when the episcopal chair at Rome was vacant); that he employs it not to vindicate freedom of action for himself, but to disclaim any intention on his part of circumscribing the freedom of other bishops; and, in particular, that he never uses it in self-defence against the intervention of Rome in African affairs.

It is of course obvious that, precisely in the matter of the baptismal controversy, in which, almost at the end of his life, Cyprian found that Rome was against him, the idea of complete episcopal independence would lead to chaos. An ex-heretic admitted to the communion of the Church in Rome or Alexandria, with no admission ceremony other than 'imposition of hands', might arrive at Carthage and seek communion with the local church there. But in Cyprian's eyes he would be an unbaptized person, one who had never been initiated into the Church, and therefore unqualified for *communicatio* unless he submitted to baptism.

What, again, would Cyprian have done if a bishop began to

¹⁷ *Qua in re nec nos vim cuiquam facimus aut legem damus, quando habeat in ecclesiae administratione voluntatis suae arbitrium liberum unusquisque praepositus, rationem actus sui Domino redditurus* (*Ep.* lxxii, 3, to Stephen, bishop of Rome).

¹⁸ 'A Bishop is responsible to God alone', *Mélanges Jules Lebreton I*, *Recherches de Science Religieuse*, XXXIX, Paris. Pp. 397-415.

deny some article of Catholic faith, or to preach heresy? Must he not have put into operation the principle to which we have already referred: 'though we pastors are many in number, yet the flock which we tend is ONE, and WE OUGHT TO CHERISH ALL THE SHEEP'? Is it not certain that such a bishop would have been denied the privileges of Catholic communion, and that a substitute for him in his episcopal office would have been chosen either by his orphaned church (cf. *Ep.* lxvii, where this procedure is approved by Cyprian; the substitute was of course consecrated bishop by prelates of the Catholic communion), or possibly by the bishop of Rome, as seems to be suggested by Cyprian to remedy the situation created at Arles by the adhesion of the former bishop to Novatianism:

Send to the province and to the (Christian) people of Arles a letter whereby Marcianus (the erring bishop) having been deprived of communion another may be substituted in his place.¹⁹

But what becomes of the absolute independence of the local bishop if either his own flock or the bishop of Rome can thus condemn and pass sentence upon his actions?

The fact is that a bishop's right to rule his flock depends on that recognition by his fellow-bishops in the universal Church which *communicatio* involves:

You wrote that I should send a copy of the same letter to Cornelius . . . so that . . . he might now know that you are in communion with him, and hence with the Catholic Church.²⁰

In this same letter to Antonianus (quoted above p. 4), Cyprian says of the see of Rome:

Once it has been filled and (the fact) ratified by God's will and THE CONSENT OF ALL OF US (sc. the bishops of the universal Church) anyone who now wishes to become bishop (of Rome) can only do so outside (sc. the Catholic Church), and cannot have ecclesiastical ordination, as NOT CLINGING TO THE UNITY OF THE CHURCH.²¹

¹⁹ *Ep.* lxxviii, 3 (to Stephen, bishop of Rome): *Dirigantur in provinciam et ad plebem Arelate consistentem a te litterae quibus abstento Marciano alius in loco eius substituat.*

²⁰ *Ep.* lv, 1: *Scripsisti ut exemplar earundem litterarum ad Cornelium transmittam . . . ut . . . iam sciret te secum, hoc est cum catholica ecclesia, communicare.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, 8: *Quo (sc. loco Petri et gradu cathedrae sacerdotalis) occupato et de Dei voluntate atque omnium nostrum consensione firmato quisque iam episcopus fieri voluerit foris fiat necesse est, nec habeat ecclesiasticam ordinationem qui ecclesiae non tenet unitatem.*

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There are thus inevitable limits to episcopal autonomy, and Cyprian recognizes that they exist in practice.²²

The Universal Church, as represented to us by Cyprian and in his writings, is made up, then, of baptized persons constituting the communicating membership of local churches, these local churches being in communion with each other. Each local church is a concrete association of actual living human beings, baptized and 'in communion' with their bishop; it is a historical entity, a 'flesh and blood' reality. And the universal Church, comprising these local communities, and only such as are in the world-wide communion, is itself also necessarily a historical entity, an actual world-wide association.

It cannot be maintained that for membership of the Church baptism is essential but communion with the body of the faithful only accidental, and this for two reasons. In the first place, a baptized person who deserts the Catholic communion is *foris*, outside the Church. As Cyprian writes to the Roman confessors who had deserted the communion of the Roman bishop Cornelius:

Since our unanimity and concord ought by no means to be severed, because we cannot ABANDON THE CHURCH, GO OUTSIDE AND COME TO YOU, we pray and ask you with such exhortations as we can to RETURN TO MOTHER CHURCH AND YOUR BROTHERHOOD.²³

Secondly, the Church is not a mere number of baptized persons, but has a divinely given constitution, a *ratio*:

²² Within such limits, which were of course, so far as our evidence goes, very far from being accurately determined in the third century, a bishop obviously has a large measure of autonomy, and hence of direct responsibility to God. The same is true of the monastic abbot, as described in the Holy Rule. St Benedict often reminds the abbot, in words which he might have borrowed from Cyprian's phrases about the bishop, that he will have to render an account to God of all his decisions and deeds (*quia de omnibus iudiciis et operibus suis redditurus est Deo rationem. Regula monachorum*, LXIII, 6), and Abbot Cuthbert Butler concluded that this was, in St Benedict's view, the *only* limit to the Abbot's power. Yet St Benedict envisages a possible situation in which outsiders may have to intervene and even substitute another person for an abbot viciously elected by a vicious community: *prohibeant pravorum praevalere consensum, sed domui Dei dignum constituent dispensatorem* (Ibid., lxiv, 14ff.). It is reasonable to suppose that he would commend a similar intervention if an abbot, validly elected, turned out after some time to be manifestly unworthy of his office.

²³ Ep. xlvii, 2: *Nam cum unanimitas et concordia nostra scindi omnino non debeat, quia nos ecclesia derelicta foras exire et ad vos venire non possumus, ut vos magis ad ecclesiam matrem et ad vestram fraternitatem revertamini quibus possumus hortamentis petimus et rogamus.*

Arranging the episcopal dignity and the constitution of his Church our Lord in the gospel speaks to Peter and says: I say unto thee, etc. (Matt. xvi, 18.f). Thence through the lapse of time and by succession the ordination of bishops and the constitution of the Church comes down, that the Church should be established upon bishops and every act of the Church be governed by these same prelates.²⁴

From this it follows that the Church to which baptism grants membership is something more than the sum of its members; it is the visible institution, founded as such by Christ himself, of which the inter-communicating episcopal *collegium* is as it were the framework.

There is perhaps not a single passage in Cyprian where the word *ecclesia* can be shown to refer to, or to include within its scope, the Church expectant or the Church triumphant; much less where it appears to include any person still alive who is outside the one communion of the world-wide Church²⁵. There is, in his thought and terminology, a coincidence of the notions of that world-wide association of baptized persons on their way to the heavenly fatherland, to which he himself belongs, and the Church which Christ founded. The two concepts are identical *in re*, and usually no distinction is made *in ratione*; but an exception occurs here or there:

Since one is the Church, which, having attained the grace of eternal life both lives unto eternity and GIVES LIFE TO GOD'S PEOPLE²⁶;

here a mental distinction is made between the Church regenerating (and sanctifying) and the People of God (who from another point of view are the members of the Church) who are being regenerated and sanctified.²⁷

²⁴ Ep. xxxiii, 1: *Dominus noster . . . episcopi honorem et ecclesiae suae rationem disponens in evangelio loquitur et dicit Petro : Ego tibi dico etc. Inde per temporum et successionum vices episcoporum ordinatio et ecclesiae ratio decurrit ut ecclesia super episcopos constituatur et omnis actus ecclesiae per eosdem praepositos gubernetur.*

²⁵ De unitate 14 (*ad regnum pervenire non poterit qui eam quae regnatura est dereliquit*), though it implies the survival of the Church in the posthistoric kingdom, yet refers to the Church militant, not to the saints already triumphant. It is this Church militant which the schismatic has deserted (*dereliquit*).

²⁶ Ep. lxxi, 1: *Quando una sit ecclesia, quae vitae aeternae gratiam consecuta et vivit in aeternum et vivificat Dei populum.*

²⁷ There are many passages in which the word *ecclesia* might refer to either the local or the universal Church, and in many cases it is probable that Cyprian himself could not have settled the question, since he would affirm that the local community

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Obviously an association, as such, extends as far as, and no farther than, the 'intercommunion' of its members. An association that is *sui iuris* can temporarily limit or suspend the privileges of some of its members, or it can expel them from membership. Any individual, any group, that is outside the 'communion' is *pro tanto* outside the association, and the corporate acts of any group 'outside' are not the acts of the association itself, even if the members of the group are 'excommunicated' members of the association. A 'divided Church', if by that phrase is meant two groups of Christians, each with legitimate authority but not mutually recognized as possessing such legitimate authority, is a contradiction in terms, if we mean by 'the Church' what Cyprian meant. A 'dissociated association' is no more conceivable than a 'square circle'. Such considerations lie behind Cyprian's appeal to those Roman confessors who had chosen to follow Novatian rather than the bishop (Cornelius) who had been recognized by the Catholic communion as lawful successor of Peter:

Since our unanimity and concord ought by no means to be severed, because we cannot ABANDON THE CHURCH, GO OUTSIDE AND COME TO YOU, we pray and ask you . . . to RETURN TO MOTHER CHURCH (quoted above, p. 9).

In this passage 'mother church' (*ecclesia mater*) is probably the universal Church, while 'your brotherhood' (*vestra fraternitas*) is only called *ecclesia* because it is the universal Church at a certain place; it 'represents', is the real presence of, the Catholic Church in a given locality. The following are of course only a small portion of the occurrences of the word *ecclesia* in the writings of Cyprian, but they may serve to illustrate his usage: (*clerici*) *divinis rebus et spiritualibus occupati ab ecclesia recedere et ad terrenas et saeculares actus vacare non possunt* (Ep. i, 1; here *ecclesia* seems to mean the affairs of the local Church); *consulendum me existimasti . . . de histrione quodam . . . an talis debeat communicare nobiscum; quod puto neque maiestati divinae neque evangelicae disciplinae congruere, ut pudor et honor ecclesiae tam turpi . . . contagione foedetur* (Ep. ii, 1; here the dominant idea is probably the universal Church—note *nobiscum*, not *vobiscum*); *sic de ecclesia receditur, sic altare profanum foris collocatur, sic contra pacem Christi et ordinationem atque unitatem Dei rebellatur* (Ep. iii, 3; here *de ecclesia recedere* means 'to go into schism'); *ecclesiae gloria praepositi gloria est* (Ep. xiii, 1; the local church); *ad ecclesiam redire et cum episcopis . . . communicare* (Ep. xliii, 7; presumably the universal Church); *ecclesiae gubernacula* (Ep. xiv, 1; the local church)—interesting because in later Patristic centuries the bishop of Rome is described as the *gubernator* of the universal Church); *ecclesia nostra* (Ep. xv, 3; the local church, cf. Ep. xxxviii, 2; xl, 1); *non . . . ecclesiae unius aut unius provinciae sed totius orbis haec causa est* (Ep. xix, 2. Note that the question of reconciling the *lapsi* is *totius orbis causa*; might we not say that this is true *a fortiori* of the baptismal question? Does it not require a solution that is universally accepted? Can it be left to the varying judgements of individual bishops?)

may be the Roman local church; in returning to the latter the confessors would in fact be returning to the former.²⁸

For Cyprian, to be outside the one association, the single communion, which is the universal Church, is to be unqualified for salvation:

Whoever he may be, and whatever his qualities, a man who is not in Christ's Church IS NOT A CHRISTIAN.²⁹

Even martyrdom, which for a catechumen would be a 'baptism of blood', does not avail the heretic (nor, we may infer, the schismatic):

Nor does this baptism (sc. of blood) benefit the heretic, though he may have been put to death outside the Church for having confessed Christ . . . because SALVATION DOES NOT EXIST OUTSIDE THE CHURCH.³⁰

As he implies elsewhere, you cannot have God for your father unless you have the Church for your mother:

Where is that man born, and of what mother, and to what father, who is not a son of the Church? One should first have the Church as one's mother, in order that one may have God as one's father.³¹

²⁸ The idea of *communicatio* ('being in communion'; it involves both admission to the liturgical worship and the sacraments of the Church and participation in the social life of the community) is very frequent in Cyprian's correspondence. Here are a few examples: (The bishop Rogatianus is advised that if one of his deacons continues to insult him) *fungeris contra eum potestatem honoris tui, ut eum vel deponas* (sc. deprive him of his office) *vel abstineas* (deprive him of communion), (*Ep.* iii, 3); *consulte . . . fecisti . . . abstinendo diaconum* (*Ep.* iv, 4); *accepta communicatione ad ecclesiam admittantur* (*ibid.*); *quosdam (e lapsis) immoderatos esse et ad communicationem accipiendam festinanter urgere . . . ad ecclesiam introire festinent* (*Ep.* xix, 2; the paragraph as a whole shows that *communicationem accipere* is the same thing as *ad ecclesiam introire*, which, however, means here, as in *Ep.* iii, 3, to be admitted to the liturgical life of the Church); *quod si obstinate perseverant . . . sciant se cum hac sua impudica obstinatione numquam a nobis admitti in ecclesiam* (sc. *accepta communicatione*) *posse . . . spiritali gladio superbi et contumaces necantur, dum de ecclesia eiiciuntur. Neque enim foris vivere possunt, cum domus Dei una sit et nemini salus esse nisi in ecclesia possit* (*Ep.* iv, 4; this shows that excommunication is the same as expulsion from the Church and—unless there is a subsequent reconciliation—involves loss of salvation).

²⁹ *Ep.* lv, 24: *Quisquis ille est et qualiscumque est, christianus non est qui in Christi ecclesia non est.* Cf. *Ep.* iv, 4, quoted in the previous note.

³⁰ *Ep.* lxxiii, 21: *Nec hoc (sc. sanguinis) baptisma haeretico prodest, quamvis Christum confessus extra ecclesiam fuerit occisus . . . quia salus extra ecclesiam non est.*

³¹ *Ep.* lxxiv, 7: *Ubi et ex qua et cui natus est qui filius ecclesiae non est? Ut habere quis possit Deum patrem, habeat ante ecclesiam matrem.* It should be observed that Cyprian hardly considers the question which usually arises in a modern mind in connection with this doctrine of salvation's dependence on visible adherence to the visible Church, the question namely of those who in all good faith fail to see the necessity of such membership. Briefly, we say that, whereas in human law-courts *ignorantia legis non excusat*, divine justice does not 'impute' transgressions which are the result of inculpable ignorance.

ST CYPRIAN ON THE CHURCH

This fundamental necessity, a necessity for salvation, of entering by baptism, and remaining by 'communion' within the single world-wide association known as the Catholic or universal Church has an interesting consequence. It is not necessary, in order to dispose of any claims by an individual or group outside the single communion, to prove that he or it is heretical in doctrine. Outside the single communion one is manifestly in schism, and this by itself is a sufficient condemnation:

As regards Novatian personally, dearly beloved brother—for you asked me to tell you what heresy he had introduced—you must know, to begin with, that we ought not to concern ourselves with the contents of his teaching, since he teaches OUTSIDE (sc. the Church) . . . Boast as he may, and proclaim his philosophy and eloquence with proud speech, a man who has not clung to brotherly charity and ECCLESIASTICAL UNITY has lost even what before he was.³²

We may pause here to point out that on the principles stated by Cyprian, it must ensue that whatever doctrines the universal Church imposes as a condition of membership must be true. God wills our salvation. It is necessary for salvation that one should join and adhere to the Church, a concrete historical association. God therefore wills that we should accept the conditions *sine qua non* of such adherence. But the Church, like any other visible association, can and does impose conditions of membership; can and does exclude and reject from its membership. If the Church, then makes the acceptance of certain doctrines a universal condition of membership, God wills us to accept this condition, that is, to accept these doctrines. But God—in the objective order which is here in question—cannot will that we should accept falsehood as truth. The doctrines thus imposed are therefore true. The Church had already by Cyprian's time exercised its power of rejecting doctrines as false and excluding from its membership those who taught such doctrines. Cyprian's position is therefore, at least implicitly, infallibilist.

(To be continued.)

³² Ep. lv, 24: *Quod vero ad Novatiani personam pertinet, frater carissime, de quo desiderasti tibi scribi quam haeresim introduxisset, scias nos primo in loco nec curiosos esse debere quid ille doceat, cum foris doceat . . . lacet se licet et philosophiam vel eloquentiam suam superbis vocibus praedicet, qui nec fraternam caritatem nec ecclesiasticam unitatem tenuit etiam quod prius fuerat amisit.*

REFLEXIONS ON DEATH—II

THE REDEMPTION

By DOM SEBASTIAN MOORE

IN my last article¹, I tried to disengage the human way of looking at death from the confusions to which it is prone. These confusions result easily from the extraordinary difficulty inherent in our thinking about death. While death is, in one sense, totally excluded from our experience, it is yet most intimate to it. This paradox will have, unless we are on our guard, a most mischievous effect on our way of thinking: we shall tend to 'locate' death in a kind of no-man's-land beyond our experience—so that what is really *our* mystery, the mystery of ourselves, becomes a mystery of 'the beyond'. We turn ourselves inside out, and the mystery (perhaps it would be better to say the puzzle) of our own personal existence becomes, in its new position, the wrong sort of mystery. Set in this vague 'beyond', it borrows its mysterious quality from the reality that *is* beyond us, God. In becoming thus confused with the mystery of God, our thought of death falsifies both itself and God. The authentic religious experience, which is of what I called a 'near mystery' twined into the very roots of our flesh, and of a transcendent mystery transforming the tragic consciousness of the near mystery, gets hardened into an unfelt, impersonal 'mystery'. I want now to consider the effect of this hardening on the doctrine of the Redemption. It is this doctrine which forces us to associate in one statement the two realities of God and death, so we may expect that it will be in the formation and, above all, in the understanding of this statement that the evil effects of this unreal thinking will threaten most.

The object of this article is not to treat exhaustively of the doctrine of the Redemption, but only to indicate what seems to me an important corrective for our way of thinking about it. It is only with a view to this corrective that I shall refer to the history of the doctrine. The treatment here will be summary in the extreme, and I ask only whether my diagnosis of what tended to go wrong as theology developed has anything to be said for it.

¹ Autumn 1952, pp. 373-84.

‘The son of man came . . . to give his life as a ransom for many.’² That is the formal statement in scripture. The analogy is taken from the payment of a sum to buy the freedom of a slave. To whom was the payment made ? It was widely assumed by the early writers that it was made to the devil. This idea was expressed with varying degrees of crudity, and took its extreme form in Gregory of Nyssa. Gregory Nazianzen roundly accused his namesake’s exposition of blasphemy, and the scholastics turned resolutely away from it, insisting that the term of Christ’s redemptive action is not the devil but God.

This insistence was most necessary, but its implications were not fully realized. For it was not realized that in making Christ’s action look to God, not to the devil, the very idea of a *payment* has to be radically reformed. It does not suffice to say: ‘The debt was paid, not to the devil but to God’. All that God demanded of Christ was love, because God is love. But what, in that case, becomes of the ransom to which Christ himself refers ? Have we not spirited it away ? Let us look a little more closely at Nyssa’s idea. According to this the devil saw in death the emblem of his hold on man, and when Christ died he tried to assert his usual claim. This was his fatal mistake, for death had not here its usual hold. He was caught like a fish that misses the bait and swallows the hook. The bait was Christ and the hook was death. Now there is an important truth contained in this fantastic image: that the devil’s claim on man was a false claim, and that Christ’s ‘satisfaction’ of this claim was the annulling of it, the definitive exposure of its falsity. Thus the idea does not tie down Christ’s action to having the devil as its term. His action does not settle with the devil, it settles the devil himself. It breaks through him to God its unique proper term. Thus although the language of ‘payment to the devil’ is not adequate, when its poetry and irony are understood it leaves the way open to a conception of the Redemption that has God, not the devil, for its term. The way to bring out this divine teleology is not to transfer the payment from the devil to God. There is a confusion latent in the payment-to-the-devil idea, but as long as ‘payment’ is kept at Satan’s level the confusion can be turned to a good use as permitting a profound human insight into the

² Matt. xx, 28 : Mark x, 45.

Redemption. To transfer 'payment' to God is to tighten the confusion irrevocably and form a conception of the Redemption that is unworthy of God and irrelevant to man. This gives us the paradoxical result that such a revision of the patristic idea fails, on the one hand, to respect it and, on the other, to break sufficiently beyond it.

Now it seems to me that this tightening of the confusion is directly connected with that 'hardening' of the mystery of death which I have tried to describe. If there is a natural tendency to push back our death onto God and, correspondingly, to bring God down to meet it, may we not see this tendency at work in a facile revision of the patristic doctrine which pushes back Christ's 'transaction' at the human level onto God? The God who has got mixed up with death, *our* mystery, becomes the God who demanded Christ's death as satisfaction. Nyssa's image contains a profound respect for our human situation in all its oddity and (which is the same) for the biblical connexion between evil and death. And the maintenance of this respect is essential for a supple and penetrating idea of the Redemption.

There can be no question, however, of returning to this kind of imagery, by a theological *tour de force*. We have to rediscover in our own terms the human truth which it embodies. What sense is there in the 'debt to the devil'? The kind of experience that can make some sense of this phrase is a difficult thing to define, because it is a feeling of the oddness in human life which no two persons will experience in the same way. There is a charming instance of an individual waking up, in his own funny way, to the human situation, at the end of *The Family Reunion*. One of the absurdly conventional uncles says:

But I remember now, that I am always surprised
By the bull-dog in the Burlington Arcade.

What if every moment were like that, if one were awake?

While the experience of oddness is individual, it can be said in general that it is connected with death, and that it is released for the religious believer when he sees that he cannot 'use God' as taking care of the point where his existence borders on mystery, the point which is death. He comes to see that the 'world of spring

and autumn, birth and dying' to which he belongs is, in a real and very frightening sense, his own affair,³ that he is somehow responsible for it. He is not a patient in a well-ordered hospital: his role is active. It is as though he found himself on the hospital staff, but without papers or anything to regularize his position. He has a new sense of obligation. And if we said to him, 'You are coming to understand your duty towards others', he would not be satisfied. If we said, 'It is a deepening of your religious sense', he would reply that it does not feel like that kind of obligation. It doesn't quite tie up with his religious duty. He is afraid of it, but not quite in the way that he is afraid of 'the loneliness of the night of God'. And he has a strong premonition that, were he to surrender to it, he would be utterly lost.

The premonition is right. The 'seriousness' of the experience is, on its reverse side, a very bad joke. But we cannot simply 'decline' at this point, with Chestertonian good-sense. So let us be wary and prudent, and try to find out some more about our strange predicament. We observe, first, that many of our contemporaries seem to be agonizing over it. And in this connexion we make our first useful discovery. For we detect in much existentialist writing evidence that the exponents of anguish rather enjoy their position. Now any sort of enjoyment contradicts the experience we are concerned with. Unamuno's concern to communicate to us his spiritual vertigo revealed a complacency that accords ill with this condition. There seems to be a queer kind of law whereby the *expression* of existential 'freedom' is compelled to contradict the *experience* of it. This brings out the equivocal character of the thing we are dealing with. We have to take it seriously, yet the attempt to do so bypasses it and lands us in a fresh false position of security. It is like the officials with whom Kafka's characters are for ever trying to establish relations. At the crucial moment they blandly deny all knowledge of the case. There is no final engagement with them, yet there is no escaping their solicitations.

Before we proceed further there is a point that has to be cleared up. We have found, in our experience, a certain 'claim' on us that is not the claim of God. But is it clear that it is a 'claim of the

³ I became more conscious of this through reading *La peste* of Albert Camus. I cannot, however, locate this realization at any particular point in that great novel.

devil'? Have we yet made sense of the patristic idea? Is not the devil gratuitous, a kind of inverted *deus ex machina*? Yet when we probe deeper into this queer sense of obligation that refuses to tie up with our religious obligation and could, we feel, if we let it, make the latter seem less real, do we not see that it is an inverted *spiritual* experience? Lurking behind the experience is the 'Ape of God'. But having seen this we have to avoid the danger of a facile satanism—which is, among other things, one of the most fruitful sources of bad writing. Satan has his part in the 'near mystery', which is not the part of God, but to push the mystery onto him is as bad as to push it onto God.⁴

What, then, *is* the true setting for this experience? What is the context in which it can reiterate its original message and not veer off into that tragic expression which is, we have seen, its denial? How does one 'take it seriously'? It already appears that the experience can only survive as part of a wider or deeper vision.

That vision is of the Redemption. The obscure claim on man which is other than the lucid claim of duty and which has always fascinated the world is held in focus in the redemptive act of Christ. That act is simple, yet it embraces two planes. It involves a certain 'engagement' with the prince of this world, which is only elucidated on the other plane where we have nothing but simple love between the Son and the Father as 'before the foundation of the world'. But we have to remember that 'plane' language is one of the surest roads to unreal thinking, and it does not do justice here to the essential fact: which is that the love between the Son and the Father is manifest to us not simply as above the obscure 'claim' on man which I have tried to describe but as dissolving it.

⁴ The relation between the dread of death and the sense of evil presences is finely expressed in the later choruses of *Murder in the Cathedral*.

I have smelt them, the death-bringers, senses are quickened
By subtle forebodings . . . I have seen
Rings of light coiling downwards, leading
To the horror of the ape.

The following too is highly relevant to the experience I have been describing :

Sweet and cloying through the dark air
Falls the stifling scent of despair;
The forms take shape in the dark air:
Puss-purr of leopard, footfall of padding bear,
Palm-pat of nodding ape, square hyaena waiting
For laughter, laughter, laughter. The Lords of Hell are here.
They curl round, you, lie at your feet, swing and wing through the dark air.

We can clarify this crucial point by considering the statement: Christ gave himself to death for love, or out of love. This statement, then, is inadequate in so far as it implies merely that Christ accepted death as the father's will. If death is regarded only as God's will and not as the manifestation and operation of evil, the staking by evil of the 'claim' to which man is open, then we are making the term of Christ's love not the Father whom Christ triumphantly rejoins in his resurrection but a kind of 'God of this world': so that God features in the Redemption not as dissolving the claim of evil but as sanctioning it, presenting it to us with his signature and demanding its satisfaction as *his* satisfaction. The only language of redemption that this picture can supply is legal language. The whole thing operates at one remove from God and love, and so obscures the identity between God and love. It is not God whom Christ's love intends, but an obligation having God's signature. It is the hardening process again: the pushing back of our mystery onto God and the using God to fix, as it were, our mystery. It seems that a contrary 'softening' process is required, to bring our mystery back to its 'fluid' form (in which the existentialists play around with it) so that it can bear the stamp of Christ's love: that the mystery thus restored is the medium in which we are to lay hold of Christ and his work, and in which the person and the work can appear more and more as one: and that the most serious obstacle, for the believer, to understanding the necessity of redemption is the ingrained habit of regarding God as undersigning the world as we see it. The Redemption is the revelation of divine love, a love to which we are joined in the only conclusive dissolution of a claim which may lead us the existentialist dance or become, for the believer, divine love's counterfeit. The Redemption is not only a work of love: it is the primary revelation of what love *is*.

Is this not unpleasantly like the gnostic exaltation? The gnostics thought of God as an ineffable invader having nothing to do with the world which he invades. And indeed, what gives its energy and fascination to the gnostic jargon is the valid perception that the world as it engages us is, in a sense, our affair, not God's. Yet the gnostics elaborated their experience along a line which led to fantasy, for they interpreted it as demanding a division of Christ into an earthly Christ who simply succumbed to the world and a

heavenly Christ who simply transcended it. Whereas the present approach demands, before all, a laying-hold of the single Christ who spans by his sacrifice the gap which our experience cannot bridge between the equivocal claim of this world and the simple claim of God which is the claim of love. The gnostic *starts* from a valid experience of this world's claim as a reality separate (or that has somehow got separated) from the claim of God. But he then does a complete *volte-face* and calls himself a 'pneumatic' for whom this claim has no reality. Christ (the pneumatic or pleromatic Christ) becomes simply the revelation, or even only the confirmation of this unreality. For the Christian there is no such easy *a priori* statement of the unreality: it is Christ alone who reveals it: which means that at the heart of this revelation there is a *work* of Christ in which the world's claim is dissolved. We have seen from our experience, and from the equivocation that dogs the existentialists, that the world's claim has a very *odd* reality. It frightens us by its show of absoluteness, yet will not allow us to engage it as an absolute. In Christ we see it in its true position, as a *relative* reality: and this vision, if it is real, is a laying-hold of Christ himself. In this laying-hold, our engagement with the world reaches its full intensity yet loses its poisonous fascination. The void which fascinates is filled with a presence which draws as love draws: it becomes the medium in which we apprehend Christ's work, whose 'satisfaction' at our level opens out onto the simple love in which he meets the Father.

Thus the satisfaction of Christ joins us to God not by a process even analogously legal but by opening up, beyond the complexity of our world-knit situation, a new dimension where God is known not merely through his ordinances but in himself, as love.

So we, while we were in our spiritual childhood, were under the control of elemental forces. But when the right moment arrived, God sent his son, born by means of a human birth and consequently subject to the law, to redeem those who were subject to the law, in order that we might be made his sons by adoption. And once you became his sons God sent the Spirit of his son into your hearts to give expression to the fact of your sonship by addressing him as 'Our Father'.⁵

⁵ Gal. iv, 3-6. Bishop Wand's translation, *New Testament Letters*, p. 19.

And the love in which Christ performs his satisfaction is not so much the motivation of it as the wider reality into which it opens and which is manifest in the resurrection: Christ 'become a life-giving spirit'.⁶ And if we ask, at this point, whether this love is his love of the Father or his love of us or the Father's love for him, we become aware that the thing we are talking about does not break down into these various specifications. They lose their power to express distinct realities precisely as 'love' begins to mean more than 'the motive' and becomes the simple reality, the further dimension that the redemption uncovers and that presages the state when 'God shall be all in all'. But it cannot be overstressed that this wonderful simplification, this movement of our thought into sheer light, has as its principle the discipline whereby we 'appropriate' our death, liberating the thought of God from it, and at the same time contemplate death, in Christ, as of a piece with his simple union with the Father. The more death ceases to be, in our thought, 'what God requires', the more can we see, in and beyond Christ's death, the fulfilment of God's only real 'requirement' which is love.⁷

We might express this perception in different terms. There is a sense in which, for us, to our way of thinking, God does require death. For the habit of drawing down God to our death is no mere error of thought, corrigible as such. It evidences the reduced vision of God that is consequent upon our guilt. This is surely the essential meaning of the statement that by sin we exclude ourselves from God: that our very idea of God, and of how we are to be restored to his favour, is reduced to the scale of the closed human world we have created. We fall from love, but it is not at love that we aim our return. We think of the latter in terms of payment, for we think within the limits of a psychology dominated by guilt, which is, of course, a psychology dominated by death, doomed to move between the life which we have spoiled and lost the sense of and the death which, as it were, equalizes our failure but does not remedy it (for to destroy a spoiled thing is no remedy for its spoiling).

⁶ I Cor. xv, 45.

⁷ Christ does describe his passion as a fulfilling of the Father's command, but this command is referred to his sacrifice in its totality, in which death is not only suffered but dissolved. 'This my Father loves in me, that I am laying down my life, to take it up again afterwards. Nobody can rob me of it; I lay it down of my own accord. I am free to lay it down, free to take it up again; *this* is the charge which my Father has given me.' John x, 17-18.

Indeed, to explore the connexion between death and guilt is one way, and that perhaps the most important, of bringing out the effect, good or bad, which our thought of death will have on our idea of the Redemption. The natural, unredeemed response to the sense of guilt may be described in two ways: as a religious movement that has as its term something short of God, and as a desire, when faced with our sin, to annihilate ourselves. These two descriptions are strictly equivalent, two facets of one complex and painful experience. It may be described in another way: as the desire to 'get right' that has got beyond a purely clinical idea of integration and has been understood as a religious desire, but still fails to look beyond the subject; so that the religious element has the exact opposite of its proper effect; its terrible power, confined within the subject, produces a mentality that can convert a whole religious terminology into a morbid cult of self-destruction. Now this mentality appears in its basic form in the way in which we think of life and death. We turn wearily and, as we think, religiously, from the life which we have spoiled, to death felt as somehow compensating. Has not this mentality dogged the religious history of mankind? Is it not to this that we have to attribute the equivocal sense which the word 'sacrifice' has in its ordinary use, and the unfamiliarity which the Augustinian definition⁸ had when we first heard it? Surely these considerations are the necessary background for the Anselmian idea, become traditional, that 'mere man could not repair the harm done'. He could not rejoin God, because he was excluded from him in that fatal way which consists in thinking one has hold of him when in reality one is only projecting religiously one's own toils. He could not 'satisfy', precisely because he thought in terms of satisfying God. Christ, on the contrary, could 'satisfy' because the idea of satisfying God had no place in his sinless un-cramped nature. He did not welcome death in the way that man welcomes it on an unredeemed religious impulse.⁹ His satis-

⁸ *Opus quod agitur ut sancta societate inhaereamus Deo. De civitate, Dei lib. 10, cap. 6*

⁹ Theology will say the same thing more formally and abstractly with the statement that Christ did not *deserve* death. St Anselm recognizes this fact as essential to the Redemption. Because of it, Christ's undergoing death could be (what scripture affirms it to be) a work of love not obligation. But to define a work of love as a work of supererogation is still to recognize death as a divinely imposed obligation and to use this obligation as our yardstick. It does not show Christ's death as breaking, beyond the obligation with which man has bound himself, into God's world whose law is love.

faction can reach out into the darkness and grapple surely with the uncharted no-man's-land which is beyond our ordinary experience yet is not to be projected onto the God who is really beyond our experience. Even we, immersed in evil as we are, fascinated by the tragic element in life, can begin to suspect that our vision of God is a reduced vision, cramped by our death falsely understood. But it is in the death of Christ that the vision is effectively widened. So that Christ, risen out of man's death, can announce his God (the God who requires love not death, whose requirement is himself) as man's real God. 'I ascend to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God.'¹⁰

By setting the theology of the Redemption in the context of a corrected (in so far as it is given to us to correct it) vision of our death, we make it, assuredly, more difficult. We introduce a 'fluid' element which prevents us tying up the Redemption. But this is a small price to pay for making it a little more real to us. Christianity, in the end, does not offer us a closed system which we can grasp but a beatific object into which we can penetrate always more deeply. We can learn to contemplate the agony in the garden, seeing there our dread of suffering and death extended beyond the reach of our ordinary experience. For when we begin to see in death not a final fixed thing that just happens to us, but an invitation to an engagement that for ever evades us, we can see in Christ's *agon* this engagement in a final, almost unbearably lucid form. We have here more than the retreat-giver's vague 'vision of all the sin in the world' ('all down the ages'): an *agon* in a primary human yet unique sense: a struggle at a level of experience that is supremely man's concern yet which man either ignores, or projects onto God, or 'engages' falsely, tragically, out of a perverse love of danger. Perhaps it was to such a vision that El Greco had arrived when he produced his final version. For in the earlier versions the apostles' comparative smallness is a natural effect of perspective, while the picture in the National Gallery has them in the same perspective as our Lord but not enlarged. The artist has been deliberately unreal in order to bring out the deeper reality: that 'Jesus Christ is the only man', as Barth says, and that we are diminutive men. Christ's doing for us what we could not do for ourselves takes on

¹⁰ John xx, 17.

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another sense, a real sense. It ceases to mean some kind of transaction done for us somewhere in the background. It no longer involves our being told that, over and above our experience of ourselves, we have a self that has contracted a debt to God which it had too have paid for it, a debt whose enormity is suggested uniquely in terms of the greatness of the person offended (may I be forgiven the flippancy of suggesting, *à propos* of the explication that is sometimes given for this, that it is really worse to insult a peasant than to insult a prince?) Indeed the redemption *is* situated 'beyond our experience of ourselves', but we can learn progressively, by meditating on our death, to understand the inadequacy of this experience: so that as this understanding develops, and we find that with it we can penetrate further into the great scriptural and liturgical statements of the Redemption, we see that it is our real life (so ill-known by us) that is engaged by this mystery, and not a kind of theologico-legal personality.

There is indeed an increasing dissatisfaction with a legal presentation of the Redemption. But it does not suffice to appeal to 'other aspects' of the mystery: to tell ourselves that the Redemption is also, traditionally, liberation, reparation (of man), incorporation, translation into God's kingdom, etc. We have to tackle squarely that very point (satisfaction) on which theology has tended to go hard and legal. It is only when the work has been done here that the other scriptural ideas can have their full depth and vigour. There is nothing more *decevant* than to be offered, as we seem to be offered by contemporary continental reviews, the '*richesses indicibles*' of scripture, simply *in preference* to the theological problem which is being manifestly burked. Thus presented, they are Dead Sea fruit.

THE 'BAPTISM INVISIBLE' AND ITS EXTENT

By F. H. DRINKWATER

THE post-war years have seen various efforts in France, U.S.A., Spain and elsewhere to revive the never-quite-settled theological question about infants who die without the waters of baptism. For another of these discussions our gratitude is due to the Editor of the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, who opened his pages to it over a period of twelve months beginning November 1950. This discussion seemed of particular interest, and the purpose of the present article is merely to give some account of it, for readers who may not have read it when it appeared. The discussion was started (*I.E.R.*, November 1950) in the theological Notes and Queries section, which is conducted by the Rev. J. McCarthy, D.D. A letter signed 'Parochus' asked for Dr McCarthy's opinion of a theory propounded as a personal speculation (in the *Nouvelle Revue Theologique*, T.7, 1949, pp. 589-605) by the Abbé Boudes, and favourably commented on by Fr Felix Puzo, S.J., in a Barcelona periodical on catechetics.

Here is Abbé Boudes theory as summarized in the letter of Parochus:

'(i) That the teaching of the Church on the condition of infants who die unbaptized is neither definitive nor final. (ii) That as it was human solidarity with Adam which landed us all in original sin and its consequences, so also human solidarity with the Second and Greater Adam—Christ in His Incarnation and redemptive Sacrifice on Calvary—at least implies that those infants who blamelessly die without Baptism should not be excluded from the Beatific Vision. (iii) That the theological principle *Ecclesia supplet* can be applied in this case. The writers contend that as the Church supplies the act of faith which the infant presented for Baptism cannot itself make, there appears to be no valid reason why the Church cannot also supply the Desire of Baptism which the dying unbaptized infant cannot itself elicit.

I should be grateful for your opinion of the foregoing conclusions.'

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Dr McCarthy's opinion, given in the same issue of *I.E.R.*, covers seven pages. We shall quote from it later as to particular points. Briefly, however, he cannot admit that the question is an open one. The Church (2nd Council of Lyons, and other pronouncements) teaches that souls dying in mere original sin go to 'a special state or place' different from those who die in mortal sin; a place later referred to by Pius VI as '*limbus puerorum*'. If the children's limbo exists, children (argues Dr McCarthy) must be there. To admit a 'baptism of desire' supplied for them by the Church would be tantamount to making redemption automatic in their case, besides being in strange disharmony with the Church's urgent anxiety in practice to get infants baptized. Theologians are quite aware (he says) how hard it is to reconcile God's salvific will with the fate of these infants. 'But this difficulty cannot be solved by suggestions which run counter to received doctrine.' It is one of God's secret mysteries.

Whether or no Parochus was satisfied by Dr McCarthy's generously-proportioned answer to his query, he made no comment on it, and disappears from the correspondence. The argument was taken up, however, by another writer who signed himself Parochus II. And from this point we feel it better to drop any attempt to relate the discussion as a continuous narrative, which in a correspondence of that kind, with such a mêlée of writers and reasons, would be confusing and unreadable. Instead we shall separate the various threads that arose in the discussion and summarize them each under a separate cross-heading. More or less as follows:—

1. The salvific Will of God: does God will the salvation of these infants? (N.B.—For brevity, in the present article 'these infants' always means the infants who die unbaptized with water or with martyrdom.)
2. The number of these infants: how numerous are they in relation to the whole human race?
3. The necessity of Baptism: in what sense is it necessary for salvation?
4. Christ the second Adam: do these infants share in this solidarity of mankind?
5. The children's limbo: is its existence an article of faith?

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6. Ecclesiastical law and practice: how far are they a decisive guide here?
7. The consent of theologians: how far can this be regarded as the Church's teaching?
8. God's Justice and Wisdom: how do they appear in regard to these infants?

1. *Does God will the salvation of these Infants?*

To this all parties in the discussion say yes, because God wills the salvation of all men. The difference is that Abbé Boudes and Parochus II treat this fact as a vital truth to be pressed in argument for all it is worth, whereas for Dr McCarthy it is a perplexing difficulty to be solved only in the next life. Usually (as in November 1950, p. 400 and January 1951, p. 62), he prefers to speak of God's 'wish' or 'desire' to save all men. 'It is of course the teaching of Catholic theology' [wouldn't it have been better to say 'of the Catholic Church?'] 'that Christ died for all men, that He wishes all to be saved'. Such a wish, Parochus II comments, appears rather a mockery if after all only a tiny percentage of mankind has any real chance of salvation, and if the vast majority of those who die in infancy have no chance at all (January 1951, p. 64). Well, says Dr McCarthy (*ibid.*, p. 62) it is quite true that God might have chosen other much more effective ways of bringing his salvation to individual men. It is not for us to say what God *might* do, but what he *has* done. He died for all men and 'He provided the means whereby all men can be saved'. All presumably except the unbaptized infants, for there seem to be no effective means provided for *them* if the customary theology is the last word. Precisely, says Dr McCarthy: 'We know . . . that unbaptized infants, without any fault on their part are deprived of these means' (November 1950, p. 443). Any apparent contradiction between this and the salvific will of God is just a mystery, for light on which we must wait until the life to come (March 1951, p. 256). This would be more convincing (one feels perhaps) if Catholic tradition had not already invaded the area of the mystery by recognizing the 'baptism of blood' even in the case of infants.

2. *How numerous are these infants in relation to the whole human race?*

This is a matter on which rightly or wrongly considerable stress is laid by Parochus II:

'Even to-day, of all the infants who die throughout the world, only (perhaps) ten per cent are baptized. If we reckon the unnumbered centuries since Adam, the percentage of baptized infants must be infinitesimal. This consideration was unknown to the Middle Ages, which had little realization of the vast pagan world of Asia, Africa and America, and no realization of the long ages of mankind before Christ. This is fresh knowledge, which ought to have its effect in our guesses about the salvific will of God. The new knowledge seems to deprive the received opinion of most of its intrinsic probability; or, at any rate, it ought to cause theologians not to be too dogmatic in excluding from heaven the vast majority of infants created by God 'to be happy with him for ever.'

Dr McCarthy passed over this point in his first answers, but when it had been reiterated his comment was:—

'The appeal to numbers is merely sentimental. It has always been realized that there were countless people, among them very many infants, whom, through no fault on their part, the fruits of Christ's universal Redemption did not reach. This limitation is inherent in the means chosen by God to bring salvation to men.'

One must agree, of course, with Dr McCarthy that numbers make no essential difference to the problem; God is God, and if he had chosen to create a world in which every soul except the Redeemer himself should be lost, no creature could rightly blame the Creator or question his wisdom. Still the creature might be expected to scrutinize such a theory very closely if it were offered by some fellow-creature, and offered as being a revelation from God.—And incidentally, is it true to say, as Dr McCarthy says, that there are countless people, besides infants, who *through no fault of their own* have never been reached by the fruits of Christ's universal redemption? What about that angel who (according to Aquinas) would be sent to any soul of goodwill if there were no other way open? Any soul that has reached the use of reason has some chance of attaining implicit supernatural faith and baptism

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of desire. The infants who die are going to have no such chance, and that is why they constitute a special problem as regards God's wisdom, and a special opportunity for his mercy.

3. *In what sense is baptism necessary for salvation?*

This question naturally underlies the whole discussion; the reason Dr McCarthy gives for rejecting Abbé Boudes theory is that it 'does not fit in with the received doctrine of the Church on the necessity of baptism'. The Church's doctrine on the necessity of baptism (as Dr McCarthy points out) is founded on our Lord's words especially to Nicodemus in John iii, 5; and the Council of Trent says that since the promulgation of the Gospel the state of Grace is not to be attained '*sine lavacro regenerationis aut ejus* *potio*' (Sess. vi, c 4). Nevertheless, it is obviously necessary to go carefully with these primary sources so as not to strain their interpretation. If for instance, one interpreted quite woodenly our Lord's words to Nicodemus, without such corrections as John xiv, 12, they would exclude any baptism of desire (and why not regard Mark x, 14 as yet another corrective, if it comes to that?). Similarly by strict wooden interpretation the Council of Trent's words quoted above could be made to exclude the baptism of blood for infants. As regards the present discussion about infants, it is accepted by both sides that baptism by water is necessary, in the sense of being the divinely-appointed way into sanctifying grace, the normal way for all which nobody has any right to by-pass. Does this mean we must also insist that God has not left himself free to by-pass it if he wishes? The language used by some theologians seems to involve such an assertion, but would it not be just the kind of cocksureness that theology ought to avoid? In any case, both sides accept that for infants who are martyred the baptism of blood is available. How (we might ask) is this fact known? For adults the baptism of blood was never really needed, since it is easily reducible to the baptism of desire. (It is interesting to note that Pope Innocent II, in the twelfth century, quotes St Augustine and St Ambrose that baptism 'is administered invisibly' when necessity and not contempt for religion precludes its being given. Such phrases, once introduced, were extended to infant martyrs [one must suppose] by a kind of

happy intuition on the part of the Church, which must have been first expressed in the guess of some perhaps long-forgotten writer or preacher and joyfully accepted by everybody.)

The baptism of blood, then, makes one loop-hole, one exception to the general rule, for these infants. The question arises, could there be another variety of 'baptism invisible'? some other form of baptism by desire? Cajetan thought there could: he thought that the desire of Christian parents for their child's baptism might supply for the lack of sacramental water. This view was left uncondemned by the Council of Trent (says Dr McCarthy, following Pallavicini; *I.E.R.*, November 1950, p. 442), for the strange reason that Cajetan's opinion '*ad baptismi doctrinam non spectabat*'. Nevertheless, later on de Soto qualified it as heretical and Pius V ordered it to be deleted from Cajetan's works.

But even if Cajetan's opinion were true the only dying infants who would benefit by it, would be the children of Christian parents; the 'uncounted billions' of the non-Christian parents would still be out in the cold, through no fault of their own. Here comes Abbé Boudes therefore with his deeper, more cosmic, more Christocentric theory, that perhaps, since these infants have no other chance of sharing in Christ's universal redemption, the desire of Christ himself and of his Church may, for all we know, be allowed to supply a *votum baptismi*, a 'baptism invisible' as Pope Innocent II would have called it, that will take the place of baptism by water.

To this Dr McCarthy has several objections to make; objections which he regards as fatal. In the first place he refuses to allow that there can be any mere possibilities in this matter. Either these children can be saved or not (he seems to say) and theology is quite able to decide which it is. 'The argument cannot stop at the mere possibility. It must pass on to the fact. If these infants can be saved, then they are saved—otherwise God's salvific will is in jeopardy as are His wisdom and the doctrine of the Incarnation and the Mystical Body' (*I.E.R.*, October 1951, p. 321). *Atqui* (he seems to argue) we are certainly not sure that God *will* save them; therefore we are sure that they *cannot* be saved. There seems to be something over-dogmatic about such a line of argument. After all Abbé Boudes is not required to prove that his theory is true—nobody could prove that—presumably he offers it only as a possible

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path which God's salvific Will could take if it wished to reach these infants *de facto*, without falsifying Christ's words to Nicodemus.

A further objection brought forward by Dr McCarthy is that if these infants were saved through the Church's desire for their baptism, their redemption would be too 'automatic'. He means that 'the merit and graces won by Christ are there for all, but application of them has to be made to the individual'. Well (Abbé Boudes would say) application *is* made to the individual who is dying because the Church desires it for that individual. No (says Dr McCarthy) that would be tantamount to an automatic application. The desire of the Church for the baptism of dying infants must be considered as being always operative. There could never be a dying infant, of any age, in any part of the world, for whom the Church would not supply the *votum Baptismi*. The Church can be conceived as acting in this matter only in a global fashion, not as specially intervening to formulate, *toties quoties*, a *votum Baptismi* for each infant. So that, on analysis, this *votum Ecclesiae* is really no more than the earnest echoing of the wish of its Divine Founder that all men be saved.

'And why not?' one may surely ask, 'What else should the Church desire?' (this is the comment of Parochus II) 'Dr McCarthy seems to object to the word *automatic*, but one could easily think of some more seemly expression to meet the case: "infallible" perhaps; or "efficacious", or "*ex opere operato Christi sanguinis*".'

Perhaps after all we can ignore the word 'automatic', for Dr McCarthy re-states his objection in different terms. He cannot admit such a thing as a baptism of desire based on the desire of the Church (*votum baptismi ex parte ecclesiae* because traditionally the *votum baptismi* has always been used in the sense of a *personal* votum, the desire of an individual adult. 'The assertion that a non-personal *votum* suffices is entirely foreign to Christian tradition' and 'this is the only kind of *votum* which is conceivable in the case of infants, since they are incapable of a personal act.' If Abbé Boudes points to the Church supplying the act of faith for a living infant at the font, Dr McCarthy replies that here we have 'the personal application to the infant of a rite instituted by Christ'. And as for infant martyrdoms, 'we have the destruction out of hatred for Christ of the individual life'. 'Thus in both cases there is

an individualization, a special personal factor which is entirely lacking in the theory of the social *votum baptismi* advanced by Abbé Boudes' (*I.E.R.*, November 1950, p. 441).

If Abbé Boudes had been taking part in the discussion, he would no doubt have replied that the Church's *votum baptismi* would not be promiscuous and global, but would be sufficiently individualized by the fact that this or that individual child is dying without any chance of salvation except baptism through the Church's *votum*. In the theologian's view (the Abbé might say) the child may be just one of an undistinguished crowd; to the Creator who made that soul for eternal joy, to God's Son who saw in Gethsemane each and every soul he was giving his life for, the child was redeemed as an individual, and every infant unbaptized with water can say 'He loved *me* and delivered Himself for *me*'. But doubtless this would be just another lapse into the sentimental, and Parochus II was well-advised to restrict himself to the remark that 'infants who don't die will have a chance of baptism by the individual desire if they should miss baptism by water' (*I.E.R.*, January 1951, p. 65)) (Dr McCarthy had urged the point that if the Church's desire can be a substitute for water, it could apply to healthy infants just as much as to dying ones.)

It is surely undeniable that what you might call the everyday teaching in the Church—the pulpits, the text-books, some catechisms perhaps, the routine directives of authority—have always spoken as if these infants are excluded from heaven. But it is also surely undeniable that the everyday teaching spoke in this way, not as announcing a piece of the revealed Good News, but rather as the conclusion of a syllogism, as thus:

'All who die in original sin are excluded from heaven.

But these infants die in original sin.

Therefore these infants are excluded from heaven.'

The major premiss may fairly be called of faith, since the Church has officially interpreted our Lord's words to Nicodemus (John iii, 5), in the strict sense. As for the minor, it was taken for granted as being a fact of common observation. But is it? What common observation observes is the outward happening; we do not perceive what goes on in the spirit-world and in the soul. A man down the street has lived in sin and died refusing the sacra-

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ments, can we safely say he has died in mortal sin ? No, the very most we can say is that as far as we know he did not die in a state of grace. Of these infants we can say that as far as we know, as far as we are told by the Faith, they would have gained no right to heaven, and we can only leave them to the mercy of God. That is quite different from saying that we know for certain that they are excluded from heaven, and still more different from saying that their merely natural happiness is an article of the Catholic Faith. The minor of the above syllogism was uncertain and therefore so was the conclusion.

You may say indignantly: but what else *can* these infants die in, except original sin? The champions of the infants could reply imperturbably that there are at least three possibilities put forward by three entirely respectable theologians: Cajetan, Klee, Boudes: take your choice, or think out a better theory, but don't say that the minor of the above syllogism is self-evident.

4. *How do these infants share in the headship of the Second Adam?*

This is the doctrine to which Abbé Boudes appeals to support his theory; let us state it in the words of Dr McCarthy himself. It is the teaching of Catholic theology, he says, that Christ 'wishes all to be saved, that he has a headship over all, that there is a law of solidarity of the human race with Christ—a solidarity which completely transcends that which exists between Adam and his posterity'. He does not deny Abbé Boudes' contention that these infants are included in this solidarity. But he reiterates the teaching of St Thomas that these infants though created for a supernatural end, are deprived of it, but 'they will not grieve in any way at the loss of the beatific vision since they were never conditioned to attain it'. 'Never conditioned' is Dr McCarthy's translation of St Thomas's word 'nunquam proportionati'. Abbé Boudes might reasonably ask what these words mean exactly. What indeed can they mean, except 'not in a state of grace'? And that (the Abbé could say) is just what is in question, so it must not be used as an argument.

On this topic of solidarity in Christ, Dr McCarthy's final words is as follows:

'In the divine dispensation of grace there is no such thing as the salvation of men *in globo*. Each individual must be linked

up with Christ; each must be raised to the supernatural order. And the sole divinely appointed means whereby this individual and personal result can be achieved is baptism *in re vel in voto*. For this we have the express statements of Sacred Scripture and the solemn definitions of the Church. In these sources the possibility of a *votum Baptismi* is envisaged only in regard to adults.'

Is there some sign of hesitation in the last sentence? 'Envisaged' is not the kind of word that settles anything. Many things not 'envisaged' in the New Testament and the Fathers have nevertheless been discovered in that treasury out of which the Church brings new things and old.

5. *Is the existence of a limbus puerorum a matter of Faith?*

Dr McCarthy lays great stress on the *existence* of an intermediate state or place called the limbo of children, which nowadays can be identified with a state of natural happiness, though in earlier ages the official pronouncements speak rather in terms of a milder punishment. 'The existence of a limbus puerorum is not a mere theological theory or hypothesis but *part of the doctrine of the Church*' (italics ours). 'The Church would be little concerned to maintain the existence of a *limbus puerorum* which is empty. It is Catholic teaching that God has provided a *limbus puerorum* as He has provided a hell for the damned. It is not credible that the Church should *enunciate the doctrine* stated, if no one were ever to enter these places. The Church maintains the existence of a *limbus puerorum* because it believes that infants *do* die in original sin and *do* go there.' To prove these statements Dr McCarthy appeals to the second Council of Lyons, and Pope John XXII, who speak of it however, as part of hell with milder punishment for those who die in original sin. 'Precisely!' says Parochus II 'We are all agreed that those who die in original sin cannot enter heaven. The present discussion is about whether infants who die without baptism by water or blood *do* die in original sin, or more strictly, it is about whether this can be asserted as dogmatically as some people are beginning to assert it.' Dr McCarthy accepted this (with a reservation as to the last five words) as a correct statement of the point at issue. But when Parochus II headed one of his letters

'The Fate of Infants Unbaptized by Water', Dr McCarthy described it as 'a somewhat tendentious caption'.

However, the authority he chiefly relies upon is Pius VI, condemning in 1794 a proposition of the Jansenist synod of Pistoia (1786). The Jansenists had suggested that the limbo of children, consisting of pain of loss without any pain of fire, was just the same as the Pelagian fable of an intermediate state between heaven and hell. Pius VI condemns this proposition (not as heretical but) as '*falsa, damnosa, in scholas catholicas injuriosa*' (Denzinger-Umberg No. 1526).

On this Parochus II urged that when making arguments out of condemned propositions and such-like official pronouncements, we must be careful to consider them in their proper setting of period and circumstance.

'The Jansenists disliked the *limbus puerorum* because it seemed to them too merciful; they wanted to stick to St Augustine, either heaven or hell-fire for everybody, no half-and-half measures; the Church condemned them for being too hard on babies. But if Abbé Boudes dislikes the idea of a *limbus puerorum* (I haven't read him as a matter of fact) it is for the exactly opposite reason to the Jansenists—that it isn't merciful enough. That particular condemnation was aimed at the Jansenists, certainly not at Abbé Boudes.'

As a matter of fact, even Parochus II seems to us to be reading too much into the condemnation of this Jansenist proposition. If the whole proposition is read attentively, it becomes clear that the condemner is not thinking about the babies at all, but about the insult to Catholic theological schools in identifying an opinion of theirs with a Pelagian one.

But Dr McCarthy will not have any of this: 'The denial of a *limbus puerorum* was the offence condemned. It does not matter by whom it was denied or why.' He admits, however, that the authoritative statements on this subject 'are less solemn, it is true. But then, if they were solemn definitions our conclusions would have been too easy and Parochus II wouldn't have lifted up a single stone against us.'

The impartial observer may agree with Dr McCarthy that the Church has given some encouragement to the idea of a children's

limbo, but may also agree with Parochus II that this was more by way of according a blessing to what seemed then a merciful bit of theological theorizing than to incorporate the theory wholesale into her official teaching.

6. *How far is the Church's practice a decisive guide in this matter?*

There are many things in Catholic liturgy, discipline and pastoral theory, which reflect the doctrine of the necessity of baptism. Funeral rites, for instance, are not allowed for infants who die unbaptized, the usual joyful prayers would be out of place since the Church feels no assurance—to say the least—of their salvation. Dr McCarthy naturally makes an argument out of this, and out of other points of pastoral practice or text-book theory, some of which have found their way into the canon law. 'If the theory [i.e., of Abbé Boudes] be admitted, there would no longer be any real need as far as their salvation is concerned, to worry about the Baptism of dying infants. Why trouble to baptize all aborted human fetuses, however monstrous and *quovis tempore editi*, or to baptize in danger of death, the children of infidels, heretics and schismatics, *etiam invitis parentibus*? Why should parents or anybody else, be burdened with the grave anxiety and obligation to have infants baptized without delay, since these infants if they die in infancy would be saved, Baptism or no Baptism?'

To which Parochus II answers :

'Nobody is asking for the theory to be "admitted" if by this is meant accepted as a fact. It can scarcely be more than a hopeful possibility. But if the possibility were "admitted" it might perhaps, lift from some parents some worry and anxiety, and so far so good; for must we really imagine that our Lord instituted Baptism in order to add to people's worries? But it is a mistake to think that parents would get careless about baptism: on the contrary they would argue: "We don't know what happens to unbaptized children, but we have our Lord's promise of heaven to the baptized, so we must make sure of that promise for our children".'

As for uterine baptisms, and the other cases mentioned, Parochus II comments:

'Regulations and customs should arise out of doctrine, not the other way round. If canon lawyers and moral theologians

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have imposed such practices as these, it is because the practices have seemed to follow logically from the received theory of dogmatic theologians. If the received theory were modified, possibly some of the above practices might seem less urgent, and it would remain to be seen whether the Church's mind would make any modifications in discipline and custom.'

It is worth adding that the new Ritual for Germany, approved by the Holy See, has a special form of churching for mothers when the child was born dead or died afterwards. It prays that mother and child may rejoice together in the kingdom of heaven, nor is any reference made to whether the child was baptized or not.

7. *How far can the agreement of theologians be regarded as the teaching of the Church?*

This interesting question arose during the discussion as a kind of side-issue, if indeed it is not the root-question out of which the other has grown. Is it possible that some belief (e.g. the eternal destiny of unbaptized infants) might be too hastily taken for granted as being of faith, for want of fuller knowledge or fuller examination? On this point the Vatican Council is not vague: a thing is not to be regarded as taught by the 'ordinary and universal magisterium' unless it is taught 'as being revealed by God'—'tanquam divinitus revelata', and this of course would have to apply equally to any universal and constant consent of theologians if claimed as an indication of the Church's revealed teaching. But what language do the theologians themselves use when they come to describe this momentous kind of theological consent, which in practice carries unlimited weight and may well be echoed by Popes and Bishops? Van Noort in his *De Fontibus Revelationis*, n.207 and 255, as reported by Dr McCarthy, stipulates that for such a consensus, the doctrine should be taught 'as being certain, for a mere opinion does not bind, even if universal'. Also he requires that the theologians should teach it ('saltem aequivalenter' whatever that means) as being 'so bound up with revelation that it cannot be questioned without danger to faith or religion'. Or, still more vaguely, they should teach it 'as pertaining to the faith'. Tanquerey says they should teach it 'as something to be held by Catholic faith'; this is

more concise, but as a criterion of *what* is of faith it does not get us much further. As for Dr McCarthy, he warns us that such a universal consensus 'does not admit of exact mathematical definitions' (*I.E.R.*, October 1951, p. 321), but like Van Noort says that it 'must have reference to a doctrine as certain and not as a mere opinion, and to a doctrine which is proposed as pertaining somehow to Catholic revelation and faith'. This is even vaguer than Van Noort, for almost anything could be represented as 'pertaining somehow' to the faith! By this time we are a long way from the clear-cut phrase of the Vatican Council 'tanquam divinitus revelata'. Would it be unfair comment to say that the maximizing vagueness on the part of the theologians at this very critical point has the effect of unduly enlarging the area on which they themselves (when agreed amongst themselves) are to be regarded as infallible for practical purposes?

With all this in mind, can we try to sort out these various points as they concern these infants?

Here are four propositions:

- a. 'Baptism (by water or by desire) is necessary for passing from original sin to a state of grace.'
- b. 'Baptism by desire means by personal desire and these infants are not capable of it.'
- c. 'These infants do actually die in a state of original sin.'
- d. 'These infants are deprived of the beatific vision, and have no natural happiness in Limbo.'

All these propositions, according to Dr McCarthy, must be included in the 'true and accepted teaching of the Church'='the received doctrine of the Church'='the traditionally accepted doctrine of the Church'='that teaching which is contained in the deposit of faith and which has been handed down and taught as revealed by the living ordinary and universal ecclesiastical magisterium' (*I.E.R.*, May 1951, p. 456).

Thus propositions *b*, *c* and *d*, which seem to Parochus II debatable, are closed questions for Dr McCarthy. He argues backwards from *d* to *c*. (The Church teaches that Limbo exists, therefore the Church teaches implicitly that there must be infants in it, see *I.E.R.*, May 1951, p. 455), and from *c* to *b*. (If the Church

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believes these infants die in original sin, it shows that Christian tradition interprets 'desire' in the strictest personal sense (*I.E.R.*, November 1950, p. 441.)

Certainly all this is an argument of sorts, but it may seem to some a complicated building to erect on the foundation of a condemned Jansenist proposition and an opinion of St Thomas. If it is all just an opinion of theologians, it can take its chance along with other opinions down the centuries, but if Dr McCarthy claims that it is all 'contained in the deposit of faith and handed down and taught as revealed' we may be justified in asking him for weightier arguments both from ecclesiastical authority and from theological consent.

It may be of interest to add that Cardinal Gasparri's Catechism (qu. 359) says that 'the souls of those who die without baptism but in a state of original sin only, lack the vision of God, but do not suffer other penalties such as are received for personal sins'. In an appendix, p. 452, he calls this doctrine *the one generally held in the Church to-day*.

8. Which opinion about these infants accords best with the justice and wisdom of God?

Of those who seek to discover a possibility of heaven for these infants, some are moved chiefly by sympathy for the children themselves, which is nothing to be ashamed of. It might be described as a kind of loyalty to our common human nature, which leads any generous-hearted person to feel like refusing privileges which are denied to his friends. An old and much-loved parish priest who died this summer was noted amongst his friends for his profound distress about these infants. Lying on his deathbed he would say 'Just wait till I get to the Gate of Heaven—I'll worry St Peter for a big tub of water and then I'll set to work and baptize all those babies'. This good P.P. would certainly have approved of another theory, propounded by a certain Professor Klee (it is mentioned several times by Dr McCarthy) that these infants are saved through a special illumination from God at the moment of dying. Others are moved more by their compassion for the Catholic mother, who (after all her other worries, which God knows are

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enough!) is liable to this extra anxiety before childbirth and sometimes great mental distress afterwards for a whole lifetime. Parochus II mentions this, but he seems to be chiefly concerned with saving God's reputation (so to speak) for fair dealing.

'There seems' (he says, *I.E.R.*, January 1951, p. 66), 'no realization that the received view seems injurious (so to speak) to the character of God. It makes God seem unfair, and even (forgive the blasphemy!) lacking in wisdom, since the means He takes to attain His purpose (salvation for all mankind) seems so inefficacious. Now, of course, such feelings are wildly untheological. God is God, and whatever He does is right, and far beyond our question. If He likes to condemn the innocent with the guilty, who shall complain? Nevertheless, it is He who has given us our sense of justice and equity, of what is fair or not fair. As Abraham says to God, in Monsignor Knox's translation: "That is not how the Judge of the whole earth executes justice!" And if there is a way of showing not only that justice is done by God, but also that it is seen to be done, then why should we not look hopefully to the theologians to find such a way, and to the Church to give her sanction to a fresh point of view, as in the end only she can?'

Here is Dr McCarthy's reply:

'Parochus II thinks we should have made an effort to explain how God's justice and character are vindicated in the accepted theory that infants who die unbaptized cannot go to heaven. In fact, he thinks that we didn't realize that the received view "seems injurious so to speak, to the character of God" and "makes God seem unfair". He is quite right in this. We didn't realize that and we don't. We know that there is, there must be, some good explanation, which we cannot fathom.'

This immediate recourse to mystery is all very well, but one cannot help reflecting that Aquinas and others were not being satisfied with it when they elaborated their idea of natural happiness to replace the older idea of a milder kind of suffering. What were they doing, if not trying to save God from seeming unfair? They were using God's justice and wisdom as a positive argument *ex convenientia*, as Parochus II does, and as Dr McCarthy, in his final word on the subject (*I.E.R.*, October 1951, p. 325) definitely refuses to do.

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A Summing Up

Can we now pull the threads together and elucidate the main points of difference?

Perhaps the area of agreement is still more important: all agree that, since Pentecost at any rate, the attaining of grace and salvation is always in some way through baptism; all agree that only the authority of the Church could say that final word about these infants, and has not said it yet. Disagreement is about whether the now-customary solution, namely natural happiness in Limbo, is final truth or interim conjecture. Dr McCarthy says that it is revealed truth, worked out at last by the theologians, backed up by some non-solemn utterances of ecclesiastical authority: Parochus II says that it is an edifice of theological theory which attempts to cover all the facts, and points to other theological theories which he thinks cover the facts better. The discrepancy seems to arise because the two contestants are concentrating on a different set of facts. Dr McCarthy's facts are practically all facts of extrinsic authority, words of scripture, of ecclesiastical pronouncements or laws, of theological writings; for him these facts come first and foremost, and must be given the fullest possible weight. Parochus II seems to regard these non-solemn ecclesiastical pronouncements as indecisive progressive reflexions of theological development, and the facts he concentrates on are what he would no doubt call the great permanent facts of God's justice and mercy, the Incarnation and its consequences, our Lord's purpose in Baptism.

Postscript on a Would-be-Convert

Our account of this discussion would not be complete without mention of an odd episode which happened in the middle of it. A short letter was printed from a correspondent who signed himself Decanus (*I.E.R.*, March 1951, p. 255). His story was that some time ago he felt obliged to refuse to receive into the Church a prospective convert whom he was instructing. This candidate rejected, as utterly incompatible with the Divine Goodness and Justice, the common teaching on the *Limbus Puerorum*. He was willing to accept it in the unlikely hypothesis that it became at some future date a solemnly defined article of faith. Further than this he would not go. He maintained that he was entitled to hold,

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and did hold, that, in ways in which it had not pleased Almighty God to reveal to us, all unbaptized infants were admitted to the Beatific Vision.

Referring the case to higher authority, Decanus was told to decide for himself whether the candidate were rightly disposed. So he told the candidate he could not be received and he remained a non-Catholic, but having often since worried about it, Decanus now asked Dr McCarthy whether he had done right.

Dr McCarthy gives his opinion, which is that speaking for himself and taking everything into account, especially the genuine goodwill of the candidate in being ready to accept a future definition, he 'would have decided that the candidate was fundamentally *rite dispositus*, and would have received him into the Church'. But he would have tried to explain to him that we should be satisfied with the actual data of revelation, and wait for the next life to explain apparent contradictions between one revealed doctrine and another.

Naturally Parochus II did not fail to point out the inconsistency of saying that the children's Limbo is a revealed doctrine and yet of receiving into the Church a convert who persists in refusing to believe it. 'Are we to enforce on the ordinary faithful', he asked, 'a belief which we don't insist upon in the case of a convert?' It is a fair question, and might be asked about other points as well as this one. But Dr McCarthy was not to be drawn further. He had not 'whittled down' the Church's teaching about Limbo for converts; it was (he said) merely a matter of using charity, consideration, prudence and tact in solving particular cases (*I.E.R.*, October 1951, p. 323).

THE APOSTOLIC ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE¹

By LANCE WRIGHT

As this is a privileged occasion I am going to concern myself chiefly with one thing: the Church's Apostolic failure at the intellectual level. For I take the view that the present crisis in religion is essentially an intellectual crisis; that Man has not grown morally worse or willingly disaffected to God; but that he is assailed by intellectual difficulties of an unprecedented kind.

The situation deserves describing in some detail because I believe that from it can be got a workable idea of what kind of person the Graduate should be and what he should be doing.

But though what happens in the world of Thought is a key to everything in life, it would be wrong to think of the intellectual apostolate as being separate from the general apostolate; and for this reason I want to take as my point of departure that commonplace 'The Apostolate of the Milieu by the Milieu'; and to apply it to our case. I do so the more readily because this question of milieu is one of the figurative rocks on which the Newman Association has evidently struck very hard. Not so much in her apostolic work—for this has been too discreet to deserve the name—but in her day to day existence. Because behind this 'rule of the Milieu' lies the truth that Man tends to pass his days between a small number of limited societies. Normally there is one centering round his family life, another centering round his work and, in England at least, where sport has tended to prize recreation and family life apart, a third round his leisure. It was on the tip of my tongue to add to these a fourth: that of the Parish, but though this is a milieu commanded by God it would be contrary to the truth to suggest that the average Catholic 'is present' in his Parish in any real sense.

These three centres, family, work and leisure, are nodal points in the life of the ordinary man or woman and determine the bent of their life. It is indeed possible to add to them—in the long run it is a matter of life and death that we add—the Parish; but we

¹ The substance of a talk given at the Newman Association Summer School at the Cité Universitaire, Paris, in August, 1952.

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can only add with difficulty; and the effect on the human person as it is far reaching, may do a great deal of harm. We have all of us, at some time or other experienced the dissipating effect of having too many divergent interests. Therefore when we come to think about the organization of Catholic life it is all important that we take these existing 'nodes' into account. Do not compel a man to go—physically—out of his way to do his apostolic work: for the normal inference is that God desires him to do it where he is already.

Now the University Graduate has no one milieu which is peculiar to himself as a Graduate. He has his home, his work and his leisure like any other man or woman. But he is not characteristically gregarious in the sense that he consorts regularly and naturally with other graduates. There are, of course, exceptions: the common room for those who teach is one. But these cannot obscure the fact that the *characteristic* situation of the Graduate is that of a solitary dispensing his gifts to non-graduates: he does not normally go out of his way to spend time with other University people—and certainly not with those working outside his field: he has no common rallying point. Perhaps he should have one. But the need is not self evident; life turns over without it. The ideal of a 'Grand Society' in the manner of the eighteenth century in which men of every kind of learning habitually gathered together is very attractive and should not be discarded out of hand. But it does not correspond to the picture of to-day and to act as though it did is to court disappointment. Doctors, Managing Directors and School Teachers do not naturally get together and if you are going to insist that they should (as in fact the Newman Association appears to do) then you must justify the setting up of a new 'node' in their lives.

As I have suggested, this has been done before: the Gentleman's Club idea which was so successful in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought it about. Is this milieu realizable to-day? And is it to be desired?

The answer to the first of these questions seems to depend on cultural unity. Men will want each other's society only if they 'understand' each other. If they habitually do not, then their meetings will be a penance which no rational man will willingly face. 'Under-

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stand' in this context means at an intellectual level and not only in respect of common human experiences; and it is unfortunately true that Catholicism, as at present interpreted and taught, is not a sufficient bond to bring this about. A common knowledge and acceptance of the Penny Catechism is not enough to make a conversation between an Architect and an Obstetrician either pleasing or intellectually fructifying. In intellectual things a Catholic Graduate will generally be much more at home with his non-Catholic colleagues.

This means that the Catholic Graduate would not, of his own free will, seek the company of others of his kind. This faces us with the question: 'Should he, in the name of Catholicism, be exhorted to do so?' Or, to put it another way: 'Should we attempt to rebuild under the Umbrella of the Faith the Grand Society of the eighteenth century?'

This turns, I suggest, on the immense changes which have taken place in our idea of knowledge, in our educational pattern and in our social organization. For these factors have changed altogether our ideas of what sort of person a Graduate is and of what sort of life he should lead.

At the time when Newman was writing the object of University Education was to fit a man for any walk of life—or we might almost say, for no walk at all. Society was predominantly agricultural and the wheels of society kept turning over thanks chiefly to immemorial skills and with little direct intervention of the human intelligence. Education was therefore limited to the few who were to administer this scheme. All that was required was to produce right minded men who could be counted on because of their just appreciation of traditional human values to keep life's familiar subject matter from going seriously wrong. That is the social background to that atmosphere of peace, timelessness and security which Oxford and Cambridge still in some measure possess. Graduates in that scheme were not required to have an expert's knowledge of any 'processes' because these were in any case chiefly 'mechanical' and did not greatly influence the course of life. A man who knew Tacitus, Cicero and Vergil knew everything of secular wisdom which was worth knowing; but he had developed above all the faculty of judgment.

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This attitude towards education is, I know, still widespread among Catholics, who are inclined to think of Technology as something applied to life, a latter-day accretion of small intellectual significance; and not, as it surely is, as something which affects our view of knowledge and which has altered, if not the aims, at least the whole setting, of education.

It is not so much that the older conception of what education is has been thrown into the discard, but rather that it impinges on society differently. Starting at the beginning, in place of an illiterate peasantry you have a whole society which receives its letters at about the same age. Catholics have been all too ready to decry literacy and to contrast it unfairly with the kind of wisdom which is got by verbal tradition. It is difficult not to have an uncomfortable feeling that Catholic popular education was prompted, not by any conviction of the value of literacy to the human person, but primarily as an attempt to stem the flight from the sacraments which was the immediate result. Yet, quite apart from its great practical uses, the mere business of acquiring literacy is an important mental discipline. Because of it and through it Man is more fully himself and therefore, we may presume, more pleasing to God. Nevertheless—be it said in passing—universal literacy posed a new and immense problem for the Church's apostolate. But perhaps what most concerns us now is the incidental fact that because of it the ordinary run of people are less in need of the kind of guidance which the old style Graduate—lay or clerical—was trained to give.

Passing up the educational ladder we see that the kind of educating which formerly went on in the Universities—the 'mens sana in corpore sano'—is now given in the Secondary, Public and Grammar Schools. The incidental differences, important as they are—the change in mental disciplines, the earlier age of the students and above all the background of competition in place of the background of leisure—are still only incidental. The sons of eighteenth century squires would have said unprintable things if they had been confronted, on leaving the University, with the educational tests which confront our Secondary School leavers. We may rightly infer that these last are not the same developed persons, for time alone can effect this; but they have at least been subjected to equivalent disciplines. To the University is reserved, in general, a

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very different task and it is here that our cultural change-over has affected our educational system most thoroughly.

The chief point to notice is that 'Science' is not merely another subject which has edged its way into the curriculum: it is a new theory of Knowledge. Let me try and illustrate the point simply. Imagine a group of people living for generations on a desert island. From time out of mind their resources have remained the same. For them therefore the essence of human wisdom consists in preserving the right human relations, in learning how to distribute these resources with the least friction and loss. But as soon as they discover that by practising a more acute observation of nature they can increase these resources tenfold, you see them occupied with a wholly different intellectual activity. Their 'psychology', as we should say, is different. The old question of distributive justice is as important as ever and its basic principles remain the same; but its *mode* may be startlingly different. And what is more significant still is that the content, scope and meaning of knowledge is changed. In place of a fixed, known subject matter you have one that is developing. Whereas before you had a subject matter which was 'closed' and which therefore you could teach dogmatically, with raps on the knuckles, you now have a subject matter which is characteristically changing and towards which therefore both teachers and taught must cultivate that exquisitely difficult attitude of an open mind. This is the underlying reason for the great change which has taken place in pedagogic method. A lively scepticism towards the matter taught which before had been a punishable vice is now become a necessary virtue.

It will be noticed in passing that this necessary inculcation of scepticism as a part of educational policy only enters the educational system in the University, and that it is chiefly this factor which differentiates University from Secondary Studies. It will be noticed also that it is at the University that the student first comes into contact with the subject matter which is to provide him with a livelihood. This again is in sharp contrast with the older system in which a man only started to worry about making himself into a surgeon or a Diplomat after he left.

This interaction between the business of life and the University is a huge factor in the game. It has evidently come to stay: every

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year it becomes more intimate and the division between the business of learning and everyday practice becomes more blurred. The idea of the Research Scholarship—an idea which would have been almost meaningless under the older system—is a manifestation of this and paves the way to a full realization of the concept that a man's earning life begins from the first moment when he enters a University and its corollary that his educational life does not end until he retires from active life. This is the natural conclusion of a developing theory of knowledge. A truly significant fact is that Research Scholarships are given equally in the Humanities: for this is clear proof that the conception of knowledge which was born of scientific method is now become of general application in all subjects. Even if you study Greek the shadow of the Research Laboratory falls across your book.

I set out on this discussion with a view to finding out what sort of a person the Graduate now is and what is his relation to society. Broadly speaking, where before he was *characteristically* an administrator, a man who 'knows how to handle men', he is now characteristically an investigator. This distinction is very real—and not merely an academic nicety—and is more widely applicable than you might suppose. For this conception of knowledge as a developing thing affects all branches of life, administration among them. A managing director of a factory is directing men just the same, but he is directing them in a constantly changing situation; technical developments tend to queer administration all the time. In a sense the new type of Graduate 'never sleeps'—we might almost say that he never really graduates, for the very idea of graduation of obtaining a competence which will serve once and for ever belongs to the older conception of a University. The new kind of Graduate is obliged to be 'an intellectual' in a sense that the old never was; indeed it is interesting to notice how this world is used instinctively to designate a new sort of person.

It would be possible to go on at great length contrasting the two kinds of man: pointing out, for instance how the old style Graduate tends to sum up any given situation according to some rule of thumb learnt by him twenty, thirty, forty years ago, whereas the new type will go all out to assemble up-to-the-minute data. Certainly the new style has failings—and very nasty they are if the

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smell which has gathered round the term 'intellectual' is anything to go by. But though it would be plain ridiculous to try and pass a value judgment on the two of them, it is surely clear that the new style fits the new situation best; just as it is a matter of experience that those who have 'felt' the Developing Theory of Knowledge can have very little 'feel' for the older system.

What, then, *is* this new situation? It is that knowledge and the raw material of life have suddenly—within the span of two generations—been drawn together. Newman, when he wrote about the University made great and justifiable play with the term 'Liberal Knowledge'. By which he meant the kind of knowledge which you could acquire without ever coming into contact with general affairs. It was all *there*, in book form and when you had absorbed it you could go out and master any situation: the very idea of 'first hand research' in the sense we attach to this phrase, was foreign to him. And indeed, a personal characteristic of the Graduate formed under this system was that he held the rest of the world at arms length: he was 'a gentleman', his relationship to the herd was patently modelled on that of a Roman Consul—whether he was in fact an Oxford Don or a Brewer in Wallsend.

With the new kind of Graduate it is altogether different. He and his subject-matter are locked in a close and lifelong embrace; and a like embrace hugs him to the whole corpus of people—from manual workers upwards, who are engaged on the same basic pursuit as he. His natural affinity is with *them*—and this is what I have been leading up to for so long—rather than with the other graduates in the University. That is why there is not, at the present time, any easily recognisable 'class' of graduates and why any attempt at getting them together runs visibly against life's grain.

This might be taken by some to mean that there was no need for a 'Newman Association' at all. This I do not agree with. But it does suggest that the 'club' approach—which has up to now loomed so large in Newman activity—is probably the wrong one.

I do not think that I need spend time trying to prove that organization of some kind is necessary in the intellectual apostolate. I would rather spend what time is left in discussing what the Church has to grapple with in the intellectual situation, in suggesting what

is to be done by us and what institutional arrangements are likely to suit our case.

Confronted with what I have called 'a developing theory of knowledge' the Church has every title to confidence, knowing as she does that this same Nature which is yielding her secrets so fast is made by the same God who instituted herself. But it is nonetheless a situation which at the human level is fraught with every sort of anxiety. Because the Truths of our religion are handed down to us by tradition, therefore this mode of receiving knowledge is become instinctive in us and other modes instinctively suspected. Though there is, of course, no necessary conflict between knowledge received this way and knowledge gained experimentally, the possible occasions for conflict are unlimited. Particularly because this dependence of ours on Tradition for truths of the supernatural order tends to breed in us a form of intellectual sloth which is peculiar to ourselves. Because the Truths which really matter were given once and for all, therefore (we argue) they are in themselves immutable and no subsequent knowledge can touch them in any way: therefore a gulf is fixed between Religious Truth (with a big 'T') and secular truth (with a little 't'): therefore the Catholic is absolved from any real intellectual curiosity concerning the things of this world. You will all have come across this attitude and will probably, from time to time, have caught it in yourselves: it is wonderfully consoling at the end of a tiring day spent in non-Catholic surroundings. But let us make no mistake about it: it is this sloth at the intellectual level which has cost the Church the allegiance of the Modern World.

For even if you look at knowledge from the point of view of theology only, you will see that reasonably ascertained 'secular truth' must always be a corrective and a sharpener of our ideas about Revelation: we must always use all the truths about Nature which we have learnt to date in order to discover, in all its fullness, what God has revealed to us. To put it another way, though keeping immutable Truths constantly in sight, we are in a developing situation and are expected by God to keep our wits about us. It is a matter of intense satisfaction to me that our own Cardinal Newman should have been the first to give, in his Theory of Development, close attention to the idea of Christian Theology as a thing developing

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what we of to-day would call 'Space-Time'. This awareness of what is going on in secular knowledge which is so necessary to keep Theology herself alive, is necessary equally if the Truths of Revelation are to be accurately applied to the conduct of everyday life. This seems so obvious. Yet the force of it does not seem to strike the majority of Catholics. What I would myself describe as a strong 'clerical' bias seems to make us regard secular knowledge as something lying outside the Scheme of Redemption: a sort of hobby for the human race and nothing to do with the real business of existence. It is not too much to say that this bias—you cannot call it a polity—has paralysed the Church's apostolate. Because it is an *intellectual* weakness and because it is concerned with according a just appreciation to so called 'secular' knowledge, it seems pre-eminently the mission of the lay university graduate to put it right.

One of the outward signs of this intellectual vice is to rejoice in what might be described as 'Catholic short cuts': to imagine, for instance, that the chief business of the intellectual apostolate is to bring intellectuals back to the Sacraments—whereas in fact this is, of course, only the ultimate fruit of it. Or to reconstruct what Catholics were thinking before the world was affected by developing knowledge, to call this 'Catholic' social theory, or 'Catholic' philosophy or some such and to attempt to force its acceptance on an unwilling and sceptical world. Underlying all these mistakes is the single mistake of refusing to allow that the facts which man has apparently stumbled on by himself are as much 'of God' as those which his Church has mediated. To put another way, of refusing to acknowledge that what goes on outside the Church is as much part of the Scheme of Redemption as what goes on inside.

Thus it is that the first duty of the Catholic Graduate to-day towards his own people: to insist on the validity and value of man's so-called 'secular' pursuits in their own right: to acclimatize his own people to the idea that—to take one possible example—the Catholic Medical Graduate does not take up the career of medicine primarily to 'set a good Catholic Example' in that God-forsaken milieu, or even to secure the acceptance of what we call 'catholic ideas' in medicine; but primarily in order to advance medicine

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itself. The other estimable effects will flow as a natural consequence: they queer the issue and make all three desiderata unobtainable if they are given a precedence. This is, in point of fact, an exceedingly practical issue in the intellectual apostolate. Time and again the Catholic witness has been spoiled because Catholics have deferred against their better judgment, to what we might not unjustly call 'the Catholic Party Line'. This, of course, poses the problem of what happens when a Catholic in his professional field appears to come into conflict with 'Catholic Thought' in that field. Earlier I mentioned the vast difference which has come upon Education as a result of what I have been calling 'a developing theory of knowledge'. I believe that the same phenomenon affects equally the position of the Catholic intellectual vis-à-vis 'Catholic Thought'. It is a matter, in practice, of making more of the distinction between Revelation itself—which we receive by Tradition and which has an absolute claim upon us; and the applying of Revealed Facts to the human situation. In a world like ours, where knowledge itself is developing very fast, it seems that Catholic 'case law'—though always of interest in its historical setting—does not occupy the place which up to now has been traditionally accorded to it.

Therefore it seems that the devout Catholic has a duty to be more critical towards it than he formerly would have been. Ultimately he must make an act of faith in the fact that God himself made the materia of his study and that therefore, as he is in this case alone confronting the facts, the devotional thing to do is to trust his own judgment. This seems a truism, but it is a matter of observation how inhibited Catholics can be when confronting virgin facts.

Curiously enough this attitude towards secular research has bearing on organization. It was to have been expected that the new information which we have recently gathered about man should have become welded into a system of thought—Marxism—and that this should have in turn coalesced into a political power massed against us. But it is hardly necessary to add that this is a huge intellectual misfortune. It may from time to time be necessary—from sheer self defence—for Catholic intellectuals to 'take sides' as we say against Marxism in life's day-to-day business; but it would be a disaster if we were to allow this constraint to colour our

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thought. It is not necessary to give any countenance to the Marxist system in order to state that those who profess this system have arrived at and acted upon many truths of the natural order which have in practice been disregarded by Catholics. I cannot here specify at length cases where this has been true, but can only point this out as one potent source of the stultification of Catholic intellectual life. We are rightly scornful when we spot cases where Marxist intellectuals have been compelled, through deference to the Marxist 'party line' to turn a blind eye to the conclusions of their own researches—or at least to put so tendentious an interpretation on them as to make them of no value. Yet I am not personally convinced that they are more addicted to this than we are. A lack of intellectual probity—an intellectual quality rather than a moral virtue—is the besetting sin of anyone who has a clear cut view of the world. But it is an immense evil. Once permitted at the intellectual level it spreads like wildfire through the whole of life, bedevelling human relations as it goes. Do not let us forget that one of the chief outward signs which distinguishes Christendom from any other religious entity on this earth is her insistence that objective Truth is obtainable and of absolute value. For this reason intellectual probity is the key to the intellectual apostolate. And particularly is this true in a country like England. Theology, as Newman pointed out, is the Queen of the Arts and the Sciences. But she is a constitutional Queen not a roaring Tyrant: and her most evident need—after recognition—is that her own subjects should stand up to her. An Englishman travelling in what we call 'a Catholic Country' is rightly impressed by the practical deference which is shown to Theology; but he also notices that the quality of this deference is much spoiled by the fact that only a nominal recognition is granted to other mental disciplines. As an unconscious result of which Religion is become, to outward appearances, a Potentate of a very disagreeable kind. This is a truth which it behoves the English Catholic Graduate—because he is in a position to be particularly aware of it—to point out gently but firmly in the Universal Church. On the determination he shows in this depends, in a large measure, the hearing which he will get in his own country. England, for all her defects, is an excellent sifter of truths of the natural order; and for this reason she is uncommonly sensitive to

and proof against any improper authoritarianism either in thought or in practice. You can see this in her reaction to Marxism. No other country in the West has been more ready to give practical recognition to the more hopeful of the new ideas which Marxism has put into currency; yet no other country in the West is more securely bastioned against a formal Marxist access to power. It is of course, precisely this charge of improper authoritarianism which she holds against the Catholic Church. That is the thought which lies in the Englishman's mind when he sees us and which justified him in not opening his heart to us. Without departing in any way from our just conception of a Teaching Church, I feel bound to admit that this charge if not justified is at least understandable. I often think that we would be nearer the sense of History if we were to admit that our country was jockeyed out of her Faith at least as much by Ecclesiastical foolishness as by secular knavery. Be this as it may, I am not suggesting that Catholic Graduates must *simulate* intellectual probity, or even that they must make a great parade of it; but only that if they are to make any true headway in our islands they must be scrupulously careful that they do indeed possess it. After all, that was the one quality which gave John Henry Newman a hearing among his fellow countrymen—even though it cost him some forty years of relative obscurity among those of his own Faith.

This means that we, both personally and in our organization must be careful not to be or appear to be a sort of masonry intent on foisting Catholicism *as a ready-made system* on an unconvinced country. This is a caricature, but it is a picture which English people have and which our ineptness rather than their ill will has made for them. That is why, when they hear that Catholic University people are being banded together into a 'Newman Association' they are hesitant to grant that body intellectual status.

We cannot be a club, we must not be an intellectual party: what remains? Much depends, I would suggest, on the present position of Theology vis-à-vis other branches of knowledge; for the situation in the human stage is always predetermined by the situation in the world of thought. Much of the failure of the Catholic effort lies in the equivocal position now occupied by Theology in the generality of human knowledge. Human culture is essentially

one and tends to follow a single pattern. In the Middle Ages this pattern was provided by Theology herself, for then theological modes of thought permeated the whole field of knowledge and by doing so made everything knowable within easy reach of any educated man. In the Renaissance the Classics did as much and it was a common knowledge of them which enabled men of different intellectual callings to understand one another. To-day the only factor which makes for unity and comprehension in the intellectual life is Nature herself. I say 'make for' because this unity though promised is not yet won, being evidently held up by the absurd conflict between those who follow 'the Arts' and those who follow 'the Sciences'. Speaking as one who has been educated in the former I have no hesitation in testifying that, in this matter, the future belongs to the latter; and that in the course of one or more generation all of life's interests will be recognized as having a common scientific basis—a blessed ending to a long and excruciating interregnum.

From the point of view of the Catholic Church it is not of great moment *what* should form the basis of cultural unity. It was doubtless a great convenience when Theology did this service; but we must recognize that this came about through an historical accident rather than as a result of any deliberate ecclesiastical policy; and further, that it was not an unmitigated blessing. What *is* important to the Church is that Theology should be enabled to take her place easily within the framework of culture: that she should not appear as an outlandish study, which is unduly painful to master and which therefore is a source of keen embarrassment to learned and unlearned alike. That, as you will recognize, *is* the present position. Owing to the Latin tongue and to origins in Antiquity it was relatively easy to keep Theology within reach of the educated man in the Renaissance. But it is immeasurably more difficult to-day. For already a scientific terminology forms the background of our minds; its terms *mean* something to us; we *live* them; to us they represent the only solid mental reality. The terms of Theology on the other hand mean almost nothing to us. It is not that the solid facts contained in them have lost their real pertinence, but only that the language in which these facts are at present enshrined has become foreign to our minds. This is at the back of that dread bishops' headache known to all Catholics as 'the School Leavers

Problem': the fact that 50 per cent of our children apparently lose the Faith within a year or two of leaving school. What happens is that they only give what Newman calls 'a notional assent' to the eminent Truths which are so patiently put over to them, with the result that the glib phrases of the Penny Catechism slip out of their minds along with the Latin Gerunds—and for the same reason. This is pre-eminently a problem of culture. We are not dealing with a perverse generation which has knowingly finished with God: Religion is unconsciously worked out of the mind's system because the vehicle in which it is contained is seen to be foreign to the mental pattern of every day, just as the human body will reject itself of a needle.

It is of no use fighting against the grain in matters of cultural unity: to do so is like trying to apply artificial respiration to the Irish Language. The human soul knows instinctively on which side its worldly bread is buttered. In the long run if you wish to salvage the body of Truth which Christian Theology contains you must be prepared to transpose its language. Needless to say this is a most anxious business in a subject matter which is essentially traditional and where words themselves are the media handed down, and another difficulty which is a very practical one in our time is that the Unity of Scientific Culture, though clearly imminent, is not yet accomplished: the different scientific studies appear still to be miles apart from one another, their secrets still inaccessible even to neighbour specialists. In other words the analogy of nature, which is the bond which is going to unite them, is not yet sufficiently patent. A good illustration of this is afforded by contemporary Art—which is only understandable at all when seen against a scientific background. Yet—though it is securely based in reason—it is still almost wholly inaccessible to the public.

I attach great importance to the cultural circumstances at present surrounding Theology because it provides a key to the Catholic intellectual problem. We are affected individually; and the value of our witness in the world depends, at the human level, on our ability to 'integrate' our Theology (as the saying is) with the rest of our mind's furniture. When you look into it, so many of the inhibitions of Catholics arise from their failure to do this: you can almost see them, when they are confronted with something

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new, turning frantically through the pages of an imaginary catechetical handbook. In intellectual matters they do not really possess a Catholic instinct.

But without wishing to appear presumptuous, it is Theology herself who, in this crisis, stands in need of *us*. For Catholic Lay Graduates, alone among the Faithful, are in direct touch with the formative influences in our society; and they alone therefore can mediate them to the Church at the earliest possible moment. This is so necessary, for only thus can the Church's reaction to them *begin at the right time*, instead of being postponed, as at present, until Society has already been re-formed in a sense contrary to Catholic teaching. 'Mediate' in this context means, not only reporting back, but chiefly securing that due weight is given to new facts of the material order. To take an illustration from the insects, the Church's Antennae seem exceedingly defective: that precisely is one humble but important office which we seem destined to serve. Ultimately it is Theology herself who is to assimilate this information; and it is reasonable to expect that by her reactions to it she will automatically become, not changed, but transposed and will by natural means become part of to-day's Cultural System.

This represents a programme which is too wide in its scope to be met by mere organization. Yet a body like the Newman Association can, better than individuals, secure acceptance for the idea that Lay Graduates have a *professional* interest in Theology. For it will be seen at once that the present concept of education as an extended thing, lasting over twenty years or more makes it increasingly practicable to give a Lay Specialist a working Theological background which will be comparable to that given to Seminarians. What seems to be required is a Lay Institute of Theological Studies. Such an Institute could have its point of departure in the present Adult Education Movement. Be it said in passing, it is a cause of great satisfaction to me that the Newman Association should have responded seriously to the challenge of Adult Education after the War: for that, after all, is our chief title to Catholic respect. But it seems to me that the time has come to canalize and to give a definite point to this side of our work.

I pass now to that other matter of the intelligent Catholic's participation in the world at large. I do not call it his 'witness' as

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I might have done because I want to make a break with that idea that we participate in civil life with one eye on the Conversion Statistics; and to substitute for it the idea that we do so directly and simply to make the world function better as a world. The other thing, which is confessedly important, will flow incidentally—but certainly and only—from our disinterested effort.

This means, if you think about it, that we must have confidence in the contemporary world. This seems obvious: yet I want to labour the point because the whole bent of the Chesterton-Belloc-Gill generation was to withhold this confidence. Catholics then made a virtue of sitting on the fence and of crabbing such new ventures as dared to raise their heads. Belloc refused, on the highest grounds, to have electric light in his country house, Gill was very sceptical about personal hygiene and Chesterton was a reckless admirer of all forms of cheerful disorder. You may say that these idiosyncracies were personal to each and do not amount to much; but in fact they are very revealing of one whole generation of the Catholic effort. The period 1900-1930 is very different from the period which is opening before us and a case may at least be made out for having taken a sceptical view of the Modern World *then*. Though personally I cannot help feeling that this attitude even so showed a certain lack of mental generosity. Be that as it may, such an attitude would sink us now; and it is a matter of great personal moment to each one of us to make a note of it and to scrutinize severely the whole bagful of prejudices which their great literary talent has endowed us with; and this done, to make a personal act of faith in our new society.

Those who are active in the world can hardly have failed to notice that the innovators of the 'twenties and 'thirties and their successors are flagging in their ideas. This is not because the ideas themselves are played out but only because there is a natural instability in the human mind which requires religious conviction to ensure perseverance. That is why, though Infidels can and do promulgate new ideas with a greater facility than Believers it takes, in the long run good, honest Catholics to carry these ideas through. I am convinced that our country made a more important contribution towards the Great Society of the future than any other during the first half of this century; but also that she will stand

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desperately in need of good, solid, tough, religious types to make good that contribution in the century's second half. We Catholics, miserably insufficient as we now appear, are almost the only body who can give this. There is a real opening for us, provided we are not too pushing and partizan about it. My only fear is that we may take advantage of the National hesitancy in order to go back on what has been done. That, for instance, in our zeal for securing Catholic Education for our own children we may try to render null those huge educational advances in the country at large which up to now have been the envy of the world.

This is not the sort of programme which a body like the Newman Association can directly implement. For, to return to the point made in the beginning—we must guard against any activity which will tend to draw the Catholic Graduate away from the milieu of his work. It is, for instance of no value to attempt to give 'catholic' post graduate instruction in secular subjects: the facilities for it could never be equal to what is to be had in the world outside and all such instruction could do would be to load the student with pseudo Catholic prejudices which would impair him for life. Secular subjects to-day, unlike the subjects of the Classroom, can only be learnt by working in the field.

But there is a kind of activity in secular studies and practice which does seem to be open to a body like the Newman Association. There are, for instance, certain studies which we as Catholics would like to see developed and which no one else is likely to touch. One which comes to mind immediately is Religious Sociology. This is an immense subject, partly statistical, partly psychological and refers to what we might describe as the Religious set-up in the country: the distribution among denominations, the psychological influences bearing on each community, the influences for good and evil which affect the Christian Life in different regions, which effect different age groups and different classes . . . and so on and so forth.

It will be seen at once that all this information is very pertinent to the Church's Pastoral work: without it we are all floundering: but how is it to be got? This is, incidentally, a very good example of what I meant earlier by a 'Developing Subject': the picture is changing every day and you can spend a lifetime on it without reaching any finality. But finality, of course, is not the thing you

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are looking for. Because all the time you are investigating, important and usable information is coming to light.

A study like this involves two kinds of activity: the first is a continuous collection of data, a vast work of human co-ordination, and the second is the launching of specific projects on the lines suggested by this data. The sheer potential of this approach can be seen in the work of the Fabian Society which in the course of a generation changed the face of the country. As has been suggested often before, the Fabian Society offers a good prototype for the Newman: for it is composed of the same sort of people—honest intelligent types who have to earn their livings—who are gathered together in the general service of an idea but who are equally prepared to face the Truth in whatever guise it come. The essence of such a Society is that the members are placed in direct contact with a continuous flow of first hand information of great variety—a sort of intellectual strip cartoon—and by chewing it over in the light of a certain view of the world, create that potent thing a Climate of Opinion. The first half of this programme is normally the work of specialists, the second of the ordinary member. The correct form of organization for the specialists is that of the Institutes. But whether for instance the future Catholic Institute of Religious Sociology be formed within the framework of our Association or outside, it will depend largely on our Membership to chew over the problems it raises and to create the climate it requires.

Though I have made a point in this talk—and as a part of my Presidential duties—of touching on concrete problems of here and now, I do not want to leave you fumbling with these at the close. Because it has been my experience that when I come to talk on matters of organization, Time usually proves me to be wrong. What I hope is that more ready and capable people than I may take 'au sérieux' the general evidence which I have tried to put before you. The Layman has no right to teach in the Universal Church—certainly when he is a Convert like me, with ten generations of East Anglican Protestantism behind him; but he has a right to testify and to make suggestions. Indeed it is precisely this cardinal idea of the Lay Graduate as the Provider of Testimony which I want to leave with you this evening.

CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE IN THE PRECARIOUS MARGIN

By ERIC JOHN

MANY centuries ago St Augustine expressed in a magisterial image the permanent conflict which each generation of Catholic Christians inherits from the last:

‘Civitas autem caelestis vel potius pars eius, quae in hac mortalitate peregrinatur et vivit ex fide . . . dum apud terrenam civitatem velut captivam vitam suae peregrinationis agit.’¹

Tradition has laid great weight on the political implications of St Augustine’s image and this was perhaps inevitable in view of the political associations which the idea of a city naturally arouses. In an important sense, which it is the task of this article to define, the image has very definite social implications and ought to be the starting point of any Christian understanding of society. Unfortunately, the analogy of the two cities has become debased by constant use and misuse and St Augustine is often taken as offering a neat theory of the relations of Church and State. It is surely clear from the context of the *De civitate dei* however, that politics in this sense was the least of St Augustine’s concerns. It is rather the awareness of his (and our) ambiguous position that chiefly concerned him. He knew that as a member of the Church he belonged to a:

‘gens electum, regale sacerdotium, gens sancta, populus acquisitionis’;

which was, however, resident in a city of temptation in which the royal inheritance, otherwise assured, might easily be lost. It is this monstrous dichotomy between the community of the saved and the community of the damned, which he saw were not two tidy categories into which men can be fitted *now*, as the later Reformers thought, but rather a dual allegiance between which the whole of life is one long choice.

¹ *D.c.d.*, xix, cap. 17.

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' Let life, waned, ah let life wind

Off her once skeined stained veined variety/upon, all on two
spools; part, pen, pack

Now her all in two flocks, two folds-black,white;/right, wrong
reckon but, reck but, mind

But these two; ware of a world where but these/two tell . . . '

For the moment, during our lifetime and before the last day, the 'dapple' of the earth is not yet at an end. The Christian lives in the precarious margin where in some sort the two kingdoms overlap; if one may attempt to express in plain prose the superb complexity of meaning which Hopkins makes that one word dapple bear. Just as the kingdom of Heaven is within us, so too is the kingdom of Darkness: the way to the City of God is precisely through the rejection of the City of this world sustained over a lifetime.

St Augustine's first concern is thus a personal concern which is at the same time worlds away from the subjective individualism or fear of it, which bedevils most modern social thinking. It is here that the image of the city, so beautifully apposite, shows its great force. No concept is more personal than that of the citizen and none less individualistic. The city is no collection of individuals, no logical class defined by its members, it is an order represented in the person of its citizens and composed of their relations to one another. Thus it is easy for St Augustine to move from the mysteries of the solitary conscience to those of the whole economy of redemption, without raising the pseudo-problems involved in an imaginary dichotomy between the 'subjective' and the 'objective'; between the individual and the Church. His thought runs from one frontier of orthodoxy to another without serious lack of coherence or continuity. It is true that there are few heresies, whether of the individualist sort or of the kind which would make the Church a barracks guarded by a supernatural police force, that could not quote a text of Augustine for authority. This is the 'betrayal by verbal fidelity', the theology of the suburbs which has failed to see that the mark of the theology of a great doctor such as Augustine is its power to provide a centre which speculation may set out from and return to; its power to act as a norm by which the purely personal idiosyncrasy may be judged and the purely private language

avoided. The point of this article is to make use of this power and to look at our largely post-Christian society in the light of St Augustine's teaching. No attempt at direct exposition would here be appropriate and none has been made; all that is claimed is a legitimate application of his doctrine.

It is now a commonplace that the major problems of modern social thinking are problems of accounting for relationship, of coping with dichotomies between the individual and the group. It has already been suggested that a society thought of after the analogy of a city gives no occasion for such dichotomies and it may be valuable to develop this analogy further and examine the account of social relationship it implies. First, however, it is necessary to look at the alternative models, which lie behind a great deal of contemporary social doctrine, Christian or otherwise, and criticize them in the light of a more or less Augustinian approach.

It is probable that the mechanical model of society, expounded in its fullest extent by Hobbes but implied in the social theories of most modern utilitarians, is still the most influential. Its great virtue is to point to the sense in which the good machine is like the good society—they both work. The opponents of the utilitarian school frequently overlook this or dismiss it as unimportant. They forget or do not know that 'efficiency saves us'; that a combination of fine sentiments and mean deeds is a good working definition of decadence. To equate utility with value is certainly to commit an error in philosophy; but to believe that utility is distinct from, and even hostile to value, is to reduce social responsibility to an occult connoisseurship. Nevertheless, utility cannot be the whole of value. Society is in the end very different from the machine. The workings of the machine are always means to an end, they cannot be self-controlled or valuable in themselves as human actions can be and occasionally are. Again a machine has to be constructed by some one and for a definite purpose. Those who allow their thinking to be controlled by the analogy of society as machine have therefore to imagine an artificial beginning for society, with individual human beings driven by the inconvenience of solitary life to make a contract, surrendering a little freedom in return for a great deal of security. But surely no one, whether Christian or not, can really accept such a reduction of value to the pressure of circumstances

or such a debasement of relationship to the level of shareholding in a limited liability company.

The alternative model, that of society as an organism, is at first sight more promising. It can account for growth and development where the mechanical analogy is useless; it requires no social contract since society on this view can be accepted as part of the nature of things. Nevertheless, it cannot provide any more satisfactory account of value and relationship than its rival. It is not enough to oppose to the purely quantitative concept of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, a biological definition of value as the total health of the organism: the one can no more illuminate the place of value in the world of experience than the other. Similarly it is equally difficult to derive any satisfactory account of relationships from writers of this school, Hegel and Bradley for example, since the idea of a biological organism is so pervasive that relationships are reduced to the artificial simplicity of those obtaining between the cells of the body. Therefore although both of these models, these sets of analogies, are useful in the ordering and understanding of our social experience, they are in the end inadequate because they cannot give any satisfactory account of the fundamental problem of society, that is of value and relationship.

The difficulties in both the mechanical and organic analogies arise because both of them refer to inhuman and impersonal objective correlatives, while the most significant factors in a human society are just those found only in human nature. Society is in fact wholly personal because it is composed of persons and nothing else. Like the university of Oxford in Professor Ryle's famous example, it can only be seen in the members who constitute it. These members do not do this only in a quantitative sense. They are not piled up as it were, in a heap: on the contrary they are personally related to each other in such close connexion that together they form a community. Now there is no necessity to propose a more or less occult explanation of this distinction. Social relationship is something which can be pointed to. To be related to another person is to be cognizant of them as *another person*, i.e. of the same basic nature as one's self. It is here that the specifically human values are located. Animals are aware of their needs and can express demands but only men can recognize the needs and demands of

other people and respond to them. In consequence what for the animal world can be described in no higher terms than those of a struggle for existence requires in human society a complex account of rights and duties. It is in the recognition of the existence of this need that relationship starts, but it is only when there is movement from this recognition to the offering of satisfaction, one of the profoundest meanings of love, that relationship is established. But even this is insufficient. The need for relationship is basic to the nature of personality. If one becomes acquainted with other persons by an extension of self-knowledge, it is equally true that one attains self-knowledge, through acquaintance with and relation to, other persons. The isolated individual of classical liberal political thought, if he were really isolated from all contact with others, could have no personal knowledge whatever. He could not even attach any meaning to the pronoun 'I' since there was no second person to require the distinction. It is this necessary commerce between persons, through which is experienced both singleness and community, that is intended when it is said that society is natural. Thus instead of the model of society as machine or as organism, what is wanted is a double analogy, of society as at once personal and communal.

The use of such a double analogy requires some illustration and some further development. What has been called the pseudo-problem of relating the individual and the group becomes on this view the very serious problem of distinguishing between the public and the private, the peculiarly personal and the peculiarly communal. The solution would appear to lie in the direction of a due stress on the representative nature of community. Society, as has already been said, is composed entirely of persons: community must therefore be expressed through persons or not at all. It is not difficult to see that any community is so expressed. It is represented by the persons who constitute it and their relations to one another; it is an order or series of orders formed by the various stations or places of the members of a community within it. The person as member has a certain status within the community from which he performs the function by which he represents it, being endowed with some of the power of the community in the shape of a certain authority over other members. The obligation to do this to the best of one's ability, to resist the temptation to enlarge one's status

while diminishing one's functions, is primarily what is meant by social obligation.²

Thus *all* obligation is personal, some is also communal; some is public, some is private. The obligations of Pontius Pilate whilst sitting in judgment are as personal as those which he had toward his wife: the difference being that whilst sitting in judgment he was also the representative of the Roman *Imperium* which therefore was also involved in his injustice. Pilate himself had also an added responsibility, that of degrading the *Imperium* which it was his function to represent.³

It is a further consequence of this view that political society cannot be equated with society as a whole. It is only the permanent stations and functions instituted within the community and handed on from representative to representative, that define the *political* community. It is only when and as the power and authority here involved, affect the members of the community, that political experience arises. Consequently only a limited part of social experience is really political. Even to-day when government has greatly enlarged the scope of its operations, the greater part of the experience even of persons with strong political interests and responsibilities, is quite apolitical. Or to approach the idea from another direction, if any community had to depend for its peace and stability on what regulations the government could articulate and the police enforce, it would lapse into barbarism overnight. Many important parts of communal life lie outside the sphere of government altogether, or at most in very superficial relation to it. Even more important is the shifting boundary between the public and the private. Because of the power of a community to grow and develop, its shape, the pattern of representative functions which express it, arises initially from private encounters which acquire a special kind of representative status. This is something more

² Private faces in public places
Are wiser and nicer
Than public faces in private places.

³ This distinction can also be illustrated from the novel. If Trollope's novel *Is he Popenjoy* be compared with Henry James' *Portrait of a Lady*, it is clear that Trollope has used the society of his time to provide a gallery of more or less convincing characters, whose interest comes solely from the brilliant social game the author is concerned to portray. In *Portrait of a Lady*, James, with infinitely greater art, has made the apparently private conduct of his characters represent the whole state of a civilization.

than some person or other representing the community in an established 'place'. Here the personal encounter represents a stage in the development of the community. What begins as private experience becomes a moment of importance in the community's growth. The student of society must in consequence be a historian as well as a philosopher; he must go behind the immediate political arrangements of his community and catch them at the moment of creation.

It may be as well to take some examples of this. If we wish to examine the English Constitution we do not go to the British Museum and look at Magna Carta in its glass case, nor do we expect to find it expounded in *Whittaker's Almanack*. Instead we must examine the working of the government, and we do this by studying the different functions of government, executive, legislative and above all, administrative, and by studying the history of how they came to be what they are. When this is done it soon becomes obvious how fluid the boundaries between the public and private are. At one time criminal justice was the private concern of the victim or his relatives, although it is now everywhere accepted as one of the most important public concerns of any political authority. The process by which this transformation arises is marked, as was pointed out above, by the apparently insignificant actions of private persons taking on an important representative status. One of the most striking examples of this, certainly one of the most extreme, is that given by the famous court case of *Pierce v. Brooks*, through which the great principle, that an immoral contract has no binding force in English Law, came to be enunciated. This fundamental principle has no higher origin than a sordid bargain between a prostitute and a cab driver, which being broken by one of them was taken to court by the other, and provided the occasion for the famous ruling. There is thus a large element of the *ad hoc* in the development of any community, which it is beyond the scope of any purely philosophical study of society to account for. This means that any community will be full of inconsistencies and generally untidy, but also that this lack of neat definition is necessary to any community composed of free persons.

It may well be asked at this point 'what has happened to National Law'. And it must be admitted that this is not an easy

question to answer. The difficulty arises from the extremely ambiguous connotation which the term 'natural law' is usually given in discussions of political philosophy. It does not seem to be always recognized that to speak of natural law is to speak analogically and that the analogy does not always mean the same thing to the philosophers who use it. It is thus important to examine very closely the context in which the term is used, in order to disclose the nature of the correlatives to which the analogy points. Now law to the medieval public meant in part Roman law, but much more the accumulation of decretals and precedents drawn from the day to day juridical experience of the Church, the great body of canon law. To-day even the *Corpus Juris Canonici* has been rationalized and digested into a *Codex*, and the word law has acquired additional meanings.

'The word "law" is used in a variety of senses to-day. It may mean the decree of a legislator, usually the human ruler regulating the external conduct of the human subject; or it may mean a scientific law, like the law of gravitation, which is regarded as merely the expression of the behaviour of inanimate objects as discerned by a process of induction from observation and experiment.'⁴

It is hardly surprising that 'natural law' with such overtones is of little help in any attempt to do justice to the uniquely human character of social experience. There are all kinds of ways in which human beings are subject to the laws of nature like the rest of creation, but there are certain ways, those of social life in particular which are quite special to humanity. Natural laws as the natural scientist is mistakenly supposed to understand them, have no relevance to social philosophy: to suppose that they have is to make the worst mistakes of the mechanical and organic theories all over again.

For this reason, and because experience of social life is prior to experience of law, since the latter presupposes some separation of public from private,⁵ it is better to abandon the analogy of law

⁴ Quoted from an article in *Blackfriars*, xxxiii, 384, p. 107.

⁵ It is true that social experience begins in the private community, i.e. the family but law here is indistinguishable from will. The distinction between will and law only becomes apparent when the law is enforced by a representative of the community who is patently not enforcing his own will. It might be said that in the family one cannot see the law for the will, in the political community one cannot see the will for the law.

altogether in this context, instead exploring the avenue opened by the idea of society as natural. In fact the superiority of the analogy of the city was precisely because it was more 'natural' than any other. This means that the 'city' covers an attempt to meet the basic problems of society by drawing analogies founded on the experience of social life. In other words it sets up the tautology, that living in society is like living in society and then shows that it is both a valuable and an important tautology. This implies a certain community of experience amongst different persons, since appeals to the experience of one are assumed to be intelligible to others. There is presupposed a common participation in a common human nature: the city is the shape of this nature made manifest in the common experience of life in the community.

Of course the impulse behind all theological talk of 'natural law' is the need to establish some kind of relationship between 'natural' and 'supernatural' and this need is fundamental to any speculation which claims to come from within the Church. For the theologian proper this relationship necessarily arises as a major *problem*; it is not the least of St Augustine's merits to show this relationship, not merely as a theological puzzle, but as something indicated by the peculiar character of experience. It is something *there*, so concrete that it is unaffected by the success or failure of theologians to describe the relationship in an intellectually satisfactory way. In other words the problem arising out of this relationship will trouble any political thinker, Christian or not, who takes his social experience seriously. Cicero, for example, saw as clearly as did Augustine that political experience points beyond itself towards a realm of supernatural value: indeed he even named this value *justitia*, translating a term long familiar in Greek philosophy. But Augustine, when he came to speak of *justitia* in his turn, spoke with the voice of a Christian doctor bringing a truly sanctified intelligence to bear on the task. His use of *justitia* stretches language to bursting point. Now this usage is not special to Augustine, it can be found in the Gospels and in St Paul, but it is from the nature of Christian experience that at this point the natural boils over, as it were, because it is just here that the Christian social thinker is forced to trespass in the territory of the supernatural. In consequence a Christian interpretation of social values can never have

the easy simplicity of pagan usage, there must always be a certain element of the paradoxical. Naturally paradoxical here does not mean the defiantly irrational, the complacently absurd. It means that because value is supernatural it cannot be accommodated comfortably in the categories of purely natural explanation; it is these categories which have to be adjusted, enlarged and re-shaped. And further because the realm of the natural is not sharply distinct from that of the supernatural, a refusal to except this element of paradox means a lack of capacity to account for social experience on any level.⁶

In practice this paradox has been deeply explored in traditional Christian social thinking. Any summary of this rich tradition must verge on travesty but at the risk of this it may be said that there are two focal points in this larger vision. The facts of social life point to justice; society implies justice; the well-being of every citizen depends upon it, yet society as experienced is always manifestly unjust. The facts point to a supernatural evil as well as a supernatural righteousness and these by their nature are eternal antagonists. Human life, the dolorous pilgrimage, is the occasion of this supernatural struggle: we are back in the precarious margin but this time there is more to be said.

For those to whom the precarious margin is more than a phrase, the experience can be crushing and temptation to despair hard to resist. In theologians, Luther is a good example, it can induce a kind of theological vertigo. Yet Augustine who experienced as much of this ambiguity as any man has ever done, is without a trace of despair or a suggestion of lack of balance. It is so, because from the experience of the precarious margin he turned to the City of God. If the margin is so precarious that no human being can be expected to survive it unaided, the aid is there. God himself has taken flesh and robbed the margin of all its terror. It has been decisively conquered not simply once, not even once for all, but for each and every human being placed in it. The Incarnate Word having overcome it in his own person, offers us a vicarious victory by virtue of incorporation in his own person. The fullness of the

⁶ A good example of this failure is the famous *Kinsey Report*, whose sociological worth is vitiated by the naive assumption that social values can be established statistically, (as well as by the extreme credulity of the compilers).

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Church is greater than the evil of the precarious margin; the last state of the redeemed is greater than the first state of the unfallen.⁷

As for personality and community, we can see why they are so important for Christian speculation. Our natural experience of them leads us straight to an awareness of their supernatural character. The need for community, for free development of personality, cannot be met in any simply natural community, because any such community would be grounded in sin as well as righteousness. In the end it is only in the supernatural community which is the Church, of one flesh with her Lord that the contradiction can be overcome and 'home' be safely reached.

⁷ . . . in Christo non solum fuit gratia, sicut in quodam homine singulari, sed sicut in capite totius ecclesie, cui omnes uniuntur, sicut capiti membra, ex quibus constituitur mystice una persona. Et exinde est, quod meritum Christi se extendit ad omnes, in quantum sunt membra eius sicut etiam in uno homine actio capitis aliquo modo pertinet ad omnia membra eius; quia non solum sibi sentit, sed omnibus membris.' *I. T.*, iiiia pars. q. xix, art 4.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Gnosis by Rudolf Bultmann. Bible Key Words from Kittel's Theologische Wörterbuch zum N.T. Pp. xiii + 67 (Black) 7s. 6d.

FOLLOWING the usual scheme in these studies, Bultmann here begins with a survey of the meanings of *ginoskein* and *gnosis* in ordinary Greek, where *gnosis* means knowledge (as opposed to opinion) resulting from the exercise of reason (as opposed to *aisthesis*, sense perception), or knowledge as a generalization from experience. It implies a mental grasp of the forms of things, or of the elements or principles embodied in these forms. The knowledge of what really IS 'may be regarded as man's highest possible achievement in this present life'.

It is characteristic of the Hellenistic period that this achievement is viewed in a religious context and with religious emotion. Thus Plutarch tells us (in the *De Iside et Osiride*) that the goddess Isis offers, in communion with herself, the *gnosis* of ultimate reality which gives true happiness. In what we call Gnosticism the term *gnosis* is applied not only to the act of knowing but to the knowledge attained in the act. The object of this knowledge is the supreme reality, sharply separated from all other objects by the dualism of Gnostic thought. Logically enough such *gnosis* was regarded not as the fruit of speculative thought but as dependent on revelation. 'Such *gnosis* is ecstatic or mystical vision' but the word can also be applied to the process which leads to this goal, a process of preparatory learning, itself conceived as being a gift or revelation through tradition. The content of this preparatory doctrine is cosmological and anthropological, leading to knowledge of the self which is 'the condition of redemption and the vision of God'. *Gnosis* is a form of piety, and is an active power divinising and immortalizing its possessor.

In the Old Testament there is a tendency to stress the subjective, experiential, aspect of knowledge, and pure (objective) 'science' finds little place in ancient Israelitic culture. Reality is found in historical events viewed as divine action or as human religious behaviour; and knowledge tends to carry with it a responsibility for 'appropriate action'. When God 'knows' a creature, this means that he chooses it as 'an object of attentive care. In the LXX there are possibly one or two signs of a tendency to deny that man can know God. *Gnosis* in the (Greek) Book of Wisdom is revealed knowledge of which the source is God or Wisdom; it is 'knowing about God and his work, which is beyond man's conceiving and is communicated to the believer through the whole creation'. Philo speaks of an immediate vision of God, not gained by study but a gift from on high. 'This', says Bultmann, 'is the Gnostic view', though a footnote remarks that Philo 'inconsistently' avoids the word *gnosis* in this connexion.

Bultmann is inclined to trace the influence of Gnosticism in St Paul, the Johannine writings, and Matt. xi, 27 (Luke x, 22). It may, I think, be admitted that Christianity came into contact (and conflict) with Gnosticism at an early date. Lightfoot argued that the erroneous teaching against which *Colossians* is directed was a form of Jewish Gnosticism which, we may suppose, was seeking a fusion with Christianity. When the Apocalypse speaks of those who 'have not *known* the *depths* of Satan' it is possible that the reference is to Gnostic errors. It is not, I think, certain that the Corinthian troubles were of Gnostic origin. It is true that St Paul, speaking with reference to those who despised the prohibition of pagan sacrificial meats, says, 'We know that we all have *gnosis*'; but it needed no Gnostic influences to suggest to cocksure converts that meat is not rendered intrinsically impure by being offered to 'idols'. It is curious to observe that Bultmann appears to have a bias against 'mysticism', though he does not define what he means by the word. In 1 Cor. viii, 1ff, he finds the implication that 'love of God is not a mystical relationship but expresses itself in brotherly love'—a somewhat baffling remark for one who means by 'mystical' what Catholics mean by it. Certainly, love of God expresses itself in brotherly love, but this does not tell us what love of God IS. I suggest that it would be extremely difficult to answer the question without conceding that it is a 'mystical' relationship.

The same issue is raised when Bultmann comes to deal with the Johannine Gospel and epistles. John is full of references to 'knowing' God and 'knowing' Christ. This knowledge, says Bultmann, is no speculation; 'neither is it mystical vision, with liberation from the bonds of history and of this world's business; these, on the contrary, are the field in which it finds fulfilment'. We should ask, What is this 'mysticism' which involves a denial of history? St Teresa of Avila is usually regarded as a 'mystic', and she was, in virtue of her mysticism, deeply and energetically caught up in the history of the Church in Spain. No doubt Bultmann means by 'mysticism' the (false) mysticism of Gnostic dualism; but I venture to think it a pity to surrender so good a word to the dualists. On the wider question of Gnostic influence upon St John, there is no historical difficulty in supposing that he wished to protect his contemporaries from the seductions of Gnosticism and to show them the reality of what they desired in the Christian revelation. But it is a very delicate matter to determine how far these considerations have influenced his expression of Christian truth. Anyone who had, as a believing eye-witness, beheld the glory of the incarnate Word, who had been the 'beloved disciple' of Jesus, and had had to face a long life deprived of his visible companionship, was liable to develop into the sort of 'theologian' that in fact St John is shown by his writings to have been. Rengstorff, in his study of 'apostleship' (reviewed elsewhere in these pages), has some wise words on the very un-Gnostic way in which St John conceives God not merely to have 'sent' Jesus, but to be present in and with Jesus.

My hesitations are still greater when Bultmann comes to Matt. xi, 27 ('All things have been delivered to me by my Father, and none know except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son and he to whom the Son may will to reveal [him]' cf. Luke x, 22.) He says of this verse that 'it can hardly have been connected originally with its present context (Matt. xi, 28-30 have no par, in Luke). On the contrary, I should affirm with some confidence that Luke has mutilated this wonderful paragraph (see *The Originality of St Matthew*, p. 52, by the present writer). 'The text', adds Bultmann, 'is doubtful, the order of the sentences varying in the tradition. Perhaps the saying that no one knoweth the Son save the Father is a later addition'; on this reference may be made to Lagrange's investigation of the textual evidence in *Évangéle selon S. Luc*, on x, 21-22; the variation or order was almost bound to occur, especially when it is remembered that early Christian writers often quoted from memory. Bultmann also suggests that 'All things have been delivered to me' may show Gnostic influence, since similar words are found in Corp. Herm. I, 32. It should, however, be noted that the treatise here referred to is one of a number of Hermetic writings which Scott (*Hermetica*, Vol. I p. 10) thought to be, for the most part, not earlier than the third century A.D., though some 'may have been written before the end of the second century' and 'one or two unimportant exceptions, e.g. Corp. III' may be even earlier; of Corp. I itself he says that it was probably written between A.D. 100 and 200 (Vol. II, p. 1). Cf. *ibid.*, p. 11: 'Its close connexion with Philo makes it almost certain that it was not written until after the Christian era'. Lagrange puts the treatise not earlier than the end of the third century A.D. P. Sagnard (*La Gnose Valentinienne*, an important book which deserved inclusion among Mr Coates's additions to Bultmann's bibliography) dates the group of Hermetic writings of which this is one to the third, or the end of the second, century A.D.; but he adds the important warning that 'under their relatively late form it is probable that they contain an older literature'. As the possibility of Christian influence on non-Christian writers in second century Egypt cannot be excluded, it would thus seem that the burden of proof is on those who would argue that Matt. xi, 27 is indebted to Gnosticism. It must be remembered that the similarity between the two texts may be accidental.

We are driven back to ask the question: What do we mean by Gnosticism? P. Sagnard finds the central point of Valentinian Gnosticism in the 'very ancient' idea of 'the fall of a divine fragment and its return to the divinity; this is the Valentinian *salvation*, which effectuates itself by "knowledge"' (op.cit., p. 610). It will be observed that *gnosis* (knowledge) is only one element in this central complex. There is nothing in the Matthaean passage which suggests the idea of a fallen divine fragment; indeed, it may be argued that the idea is excluded by the restriction of *gnosis* to those to whom the Son 'wills to reveal' the Father—*gnosis* here

is a gift of grace, not a natural right. May we not conclude, hypothetically at least, that *gnosis* need not have had any original connexion with, or derivation from, 'Gnosticism'? Is it not possible that Gnosticism, deriving its 'myth' of a fallen divine fragment from ultimately non-Hellenistic sources, 'picked up' *gnosis* from a thought-world which was not itself originally 'Gnostic'? Is not Bultmann the victim of a vast equivocation?

The basic presuppositions of *gnosis*, in this wider and not specifically Gnostic' significance, are three. (1) The supreme desirability of 'knowing' the highest reality (God or 'that which IS') or at least the final explanation of everything. (2) The impossibility of such knowledge apart from 'revelation'. (3) The possibility (and fact) of such revelation. None of these suppositions requires a 'Gnostic' source. (1) Plato (in the *Dialectic of Beauty*) and Aristotle had already reached the first of them; so perhaps had Thales. (2) As regards the possibility of reaching such knowledge by speculation, it will be remembered that the Seventh (probably genuine) Epistle of Plato seems to deny that the essential philosophic truth can be written down, since it is the sudden product, in the soul of the student, of long familiarity with the subject—it is, we infer, not taught but 'caught'; and Plotinus did not think himself unfaithful to Plato in seeking the One in an ecstasy beyond thought. Plato seems to have had a respect for religious practices and tradition which was not entirely ironical, and in the *Laws* (X, 887) indignation is expressed at those who reject their early education and the witness of institutional religion throughout the world, in order to profess an atheism for which no sort of good argument can be adduced. And it will not be forgotten that in the *Phaedo* discussing, it is true, not the knowledge of the supreme being but the important question of the soul's immortality Simmias hints that certainty on so hard a matter may be difficult to come by unless one can get the support of 'some divine words', some utterance from on high (85d). After Plato's time his Academy went through a phase of virtual scepticism, and the conflicts of the philosophic schools must have tended to produce a 'failure of nerve' in intellectual circles that were not committed to any sectarian dogmatism. (3) The idea of revelation was far more ancient and widespread than critical philosophy, and its topicality about the beginning of our era could scarcely be more ironically illustrated than by Lucretius's panegyric on his hero Epicurus the rationalistic materialist: O thou who first from so great a darkness wast able to raise aloft a light so clear, illuminating the blessings of life, thee I follow O glory of the Grecian race, and now on the marks thou hast left, I plant my own footsteps firm' (note the reliance on a tradition of truth) not so much desiring to be thy rival, as for love, because I yearn to copy thee . . . Thou, father, art the discoverer of truths, thou dost supply us with a father's precepts . . . For as soon as thy reasoning *born of divine intelligence* begins to proclaim the nature of things, away flee the mind's terrors, the walls of the heavens open out . . . before me there appears the gods in their majesty

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and their peaceful abodes . . . Thereupon from all these things *a sort of divine delight gets hold of me and a shuddering . . .*¹ And again: 'If we must speak as the very majesty of nature now known to us demands, he (sc. Epicurus) was *a god . . . who first discovered . . . Wisdom* (i.e. philosophy), who by his skill brought life out of tempestuous billows and that deep darkness, and settled it in such a calm and in light so clear'. The fact that Epicureanism is a rational system, inconsistent with the idea of a divine being moved by love to reveal himself, makes the revelational language and religious tone of these passages all the more striking, as evidence of the mental climate of the age. The indirect influence of Mystery religiosity may be suspected here, but scarcely that of 'Gnosticism'.

What of contemporary Judaism? The Book of Wisdom (dating perhaps from the middle of the first century B.C.) had spoken of Wisdom as the 'reflexion of the pure glory of the Almighty . . . the image of his excellence' (vii, 25, 26); and this Wisdom 'traverses the ages in holy souls, making them friends of God and prophets' (ibid., 27, 28). It would seem to follow that the Wise man, the holy soul, possessing, or possessed by, Wisdom the image of God's excellence, has *gnosis* of God. It is true that all men, in the author's view, ought to have such knowledge, but in fact, outside the Chosen People, men gave themselves up to the errors of idolatry and philosophy, instead of seeking the wisdom of God. 'Hardly do we divine the things on earth, and with labour do we find the things that are before us. But the things that are in heaven who shall search out? And who shall know thy thought, except thou *give wisdom* and send thy holy Spirit from above?' (ix, 16, 17).

The Book of Wisdom is a product of Hellenistic Judaism, though it follows in the wake of a tradition which we find at an earlier date in

¹ *E tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen
qui primus potuisti inlustrans commoda vitae
te sequor, o Graiae gentis decus, inque tuis nunc
ficta pedum pono pressis vestigia signis,
non ita certandi cupidus quam propter amorem
quod te imitari aveo . . .
nam simul ac ratio tua coepit vociferari
naturam rerum, divina mente coorta,
diffugiunt animi terrores, moenia mundi
discedunt . . .
apparet divum numen sedes que quietae
his ibi me rebus quaedam divina voluptas
percipit adque horror . . . III, 1-29.*

² Nam si, ut ipsa petit maiestas cognita rerum,
dicendum est, *deus ille fuit . . .*
qui princeps vitae rationem invenit eam quae
nunc appellatur *sapientia*, quique per artem
fluctibus e tantis vitam tantisque tenebris
in tam tranquillo et tam clara luce locavit. V, 7-12.

The translations are by W. H. D. Rouse (Loeb Library).

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Ecclesiasticus. If an immediate source for the idea of *gnosis* in Matt. xi, 7 is required, this sapiential tradition is a nearer and more probable one than pagan *gnosis*, and certainly than Gnosticism. Matt. xi, 19 ('Wisdom has been justified in respect of her children') may show that the Wisdom idea was still alive in Palestine, and if the Gospel was something greater than Solomon's we cannot forget that Solomon is the type of the Wise man. The disciples of Jesus, 'learning of him', were privileged to 'know (gnonai) the mysteries of the kingdom of God'. 'Blessed are your eyes because they see'; *felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas*, as Vergil had said with reference to Lucretius's praise of Epicurus. 'Blessed are the pure in heart (i.e. mind) for they shall see God' (is this Gnosticism?) And what was the greatest of the mysteries of the kingdom? Shall we be far wrong in identifying it with the truth (not seized by Herod or by common opinion, hidden from the wise and prudent) that Jesus was the Anointed, the Son of the living God? 'Blessed art thou, Simon baronan, for flesh and blood hath not *revealed* it unto thee, but *my father* who is in heaven' (cf. 'Thou hast revealed these things to little ones . . . None knoweth the son but the father'). This shows how little justified by internal considerations is any doubt of the authenticity of the clause in Matt. xi, 27. All seems to hang together. Jesus did not, in the final analysis, come before men simply as a teacher of ethical truths, nor simply as an apocalyptist. He proclaimed the kingdom of God, something transcending and yet fulfilling the highest features of Old Testament religion: Law, Temple, Kingship, Prophecy ('something greater than Jonas'), Wisdom. Ultimately, this kingdom was one thing with his person and mission. All depended now, all religion, all contact with God, all salvation, not on physical descent from Abraham but on *recognition* of the mysterious kingdom in the person of the lowly King. And this recognition could have no natural source in flesh and blood; it must be given by God ('to you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God'), or (which is the same thing) by the Son ('to whomsoever the son wills to reveal him'). And if it is still objected that it is un-Jewish to attach importance to the *gnosis* of God, it should be observed that the new covenant, instituted by Jesus at the last supper, between God and those to whom it had been given to know the mysteries of the divine kingdom, had been described by Jeremias, speaking in God's name, thus: 'I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel . . . I will put my law in their inward parts and in their heart (i.e. intelligence) I will write it; and I will be their God and they shall be my people: and they shall teach to more every man his neighbour and every man his brother, saying: Know Jahveh; for ALL SHALL KNOW ME from the least of them even to the greatest, saith Jahveh; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more' (xxxii, 33, 34). Moses, the friend of God, had asked: 'Show me, I pray thee, thy face', and the request had been refused, since 'no man can see my face and live'. But the disciples of

Jesus, 'beheld the glory' of the Word made flesh 'as of the only-begotten of the Father'. 'He that hath seen me hath seen the father.' And yet there was still something more to hope for: 'It hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him because we shall see him as he is' (I John iii, 2)—again I submit that this is not Gnosticism but the echo of the Psalmist's aspiration: 'And for me, I shall behold thy face in righteousness; I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy form'.

Christianity involves a profound and transforming re-reading of the religion of Judaism and the Old Testament, a re-reading which, it may be said with reverence, is the expression of a sublime religious genius. According to this re-reading, the *raison-d'être* of religion is the glory of God, not found henceforward in the temporal prosperity of Israel and its members but in a post-historic 'joy' ('Enter thou into the joy of thy Lord') which was surely not conceived by the Founder as a mere transposition of the so-called 'good things' of this life; what else can he have meant by this 'joy' but the final friendship of God, involving as all friendship must, a mutual love based on mutual knowledge?

Apostleship by K. H. Rengstorf. Bible Key Words from Kittel's Theologische Wörterbuch zum N.T. Translated and edited by J. H. Coates. Pp. xii + 76 (Black) 7s. 6d.

THIS study of the New Testament meaning of the word *apostolos* begins by examining the meanings of the word in classical Greek and in non-Christian papyri. Nowhere here does the idea of 'authorized missionary' appear. The Cynic claims to know that he is sent (*apostellesthai*) by God as a messenger (*aggelos*) or spokesman (*keryx*), and his function, as thus sent, is to be an observer (*kataskopos*) of man's condition, and to proclaim the truth which will make moral reform possible. Thus he is sent to exercise an initiative and is conscious of his difference from ordinary men. He has a responsibility towards them and also towards God whose servant he is. He travels through the world seeking hearers, He is a 'divine man' (*theios anthropos*, an inspired individual?) a designation which introduces a touch of the enthusiasm associated with the Mystery religions. 'The Cynic-Stoic philosopher in his role as *kataskopos* is the contemporary figure who stands nearest to that of the New Testament apostle, but it is to be observed that the title *apostolos* is not applied to him.

We turn to the question of Jewish *sheluhim*, envoys sent out with a commission to perform at a distance from those who send them. The *shaliah* 're-presents' his principal within the limits of his (temporary) commission. He can represent not only an individual but a community.

or a whole class. The term was specially applied to rabbis sent out into the Dispersion by the central religious authority, for example (after A.D. 70) to collect charitable gifts. When Saul went to Damascus with letters from Jerusalem to round up those there who followed 'the Way', he was a *shaliah*. Such *sheluhim* seem to have been specially set apart for their task by a laying-on of hands in the name of the community which sent them, and they were usually sent out two by two or in groups. But they were not proselytizing missionaries; they were 'authorized agents'. Authorized Jewish missionaries did not exist before A.D. 70. The rabbis regarded the priest, when offering sacrifice, as commissioned not by the community but by God; the community has no right to offer sacrifice and cannot give what it does not possess. Moses, Elias, Elisaeus and Ezekiel were likewise reckoned as *sheluhim* of God, since in performing miracles they exercised a divine power entrusted to them by him. The essential meaning of *shaliah* is that he represents another' not in speech but 'in action'.

The New Testament word *apostolos* is of course Greek, but its meaning is derived from 'the *shaliah* of rabbinical Judaism', cf. John xiii, 26 (the only occurrence of the word in the Gospel or epistles of St John, and not necessarily here used in its technical Christian reference). At I Cor. vii, 23, it is used of a representative of a local church, cf. Phil. ii, 25. But usually 'apostles' are those sent by Jesus to carry the Gospel to others, especially (in Luke-Acts) the Twelve. That the title is not restricted to the original Twelve is shown by Act xiv, 4, cf. Rom. xvi, 7, I Cor. xv, 7, and, of course, by St Paul's self-designation as 'apostle'; Apollos and Timothy are never termed 'apostles'. The apostolate is 'not an office created by the community . . . but an appointment of Jesus creating the Church'. Christ himself, in whom the final revelation of God has taken place, is called 'the apostle and high priest of our confession' (Heb. iii, 1).

The Twelve were chosen as an 'inner circle' among the disciples and were 'sent out' by Jesus, endowed with his authority or delegated powers, first as a stage in the extension of his own ministry. Their task was to proclaim the Kingdom of God and to work miracles 'in his name'; in both respects they are entirely dependent upon the commission and powers they have received from him. This commission 'obviously ended with the return to Jesus' of the Twelve after the accomplishment of their little missionary expedition. It was renewed, and in a final form, after the resurrection of Christ, and was not to terminate except upon his second coming. Thus permanently commissioned the apostles are missionary witnesses of the Resurrection, and also Christ's representatives within the community. Despite the fact that women were the first to see the risen Lord, no women are included among the apostles.

The apostles after the Resurrection perform miracles which, as proving their possession of the divine power that was in Jesus, are credentials of their commission. It is in the Spirit that they receive the

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assurance of Christ's presence and also receive his power, and this is made clear in John's Easter narrative, though the word 'apostle' is not used there. 'Paul is the classical example of a New Testament apostle. He became a disciple and an apostle at the same moment, on the road to Damascus, when he was 'called through the will of God', by the appearing to him of the risen Jesus, who there and then gave to him his apostolic commission.

It will be seen that we have here, in the form of a dictionary article on the meaning of a word, a valuable study of the nature and background of apostleship. I add the following comments. The translation reads awkwardly here and there. The author examines the references to 'apostles' in the Didache, but I cannot think that these deserve to find a place here, as I hold the Didache to be a late second century work presenting a largely imaginary picture of apostolic times, probably distorted by Montanist, or quasi-Montanist, presuppositions. There is a curious suggestion (p. 59) that there is an 'absence of any tendency towards an *imitatio Christi* either in his own life (sc. Paul's) or in that of Christians who imitate him'; what, then, does the author or make of the injunction 'Let this mind be in you which was in Christ Jesus'? And what of 'making up what is lacking in the sufferings of Christ'? DOM B. C. BUTLER

Sin by Gottfried Quell, Georg Bertram, Gustave Stählin and Walter Grundmann. (Bible Key Words.) Translated and edited by J. R. Coates. Pp. vii + 96 (Adam and Charles Black) 7s. 6d.

THIS is another great article from Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum NT* put at the disposal of English readers. After discussing the O.T. terms expressing sin, their legal and theological connotations and the idea of guilt, it gives a masterly analysis of the story of the Fall. Sin is shown there as man's self-assertion against God, as a grotesque aberration. Sin is shown there as man's self-assertion against God, as a grotesque aberration which is yet our common experience. 'In every act of disobedience to God the same encounter takes place with its unfathomable distress.' Sin is 'prime mover and cause of all man's restlessness and misery'. 'Hardly anywhere else in the O.T. do we find a religious question discussed with such a combination of penetration and piety.' We should disagree with the article when it appears (not on Scriptural grounds) to regard sin as the inevitable outcome of man's nature, but it is right of course in saying that sin is universal, and in that sense 'to be human is to be a sinner'.

From a treatment of the Septuagint's doctrine of sin the conclusion is reached that it tends to go to the heart of the matter, the fundamental sin which separates man from God. Greek usage is then considered, and the view in classical Greece and Hellenism that man is fundamentally good and that right understanding must lead to right action. There was

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so an idea of foredoomed, existential guilt, but philosophy abandoned and became purely rationalistic, making guilt come from ignorance which is removed by education. As Kierkegaard said: 'If the Socratic definition is correct, sin does not exist'.

We pass to the New Testament. In the Synoptics, we are told, Jesus recognizes the fact of sin without talking of its nature and consequences. When he preaches God as a loving Father, men recognize that in their guilt they are far from God and long to return to him. (There is point in this summary, but what of the opening preaching on repentance?) But there is more. Jesus's forgiveness, his coming, death and resurrection are eschatological in their conquest of sin, and now man's debt is forgiven and fellowship with the Father is granted to the erring son. The Last Supper shows the New Covenant operative through Christ's death (but why weaken a fine account by dragging in the old mistranslation 'this means my body'?)

The Johannine conception of sin goes deeper still. The contradiction of God, of which man is universally guilty, involves absolute separation from him. Christ's coming shows up sin as hatred of God, and a man who refuses Christ remains in his sin. The decisive hour of judgment is still with us, for the Paraclete continues Christ's work. But the community in which Christ's mission is achieved is delivered from sin by being born again of God, and their new situation becomes concrete through the practice of love, which is sin's opposite. All this is well said. We should have wished to see mention of the New Testament's sense of sin as a breaking of unity, a division, Satan's scattering of God's flock John x, 16; xvi, 32; cf. Matt. xii, 24-30; xxvi, 31; Luke xv, 3ff. From this aspect, redemption brings return to unity, for Jesus died to bring God's scattered children into one, John x, 16; xi, 52; cf. Eph. ii, 15ff. They enter the very unity of the Son with the Father, and their own visible unity is a proof of the divinity of his mission, John xvii, 20-3. Thus the object of the redemption is the at-one-ment with the Divine Persons of that Communion which is the Church. Lasting good will result if Protestant scholars start to study this essential part of the Gospel message.

St Paul's doctrine on sin is admirably treated. He binds together Adam's fall, human mortality and the universal propensity to sin. Basically it is man's self-assertive rebellion against God (cf. Rom. i, 21), and the Law showed up its nature, while even increasing its guilt—here St Paul depens and goes counter to Jewish conceptions. This terrible, universal situation is met by the fact of Christ, sent by God to destroy sin. The Cross and the Resurrection, which form one historic event done 'on our behalf', give the victory and are the turning point of time. For men now obtain forgiveness by union with Christ. The article does not seem very clear on how this union is achieved. 'Justification does not depend on life and work, but solely on faith in Jesus—and this means a complete re-orientation.' 'Freedom from sin finds its fulfilment in the obedience

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of faith (Rom. xiv, 23) and the new life of faith, which is lived unto God, shows itself in brotherly love, which is the fulfilment of the Law.' This seems good Pauline theology, but the phraseology has a little Lutheran flavour and a certain looseness of thought appears in the sentence 'Christians share in Christ's death by faith, and their union with him perfected in baptism' (Rom. vi, 2f.). The fact is that St Paul opposes 'faith' to the Jewish doctrine of justification by works previous to 'faith', but the N.T. also attributes justification not only to faith, but also to baptism, charity, etc., showing that the exclusive attribution to faith was not intended.

Christ, then, has brought about a new world-situation with regard to sin, and Catholic scholars will be glad to welcome the translation of an important article which deals with that fundamental fact. The conclusion: 'the whole meaning of redemption is concentrated in the forgiveness of sin', while true enough in the negative aspect, suggests a certain narrowing of the approach. Great horizons upon the redeemed life open out of the positive side of redemption, and while the article rightly underlines the 'demonic' nature of sin, it does not look beyond the human race. But the Bible opens our eyes to the titanic struggle with Satan and the fallen angels which Christ engaged upon when he came 'to destroy the works of the devil'. The treatment here of the terrible nature of sin is not universal enough. Père Prat's *Theology of St Paul* should have been given a place in the Bibliography, and if the latter were brought up-to-date, it should include Père Bonsirven's *Evangile de Paul*.

DOM RALPH RUSSELL

Histoire de la Théologie au XIX^e Siècle by Edgar Hocedez, S.J. Tom. II. Epanouissement de la Théologie, 1831-1870. Pp. 421 (Museum Lessianum, l'Édition Univ., Bruxelles and Desclee de Brouwer, Paris, 1952).

THE death of Fr Hocedez four years ago is a great loss to Catholic theology; but it is certainly a blessing that before his death he finished the MS of this great work. The publishers have thoughtfully prefaced this volume with a short biography of the author. From this we see something of the personal devotion to his Church which inspired his life's work and makes his criticisms of theological movements of the past so living and sympathetic. He is the type of man who has a delicate sense of orthodoxy, which yet does not destroy his ability to see the genuine devotion which inspired the work of many of the less orthodox. These, in their eagerness to protect the Church's doctrine, sometimes unwillingly drifted into extreme positions which compromised the very doctrines they wished to safeguard. The period that this book covers

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bounds in men of this kind. Some of them, like Gioberti, Hermes, Günther and Frohschammer, are best known to the modern seminarist from their appearance in the pages of Denzinger. We can see from reading Fr Hocedez that, though their inclusion in Denzinger was inevitable, it is unfair to them that their genuine zeal and services have so often been forgotten. What makes the author so fit for his work is that he spent many years in Louvain, Rome and other centres lecturing on the very questions that exercised the minds of nineteenth century theologians. In doing so, he could not fail to mention those who had worked so hard in the past, even if sometimes on the wrong lines, to answer these questions.

These questions were indeed not many. There is a surprising unity about the century, as far as their problems are concerned. What always concerns them in one form or another is the harmony between faith and reason, between the natural and the supernatural, between ecclesiastical and civil authority. It could not have been otherwise for a thinking Catholic, in view of the movements of thought and politics which characterized the epoch. This is extremely well brought out by Fr Hocedez; for he regards it as the task of the historian of theology to give a history of the background and development of ideas and systems, rather than a mere series of biographies of great men.

In the Latin countries during the early part of the century, we find that the popular answer to rationalism on the part of the right wing ecclesiastical parties tended in some form or other to humiliate reason. In place of pure reason as the ultimate justification of the foundations of religion and ethics, they tend to substitute a kind of natural faith (deism), or a body of traditional teaching (traditionalism) which reason can appreciate when it sees it, but which it would never discover on its own. This traditional teaching is embodied in language, traditional beliefs and natural institutions. It is given to the individual by authority and, at least according to many of this school, the individual then and only then has a power to recognize its truth. The opposite to this in the same countries was Ontologism. This school of thought exalted intuition at the expense of logic and inference. It tried to put the individual in direct contact with God by claiming that the divine idea of being is immediately, and before all else, seen by the intellect. We see the necessity of divine being before realizing the existence of contingent created being. Some of these writers even seemed to say that we see the creative act by which the creature comes forth from Uncreated Being. To answer the objection that, in this case, we must enjoy the beatific vision on earth, Fr Ramière distinguished between the *intuition* and *extuition* [sic] of God. Unfortunately, this philosophy kept slipping, at least by implication, to some form of pantheism. The defenders of these views whether traditionalist or ontologist, had practically all to submit to some form of ecclesiastical censure, but, with very few exceptions, were much too zealous Catholics not to submit to the Church's judgment.

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Following upon the ontologists, at first their great opponent, afterwards seeming to move in the same direction, was one of the greatest and most saintly Catholics of the period, Rosmini. Fr Hocedez insists on his incontestable genius. Both in his day and since he won enthusiastic followers, attracted by his ability, the freshness of his solutions to the problems of the day, his concern to harmonize faith with progress, his ambition to build up a great new Christian philosophy and his undoubted loyalty to the Church. He did, moreover, in spite of the novelty of his conclusions, raise the intellectual tone of the Italian clergy of his time and so much added to the prestige of St Augustine, St Anselm and St Thomas as to merit the title of a precursor of the Thomist revival.

Fr Hocedez finds the story of theological progress in England perhaps the most consoling in Europe. He tells the story of the Oxford Movement with great sympathy and fairness. He appreciates justly the importance of writers like Ullathorne, Faber, Manning and Ward. Above all, naturally, he places Cardinal Newman, of whom he says, 'his name dominates the whole epoch'. In his long account of Newman's thought, he shows a deep understanding of that man's genius and achievements, and evidently does not hesitate to endorse his complete orthodoxy. He has based his study on the best authorities, and is quite free of the biased views of earlier critics of the Bremond school.

I should like to review other topics of interest which fill the pages of this volume. I will be satisfied to mention: first, the long struggle between the extremes of liberal Catholicism and ultramontanistism and, in connexion with these, the circumstances and aftermath of the Syllabus and the Vatican Council; and, secondly, the origins in France and Belgium, chiefly in the persons of Gratry the Deschamps, of the school of philosophy and apologetic of which Blondel was in the present century to be so well known an exponent, a school which, like Newman, insisted on the importance of moral and psychological dispositions necessary for the discovery of the truth in matters of religion and morals; thirdly, the great intellectual leadership of Germany.

In my review of the first volume in 1950 I hazarded the opinion that, from the point of view of content, I judged that the third volume of Fr Hocedez's history would be the most interesting. I wonder now whether I must correct that statement in favour of the present volume. I have certainly enjoyed, and profited by, every moment I have spent reading it. Many of the questions discussed are seen to have a real bearing on twentieth century developments of thought.

As in the other volumes, the author gives a valuable select bibliography at the end of each chapter, which adds immeasurably to its practical value. Truly, while rejoicing that the history of nineteenth century Catholic theology is complete, we must regret that we shall receive no further volumes from Fr Hocedez's able pen.

H. FRANCIS DAVIS

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The Primitive Christian Calendar: a study in the making of the Marcan Gospel by Philip Carrington. Volume I: Introduction and Text. Pp. xv + 235 (Cambridge University Press) 30s.

IT is conceivable that the public preaching of our Lord lasted for exactly one year and that during that time he contrived to make topical references to the parts of the Old Testament which were currently being read in the Synagogue according to some fixed system of lections; and this theory could be adapted to a two-year or to a three-year ministry of our Lord if it could be believed that the Jewish cycle of readings was on a two-year or three-year basis. Dr Finch in his work on *The Synagogue Lectionary and the New Testament* (1939), worked upon this plan. It is quite another thing to suppose that a single gospel such as that of Mark—or possibly all the Synoptics—originated through a desire on the part of the author to provide lections for use in the Christian liturgy throughout the year, as was suggested in Wright's *Synopsis of the Gospels in Greek* as long ago as 1896. In this case the distribution of the matter of the gospel into some fifty-three or fifty-four sections is all that is required. When an attempt is made to combine the two theories—and it is something very like this which the Archbishop of Quebec is attempting in the present work—then extreme caution is needed to prevent Pelion rolling down the slope of Ossa in confusion. Much care and many friendly discussions have gone to the making of this book, and it is shown to be a work of scholarship, if only by its learned appendices, which like the by-products of some great refinery speak well of the quality of the work that has thrown them off. It is at the same time a pity that the most questionable part of the book, a theory about the Three Mountains which are mentioned in Mark, comes first in the exposition, for it will deter some readers from approaching the main argument of the book.

It is beyond doubt that the Vatican codex of the gospels has Mark divided into sixty-two numbered sections. These are here assigned as follows:

From end of Tisri until Nisan 1:	Lections 1-22
From Nisan 1 to Tisri 23 :	lections 23-48
Day of the Pasch:	lections 49-62 (Passion gospel)

These major divisions are justified by the fact that the Vatican codex at these points has also a script-division, where the scribe has begun his new paragraph one space to the left in the left-hand margin, producing an effect opposite to that of indentation. The fact that such script-divisions occur elsewhere (three times in the first chapter and at ix, 16 and x, 31) is faced by Dr Carrington, but he does not make it fit into his scheme quite smoothly. The idea that the gospel followed a Jewish calendar is surprising, if it was written at Rome for Gentiles. Dr Carrington's answer to this is that the gospel began as a Galilean document, based upon the

simple round of feasts of the agricultural year which the first Christian community of Galilee kept, and that it underwent adaptation at Rome when Peter had removed thither. He well says: 'The gospel document cannot be understood until they are related to the apostolic mission and to the ecclesia or church which it created', but it will not be obvious to everyone that it was Galilee which saw the origin of Mark.

When John complained about Mark's gospel that it lacked order, this means according to Dr Carrington, that it lacked the order which John, who was a Quartodeciman and who disliked the Roman liturgical order, wanted to see in a gospel. It is hinted that he found this order in Matthew, which he accordingly preferred. This is a large conjecture from a single word of Greek, and if it were a true explanation, one would expect the Greek to say: 'not in our (Asiatic) order'. What is harder to understand is that John could have found Mark unsuitable, for, in the distribution of lections accepted by Dr Carrington, forty-eight lections go to the Sundays of a (lunar) year and there are fourteen left for the Passion gospel on the Pasch, and these John could certainly have used on Nisan fourteen, had he wanted to keep the Pasch that day.

Much of the book is taken up with the actual division of the text of Mark into the lections. They are printed out from the R.V. and reasons are given for the dating of each lection as it comes. A further volume is to contain the Commentary, in which we are promised much that will relate the lection-calendar to its background in thought and history. It will be seen that this is not a work of perverse ingenuity, but that a serious problem is raised by the antiquity of the section-divisions in the Marcan text of codex Vaticanus, a problem which all those who deal with that gospel will have to face sooner or later. The script-divisions (which number forty-eight in Matthew, seven in Mark, twelve in Luke, and none in John) are more perplexing still. They are not evenly distributed, and yet are quite clearly conceived as indications of text-division by the scribe, who was in this presumably following the MS that he was then copying.

The theory supposes that local churches used a single gospel for liturgical purposes until about 120. This may be true of the church in Pontus, whence Marcion brought his copy of Luke, which is the only gospel he seems to have known, but it can hardly have been true of places nearer to the centre of Christendom. The *Gospel of Peter*, which came into being not later than 150 and probably a score of years earlier, is already an example of an attempt (made by some heretic) to combine the four gospels into a single stream of narrative, with heretical additions of his own, and Dr Carrington is himself prepared to admit that Tatian was not the first to compose a *Diatessaron*. One can admit that the liturgy has played a part in the arrangement of Mark (especially in the selection of the story of the Widow's mite) without going so far as to think that the Roman church was content to use his gospels alone until the days of

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ope Xystus. John's gospel was in the villages of Egypt by 130 and Ignatius knew it and Matthew before he left Antioch for martyrdom; Papias in Asia Minor about the same time was in possession of John's comments upon Matthew and Mark. Local patriotism would have to be very strong indeed if it is to be held responsible for keeping the local churches in the narrow way of one gospel amid all this wide circulation.

J. H. CREHAN, S.J.

L'Assomption de Notre-Dame. Tome I. Des Origines au xvi^e siècle. Textes choisis et présentés par Dom R. J. Hesbert et Dom E. Bertaud. pp. xx + 428 (Librairie Plom) 990 frs.

THE Benedictine authors of this fine addition to the 'Bibliothèque Spirituelle du Chrétien Lettré' set out in good, free translation original texts illustrative of the great Catholic tradition on the assumption of our Lady. The order chosen is chronological. There are brief, useful, scholarly introductions to each piece. The selection ranges over many countries—from Spain to Armenia, from England to Ethiopia—and includes many literary forms—sermons of the Greek Fathers, sacramentaries, the writings of medieval thinkers and mystics, sequences and poems, and treatises of post-Reformation theologians. The apocrypha, as such, are excluded, but not later texts which used them as aids to the imagination while deriving their own doctrine from right logic and objective argument. So far as possible, passages have been given in their entirety, and this is a gain for richness of nuance and variety of approach. Concern for literary presentation has led to the omission of writers, even of the eminence of St Thomas and St Alphonsus, who have spoken of the Assumption only in passing, or by an accumulation of quotations. The result is a book which makes beautiful spiritual reading, and is a mine of information upon the history of the dogma.

What stands out from these pages? The continuity of a thousand years of tradition and the reflexions of innumerable Christian thinkers showing how Marial devotion and the doctrine of the Assumption itself belong to the essence of Christianity. This is not to say that there were no hesitations. There was the difficulty, expressed by various writers, of the absence of direct record in Scripture and the earliest centuries. There was every proper doubt on the testimony of the apocrypha. There was the influence of pseudo-Jerome, unfavourable to the belief. The lessons used in Matins at Cîteaux on 15th August, were drawn from him, and that is why St Bernard himself and most Cistercians say nothing about this privilege of our Lady. But great Greek Fathers, such as St Germanus of Constantinople and notably St John Damascene had already set out the theology of the Assumption, and shown that it springs from the divine Motherhood of our Lady and the Second Eve doctrine, quite independently of the apocrypha. Gradually Latin theology, at first so

poor in comparison with the Greeks and lagging far behind the liturgy came to understand how to solve the problems. In this it was assisted by the important treatise which went under the name of St Augustine, but rests on its own merits as a little masterpiece of theological deduction from the data of faith.

In its meditations and prayers the liturgy now came to echo the theological arguments: How could the virginal flesh which gave flesh to the Son of God (for the flesh of Jesus is the flesh of Mary) become the prey of worms? How could the all-pure Mother, the hope of mankind never visited by taint of sin, see corruption? How could the Son who commanded children to honour their parents, fail in according to him the honour due to his own? Every soul naturally desires union with the body and heaven would be incomplete for the Mother of God without the body which gave him birth. Most impressive argument of all is the continuity and growing firmness of the tradition and its close connexion with the very heart of the doctrine of the Redemption. For her Son's redeeming body and blood came from Mary's, and are eternally associated.

This volume will be followed by another, carrying the tradition down to our own times. We hope that it will show the truth emphasized by St Teresa of the Child Jesus: that our Lady is more Mother than Queen and that her splendour on earth shines through simple human acts, done in and through the body. The Assumption is thus seen to be the spiritual and bodily triumph of divine and human love in her who is the Second Eve, the Mother of us all.

DOM RALPH RUSSELL

The Western Liturgy and its History: some Reflexions on Recent Studies by Theodor Klauser. Translated by F. L. Cross. Pp. 64 (A. R. Mowbray and Co.) 4s. 6d.

IN spite of its small compass this is a study of great value: it will be useful to students of liturgical history to provide them with a conspectus of the main lines of the development of the Roman rite and to enable them to 'place' the evolution of this or that rite or feature of it. It will be useful, too, to the general reader, if he can be persuaded to tackle it, because it will show him, better than definitions or explanations, the true significance of liturgy in Christian life and that a concern for liturgical history is not to be confused with the antiquarianism denounced in Pius XII's *Mediator*.

Dr Klauser divides the history of the Roman liturgy into four periods—the epoch of creative beginnings (to 590), of Franco-German leadership (590-1073), of unification (1073-1545), of changelessness or rubricism (1545 onwards). He employs a selective method in dealing with the mass of evidence, necessary in the circumstances, though it may cause disagreement on certain details—was, for example, the Pisan reform of the breviary (1568) introduced 'into every country . . . without any gro

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upheaval'?—nevertheless there can be no doubt that this short study will be welcomed by all who have a concern for Christian public worship. Of the many considerations this booklet provokes perhaps the most startling is the contrast which emerges between the first two periods and the last; the anomalies caused by 'rubricism' are faithfully dealt with by Dr Klauser and he instances the shape of vestments and the separation of *Benedictus* and *Sanctus*. What he has to say about the council of Trent is also extremely significant. Thus the booklet fills a real gap and we can be grateful to Dr Cross for making it available to English readers in a smoothly reading translation.

LANCELOT C. SHEPPARD

Thomism and Aristotelianism. A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics by Harry V. Jaffa. Pp. viii + 230 (University of Chicago Press and Cambridge University Press) 37s. 6d.

QUITE apart from its motive, which is to find a way of restoring the study of 'values' to the social sciences, this book is a very notable contribution to the understanding of both Aristotle and St Thomas. Mr Jaffa, who is assistant professor of political science at Ohio State University, is well aware of the importance of Neo-Thomism in giving to these secularized sciences some standards of judgment and an opportunity to go beyond the mere 'facts' without being lost in a realm of myth. The adherents of this movement claim to be upholding natural law and a system of morality which can be rationally justified, without appeal to revelation; it is largely Aristotelian ethics accepted in the light of St Thomas's interpretation. The care with which the interpreter endeavoured to establish, not his own opinions, but the views of Aristotle in the light of the latter's own words, is well known. We do not look in the first place to the commentaries on Aristotle for St Thomas's own conclusions, even on matters of philosophy, but to the *Summa Theologica*, the *Contra Gentiles*, or the *Quaestiones Disputatae*. May we not therefore appeal to pagan and Christian alike to return to Aristotle with St Thomas as the most reliable and unprejudiced guide?

Mr Jaffa thinks not. If a system of natural ethics can be worked out from St Thomas's writings, it will not be the ethics of Aristotle. In the *Summa Theologica* he quite properly brings to bear the data of revelation on the problems of morality; but even in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, at every stage seeking to interpret Aristotle in the light of the latter's own writings, his determination to find out the truth rather than what men have thought about it colours his exposition. If there is a doubt about the philosopher's meaning, it is usually resolved in favour of the faith.

By his assertion of the pre-eminence of intellectual virtue Aristotle sets human perfection above morality. The situation is saved for St

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Thomas because natural wisdom, in his system, is subordinated to the wisdom that is a gift of the Holy Ghost: the infused theological virtues impose obligations on the intellect and grace exalts the dignity of the moral virtues. The truth is that the harmony between reason and revelation is not to be identified with a harmony between Aristotelian philosophy and Thomistic theology; the latter is only established by the imputation, at least virtual, of non-Aristotelian principles to Aristotle—and that in the course of a commentary more than usually faithful to the thought of the original author. Mr Jaffa gives a list of such principles, which include belief in divine particular providence and belief in personal immortality. These beliefs, it now seems certain, Aristotle never held; but St Thomas regarded them as implicit in his writings and interpreted the *Ethics* in the light of them.

Particularly important is Mr Jaffa's exposition of the great advance on Aristotle represented by the theory of Natural Law. You cannot even have natural law without the promulgation of an ordinance of reason: if this is not given from Sinai, it must at least be the imprint of a wise providence on a responsive human mind. It belongs to man's nature, but in the actual condition of our fallen world grace was required perhaps for its discovery and certainly for its adequate development.

This is a work of first-class scholarship, a close study of original texts and a largely successful attempt to bring out the differences between two of the world's greatest moralists; but it has also immediate, practical importance. If the most finished system of purely natural morality that we know is so distant from the rational thought of Christians, would we not achieve more, say, in the educational field, by frankly recognizing that we and the post-Christian world do not speak the same language on human rights? If only we had done more ourselves to discover the mind of Christ, we might even boldly assert that our aim is to bring every intellect into captivity to Him.

Ontologie by Caspar Nink. Pp. xii + 496 (Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau) 28 DM.

FR NINK'S subtitle states that he is here attempting to lay down the foundations of ontology. The attempt is so energetic and thorough that it requires—and deserves—more than one careful reading. He treats of all the usual topics of ontology—essence and existence, the transcendentals, potentiality and act—and, with incidental justifications, many that are not often brought into the scheme. Epistemological problems are obviously not very remote from the study of being as such, but there are also sections on love, on the philosophy of the heart, and many details rarely discussed by scholastic philosophers at all. The author is Professor of Philosophy at the Jesuit house of studies in Frankfurt, is a thomist; but his thomism is thoroughly up-to-date. He has studied

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arefully and sympathetically interpreted modern philosophers, particularly Kant and Hegel and contemporary existentialists. The bulk of this finely produced and printed book is formidable, but one may find encouragement in such lines as—'We understand the expression, speech and form of a being, of a friend, of a flower, of a landscape, of the flowing Rhine, the splendour of the starry sky, the mood of a spring morning or a summer night, the meaning of the rise and set of sun, and yet can never grasp this speech adequately in concepts . . . Whole volumes cannot bring out the rich symbolism of the ceremonies of the Mass. No Dogmatic Theology can express the full content of the "Lauda Sion".'

EDWARD QUINN

Avicenna's Psychology: Translated with introduction and notes by F. Rahman. Pp. 127 (Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press) 12s. 6d.

AVICENNA's major philosophical work, *Al-shifa* (Sufficientia), was translated into Latin as early as the end of the twelfth century. The author's abridgement of this work, which he calls *The Book of Salvation*, however, was tackled by scholars much later on. In 1658 French Arabist, Vattier, translated the logical part into French and in 1926, the Metaphysical part was translated into Latin by Mgr Nematallah Karame. This amounted to about two thirds of the book, so that the intermediary part on Physics (which included Psychology according to Avicenna's classification) was passed over. Dr Rahman has now made the psychology accessible to European scholars. One hopes that the remaining part of the Physics will also be translated so that the whole work may be accessible in some European language, preferably a single one. This task, I understand, is being undertaken by a Czechoslovak scholar.

The importance of the study of the Arab philosophers, especially Avicenna and Averroes, for the understanding of Scholasticism in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, has been repeatedly emphasized by Prof. Gilson in recent years. A survey of the doctrinal conflicts which raged at the University in Paris throughout the better part of the thirteenth century is enough to convince one of the extent of the influence of the Arab philosophes on the Latin Scholastics. Round the name of Averroes rallied a very staunch faction led by Siger of Brabant ; whereas the cause of Avicenna was championed by the Augustinians, with St Bonaventure and Roger Bacon at their head. Despite his attachment to Aristotle and despite his debt to Averroes on a number of questions, St Thomas Aquinas secured the final defeat of the Averroist faction in 1277, following the condemnation of Averroism ; but did very little to overthrow Avicenna whose influence revived in the following century with Duns Scotus and his followers.

This should suffice to show the relevance of the study of the Arab philosophers to the study of Medieval philosophy and of Latin Scholastic-

ism ; since it was those philosophers who first transmitted and interpreted Aristotle to the Latin West. Nor is this study without relevance to the study of philosophy in general and Aristotelianism in particular. Thus the present translation of the *Psychology* of Avicenna, which is in line with the great commentaries on the *De Anima*, extending over fifteen centuries from Alexander of Aphrodisias to St Thomas Aquinas, represents a contribution to the study of Aristotelianism. That the study of Aristotelian psychology itself is not irrelevant even to the contemporary student of philosophy appears from the reading of *Concept of Mind* by G. Ryle who mistakenly equates the Cartesian dualism of mind and body with the 'traditional view' of the mind—a title which belongs as a matter of historical fact to the Aristotelian view, which was by no means vitiated by the 'myth of the ghost in the machine' and was, at any rate, far from being dualistic, in any strict sense.

In the introduction and notes, Dr Rahman surveys very competently, though very concisely, Avicenna's place in the history of Aristotelian psychology and the definite Plotinian manner in which he modified the Aristotelian view. He does not unfortunately mention Avicenna's debt to Plato at all. Even his argument for the incorruptibility of the soul from its simplicity is ascribed to Plotinus's influence (p. 108) whereas this argument should be traced back to Plato's *Phaedo*. This Platonic influence is more strongly reflected in Avicenna's 'Poem on the Soul' in which its descent into the body from the 'Higher World' is compared to the descent of a dove—a notion of the 'fall of the Soul' strongly reminiscent of the *Phaedrus* (246c)—and which Dr Rahman omits to mention altogether. Similarly on the question of Aristotle's belief in the 'separability' and 'immortality' of the soul, Dr Rahman, it seems to me, does not do Aristotle justice. Aristotle's belief in the 'immanence' of the Soul as *ἐντελεχέας* and as 'Form' does not necessarily exclude belief in its being also substance (as he actually states in *Met.* V, 1017b-17)—as Dr Rahman maintains (p. 6) in commenting on Alexander's teaching. This might be the case on the assumption that substance should be taken in its 'primary sense' only—and this is contrary to Aristotle's generalized use of the term 'substance' in the *Metaphysics* to include Form and 'essence' or 'nature' e.g. (*Met.* XII, 107a-21 and V, 1017b-17f). It was this consideration which enabled the followers of Aristotle to elaborate the notion of 'Separate Substance', free from matter, and to ascribe individuality to his 'Pure Act' in the interest of personalist theology. And this was not done through a violation of any of Aristotle's presuppositions but rather in pursuance of a line of reasoning implicit in Aristotle himself as e.g. in XII, 1069a-31. Thus the substantiality and the immortality of the soul could be defended, despite Aristotle's silence (except in *De Anima* III, 430-10f) on this question which so vexed Plato.

As regards the translation from the original Arabic, Dr Rahman has produced a very accurate and readable translation on which he

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ould be congratulated. The present reviewer has compared it carefully with the original and finds that it would be very difficult to improve upon. It is, however, regrettable that the author has not made much use, as it appears, of Mlle Goichon's two excellent books, the *Lexique* and the *Glossaires Comparés d'Aristote et d'Ibn Sina*, and has not even mentioned these two works in the bibliography. Another regrettable omission is the author's failure to consult Avicenna's discussion on the Soul in the *Sharaf* which is of some importance for the understanding of the development of Avicenna's thought. In this latest of his works, by the way, Avicenna uses the argument of the 'man in the void' to prove the certainty of the being of the soul and its immateriality—which would support the interpretation of Prof. Gilson rather than Dr Rahman's (p. 11). This is clear from a casual reading of Avicenna's argument in the aforementioned book recently published in a French translation, under the auspices of UNESCO, by Mlle Goichon. Similarly the *Poem of the Soul*, which is of some relevance to determining Avicenna's debt to Plato, has also not been consulted, it seems.

One might mention here, for the sake of completeness, some *minor* defects in the translation. On p. 37, line 8, 'Divine Intelligence' is left out. On pp. 35 and 36 the author translates 'within himself' whereas the Arabic simply says 'by himself'. Instead of the author's version on p. 37, lines 7-10, one could suggest as a possible improvement: 'It (the rational soul) has a certain relation to the animal, appetitive faculty, another relation to the imaginative and the estimative faculties and a third relation to itself'. I think one could also improve on another involved passage, further down the page. But the instances of such passages are very rare, indeed. Instead of 'become at one', which suggests an unwarranted notion of mystical union, on p. 35, line 21, one should simply read 'resemble' or 'are assimilated to' to the First Principles of existence as in the Arabic. Throughout Chapter III and the sequel, Dr Rahman uses 'representation' instead of 'imagination' which corresponds normally to the Arabic. I must confess that I cannot follow the author in so opting for this rather ambiguous term. Goichon translates likewise 'imagination'.

These remarks are not, however, intended to detract in any way from the merit of this competent and scholarly study and translation of the psychology of one of the greatest representatives of Arab Aristotelianism, whose praise was sounded by Roger Bacon himself six centuries ago.

M. FAKHRY

Recent Thought in Focus by Donald Nicholl. Pp. 250 (Sheed and Ward) 16s.

THIS book achieves a purpose to which many aspire but which few attain: to give a comprehensive view of modern thought in philosophy and those sciences specially related to it. 'It is meant for the general reader', Mr Nicholl tells us, 'and has been written in the

knowledge that many of the books addressed to the general reader never reach him.' This promise does not go unfulfilled and the book is one that should encourage us all to try and see at least some of the great mass of new knowledge in its true perspective. Not content merely to demolish what he considers to be the wrong theories, the author shows us the thought that lies behind them. This, of course, leads to sorting out the truth from the error which they contain and not merely throwing the whole on to the scrap heap. This latter process, though tempting, is one that must ultimately end in despair of all progress.

Perhaps the most valuable section is the introductory chapter and especially the remarks on proving first principles and on the nature of 'science'. Indeed many more pages could profitably have been devoted to such themes as these. However, they are well illustrated in the sequel. The main section is devoted to philosophy itself, and Mr Nicholl provides thumb nail sketches of marxism, phenomenology, existentialism, logical positivism, and their mutual relations. The author is outstandingly successful in outlining these trends in modern philosophy while at the same time noticing what lies behind the individual philosopher's thought. Here he is able to demonstrate to us that the thinkers of every age and school are talking about fundamentally the same things. It is doubtful if this has brought philosophy such ill repute during the present century though this has already been removed to a certain extent by a realization that physical science is in much the same plight. We must realize that both philosophy and physics can only advance towards the truth. It is not always that they contain error: it may be simply that they do not contain the whole truth. Mr Nicholl is trying to perform for philosophy the task of winnowing the wheat from the chaff.

In the section on natural science the author is concerned with the topics of physics and evolution. As regards the former he does not attempt a detailed solution of the spate of problems with which it has flooded philosophy during the past few decades. Indeed a respite in the production of popular books on the philosophy of science would be welcome as this seldom do more than increase the confusion which already exists. Mr Nicholl contents himself with a more general approach and does well to point out that the description of a table as 'something like a swarm of gnats' is in no way more real and ultimate than that to be found in the auctioneer's catalogue. There follows a plea for rather less dogmatism among the biologists, for they seem slower than the physicists to realize that they are not themselves the ultimate arbiters in settling the boundaries of their own province. The author also emphasizes the dearth of evidence in certain evolutionary problems and the fundamental lack of logical thought on the part of some of the more vehement of the protagonists.

The book ends with a section on psychology which deals with the systems of Freud, Adler and Jung. After giving an extremely intelligible account of their theories, Mr Nicholl emphasizes that in psychology all

we must distinguish the practice of the science from its philosophical implications. Being primarily a doctor Freud looked at psychology from the medical aspect: the fact that he was consequently an extremely successful practical psychologist does not mean that we must accept all his philosophical conclusions as if they were flawless.

It would perhaps have been better if mathematical formulae were altogether omitted from a book such as this and the misprints in those on pp. 20 and 153 are to be regretted. However, this is but a small point and the book as a whole is excellent and should provide a basis on which to form judgments on the work of the specialists in their respective fields. This, it must be emphasized, is not a mere luxury, as ultimately every theory must undergo its trial before the jury of mankind.

DOM ANDREW ROPE

The Hierarchy of Heaven and Earth by D. E. Harding. Pp. 268 (Faber and Faber) 21s.

THIS book is an attempt, 'forgetting the ready-made answers', 'to discover for myself and in my own way, what I am and what I amount to in the universe'. In fact he never finds out. His careful arguing leads to this: 'How many boxes are there in this nest of boxes which I am, and what does the smallest contain—if there is a smallest? The ultimate substratum would only call for further analysis if it were not uniform, a featureless unity; and if it is such a unity, changeless and inscrutable, then surely it is nothing. And this is indeed what I find myself to be, here at the central fountain of all my regional manifestations. Here the many are one, and the one is nothing, and the nothing is all.' There is no final basis in Mr Harding's world, only much complexity. The book is interesting in showing liquidness of mind brought about by the scientists' concentration on a thing's qualities rather than on the thing itself.

DOM FABIAN GLENCROSS

God and The Unconscious by Victor White, O.P. Foreword by C. G. Jung. Pp. xxv + 277 (The Harvill Press) 21s.

A NUMBER of years ago Fr Victor White, in a review of a little book, pointed out that a study of the relationship between 'Catholic Thought' and 'Modern Psychology' was a job which the pundits of neither science had really attempted to do or seemed ready to do. The present reviewer has, in succeeding years, constantly pressed on Fr Victor White the need there was for him to undertake the task himself. *God and the Unconscious* is the answer to that appeal. In the event Fr Victor has not been able to undertake the full length study that the subject would require if dealt with in detail but, as he points out, other works have now appeared that have largely dispensed him from many chapters of his book as originally projected. There are, however, aspects

of this confrontation which he, and he alone, it would seem, was competent to fulfil. Others may write excellently on the general groundwork of the relationship between Catholicism and psychiatry, but the essential task, the confrontation between the psychology of Jung and the Catholic religion, has remained for Fr Victor.

The works of Jung are not easy to read, and perhaps they are even more difficult to understand and appreciate when read; and it may be that it is necessary to experience the psychology of Jung in actual practice before it can be truly evaluated for what it is. For this reason Jung is often misunderstood and misinterpreted, sometimes most grossly. However often it seems that writers, even in this REVIEW, have been content to look up an article, say on Jung's idea of poetry, and as a result of a perusal of it have concluded that they have really reached the mind of the master. Fr Victor is to be numbered among those who have tried to enter into the thought and discoveries of Jung from the religious, the practical, the philosophical and the intellectual points of view to integrate them into a single whole. From the foreword by Jung himself we can understand how successful he has been in this attempt. This is a remarkable achievement when we consider how many others simply cannot understand what the bother is all about and are content to dismiss the whole thing as nonsense forgetting, as Fr Victor has recently pointed out in *Blackfriars*, that Jung is a challenge to religion which must be understood and met. It must be met not by an 'either-or' attitude, but by accepting *both* one side *and* the other. If this can be done then the underlying problems of Modern Man will be able to be understood and practical conclusions reached in the area of religious theory and practice. The psychology of Jung deals not only with what is conscious, but more especially with the unconscious and the latent forces that lie there, often hidden from view, but nevertheless at work and slowly bringing about the enantiodromia that often causes such a shock when it breaks the surface of society. To those who feel that the world must be dominated by will power this is a very shocking idea—yet indeed even the Christian will deform his own Christianity as a result of his fear of unconscious forces, and 'will' will corrupt to will power. It is not surprising then that the working of these unconscious powers turns out to be a completely empirical fact.

That there are difficulties in the confrontation of religion and psychology is clear, and some of them are discussed in Fr Victor's book—and also very valuably in the appendix by Fr Gebhard Frei who provides us with an excellent discussion on the 'Self', as well as pointing out some of the difficulties the Catholic must face when trying to appreciate the theories of Dr Jung. But one has to admit that such a teeming field of rich ideas is opened up and such a new appreciation of religious symbolism and thought that it is well worthwhile the trouble involved. The trouble is considerable not only on account of difficulties

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f the subject, but perhaps even more so because the thought of Jung is constantly growing and to some extent changing, at least in emphasis, as this science and therapeutical method have developed in the last half century. However, those who specialize in this corner of the psychological field have indeed chosen the better part which will provide them with a specialized task for a lifetime.

In Father Victor's book we not only meet with a confrontation between Catholicism and psychology, but will find very interesting and detailed expositions on the relationship between the generally despised philosophical psychology of Aristotle and St Thomas and modern discoveries, being a very useful corrective to the latter. For all these reasons therefore we thank Fr Victor for the trouble he has taken with this book.

DOM OSWALD SUMNER

The Christian Dilemma by W. H. Van de Pol, D.D. Translated by G. van Hall PH.D. Pp. xviii + 299 (Dent) 21s.

THIS book is a description of the differences between Catholicism and Protestantism. It is written with the œcumenical movement in mind. The author has long experience of the movement of the reformed churches towards some sort of unity, and a deep understanding of their spiritual standpoints. He is now a Catholic priest and a Professor at Nijmegen University. He has a realistic understanding of the Catholic Church's attitude to the œcumenical movement and is well versed in the Vatican regulations. The total result is a book of a practical and yet profound nature. It is certain to be of great use to members of either the Catholic Church or the reformed churches who take part in the œcumenical movement.

Here are some examples of his analysis of the theological situation. It cannot be denied, however, that . . . many [Catholics] have become estranged from the typically biblical way of thinking; yet, if the Catholic really wishes to be understood by the Protestant, he will have to acquire once again this scriptural mode of thinking; however true it may be that the Protestant might profit by a little scholastic thinking' (p. 115). With this difference in the mode of thinking and speaking is connected still another difference owing to which it is extremely difficult for Catholics and Protestants to understand each other. When both converse together on religion or faith the Catholic speaks from tradition and opportunistic-ly; the Protestant, on the contrary, existentially' (p. 117). 'According to the Catholic Church revelation is a reality-revelation, according to the Reformation it is a word-revelation, and it is a matter of supreme importance that this cardinal difference be not misunderstood' (p. 133). 'The Anglican Communion is itself the embodiment of the œcumenical dilemma which it appreciates and ponders over as does no other part of Christendom. This is why it is this particular communion that con-

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stantly reintroduces the œcumenical discussion and keeps it going, and why the contact between the Eastern Orthodox and Old Catholic Churches on the one side and World Protestantism on the other, which exists on the œcumenical movement, would be unthinkable without the mediating influence of Anglicanism' (p. 189).

The analysis is a refreshing mixture of realism and hope. The cultural traditions of the reformed churches exist; the œcumenical movement exists; the World Council of Churches exists; the Catholic Church exists. Christ, the reconciler and redeemer, is followed by all these, absolutely. Eventually, through charity and understanding, a reconciliation must come. The author stresses the 'understanding'; the two sides must be prepared to study and understand each other, and that without any motive of attempted conversion. There must be complete confidence and trust. The final conclusion is perhaps surprisingly forthright, but completely convincing: 'Catholic Church or Reformation. Such is the dilemma that confronts Christendom. To gloss over facts in such a grave matter, to create illusions that can never be realized deserves no respect for it is a sign of irresponsibility. Inflexibility, steadfastness, a firmness of principles on this point is the best service the Catholic Church can render to the œcumenical movement' (p. 283). But this is a conclusion which is only admissible as the conclusion following from the sort of charity and understanding, and prayer, which this book manifests. The author continues: 'The movement of a universal return to the Mother Church has—humanly speaking—not arrived yet, but Holy Church can make every effort to prepare for such a return. In some sense, such a preparation for the reception of those that return is as indispensable, though in a different way, as their preparation for their homecoming.'

JOHN M. TODD

The Ramayana of Valmiki, Vol. I, translated by Hari Prasad Shastri. Pp. 430 (Shanti Sadan, London) 15s. 6d.

The World Within the Mind (Yoga Vasishtha) by Hari Prasad Shastri. Pp. 142 (Shanti Sadan, London) 8s. 6d.

THE RAMAYANA' is an epic poem of prodigious length (48,000 lines) attributed to the Hindu Sage Valmiki. It narrates in Sanskrit verse the history of Shri Ramachandra, the seventh incarnation of God (Vishnu) whose purpose on earth is to combat the forces of evil personified by King Ravana. Valmiki was inspired to write when, after years of meditation on his hero, he was granted a vision in which he beheld the entire life of Rama. Wishing to preserve his knowledge 'for the good of the world', he recorded his experience employing an inspired metrical form. Rama, as an incarnation of the divine Maintainer of the Universe, takes the form of a perfect man endowed with all manner of excellent and heroic qualities. The eldest son and beloved heir of King Dasaratha, he is married to Princess Sita, an incarnation of Lakshmi.

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the consort of Vishnu), who is similarly endowed with the highest feminine virtues. Exiled through the intrigue of the jealous Queen Kaikeyi, Rama retires to the forests for fourteen years accompanied by his wife Sita and his brother Lakshmana. King Dasaratha is overcome with grief at the departure of his favourite son and eventually dies. Prince Bharata sets out with an army to bring back his brother as the rightful heir. Rama declines to return till he has fulfilled his father's vow and instructs Bharata to act as his deputy. This is a Synopsis of the story as told in the first two books which are translated in the present volume. However, such a brief outline cannot do full justice to the wealth of enchanting description and fascinating detail with which the poem abounds. Professor Shastri provides an admirable translation which reads easily and yet manages to retain the exotic character of the original work.

The World Within the Mind is a selection of extracts from another lengthy Sanskrit poem, 'Yoga Vasishtha', which is also attributed to Valmiki. Whereas in the Ramayana the poet was concerned to relate the story of Shri Rama's outward achievements, here he devotes his energies to describing the spiritual development of his hero. Professor Shastri does not provide a translation of the entire work, a task only comparable to that which he is performing in the Ramayana, instead he singles out certain passages which sum up in a convenient form the essential teaching. This project has been most successful and the publishers have found it necessary to issue a third edition. The chief value of the selection lies in the fact that the choice has been made by one who has an inside knowledge of the Yogic tradition and is in full intellectual sympathy with the poet whose teaching he summarizes. The book deals with the concentration of thought within the mind and the discourses supply the method which chiefly consists in the withdrawal of the senses from the external world and reducing them to inactivity. Yoga is essentially a system of exercises for the attainment of higher states of consciousness and thus to effect the reunion of the soul with the universal soul. By the constant practice of contemplation the absorption of the mind reaches such a pitch that the mind can no longer wander to other objects. At this point the soul receives intuitive knowledge of the essential distinction between soul and matter and so is emancipated. Without wishing to depreciate what is perhaps the supreme achievement of the human mind, unaided by grace or revelation, the fundamental error must be indicated. The noumenon which is the object of this contemplation, on analysis is found to be the coincidence of thought and its object, not God as the Christian mind apprehends him. No matter how much this figment of the mind is elevated in sublime language, it can never raise the system on to a supernatural plane; it merely gives a flavour of transcendence to the proceedings.

DOM GERVASE MURRAY BLIGH

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Primitive Man and his World Picture by Wilhelm Koppers (Sheep and Ward) 16s.

THIS book will probably receive more praise than is its meed and more adverse criticism not unmixed perhaps with downright abuse than it fairly can be said to merit. To understand it one must grasp that it is a product of the reaction which many minds are experiencing against the crude materialist conception of human evolution which has been so long dominant and that this latter was itself a reaction against the Biblical doctrine of primal innocence.

Dr Koppers would perhaps have been wiser had he confined himself to ethnology; for it is when he comes to physical anthropology that the weaknesses in his treatment of his subject become most apparent. He hammers into our ears that it has not been proved that man, in so far as he is an animal, shares a common origin with the ape. Certainly it has not been demonstrated in the strict sense. But such an assertion proves too much. For neither has it been demonstrated that God did not create the world in a week. We involve ourselves in no logical fallacy if we suppose that He did so. Yet it would be difficult to find anyone with pretensions to be called a scientist who would hold this to be the case, since it fits so ill with the testimony of Geology. In a similar way almost all of those who have devoted themselves to the study of human anatomy, physical anthropology and human palæontology are convinced that the body of man has been evolved from lower forms of life. For if this view be rejected a hundred problems present themselves to which we shall be hard put to find a rational answer. Catholic savants such as the Abbé Breuil hold this to be the case no less than non-Catholic ones. A philosophical mind will therefore instead of addressing itself, as does Dr Koppers, to the sterile question as to whether kinship between man and the lower creation has been proved, which it never can be, ask itself instead which view is in best accord with the facts, a question which Dr Koppers discreetly though somewhat irritatingly evades.

On the other hand not everything which he has to say on this subject is by any means irrelevant. He rightly points out that the old view that human evolution from an ape-like form took place in three stages—pithecanthropus, Neanderthal man, Homo Sapiens—must be abandoned in view of such discoveries as those of the Piltdown, Swanscomb and Fontéchevade men. These discoveries make it clear that neanthropus was contemporary with the once supposedly older Neanderthal type. Dr Koppers therefore asks the question whether the pithecolim features of the older hominids, pithecanthropus and sinanthropus, can be explained without recourse to the supposition of evolution from a lower type. That these features may be 'secondary' may not be an impossibility, but even so this supposition would merely discredit a particular theory of evolution leaving the main arguments of it intact. Dr Koppers' treatment of the problem raised by the discovery of the South African

australopithecinae is highly unsatisfactory. In the part of this book concerned with physical anthropology Professor Portmann of Basle, of whom the author has a high opinion, is quoted extensively.

In ethnology Dr Koppers belongs to the school of Father Wilhelm Schmidt of whom he has been a colleague. This school, which had in certain respects an anticipator in this country in Andrew Lang, has sought to draw the attention of a reluctant world to the presence in the cultures of widely dispersed primitive peoples of belief in a 'high God'. The evidence for such seems irresistible and the question arises how are we to interpret it? Scandalized agnostics have often attributed it to borrowing or to missionary influence. Lang believed that it had been reached by a process of reasoning. Koppers sees in it traces of a primitive revelation and believes himself to have shown that alternative theories are untenable. A Catholic must believe in a primitive revelation and so is under a temptation to seek unconsciously for traces of it everywhere as his opponents fall into the opposite error. Can we really form any valid inferences as to the religious beliefs of the far-off men of the Riss-Würm interglacial period from those of primitive peoples? Dr Koppers justly rejects the pseudo-scientific myths of a pre-religious and even pre-logical age. Of the latter, which was eventually abandoned by its author Lévy-Bruhl, he asks how the most primitive of tools could be made by men who did not see the connexion between cause and effect. He seems, however, to overestimate the force of tradition. The zeal shown so often in the burning of the books of opponents is an indication of belief that the doctrine and tradition they contain will not long survive if preserved merely orally. Dr Koppers believes that through eighty generations the Yamana of Tierra del Fuego have preserved the tradition that they were the earliest inhabitants of the country, but can we be sure that such an idea was not put into their heads by a Spaniard?

He believes the tradition of a primitive revelation to have been handed on orally throughout a much longer period. In spite of our enlarged conception of the antiquity of man considered in millennia this is by no means impossible. For traditional belief in a high god might easily persist where historical traditions had become distorted. It is also legitimate to point out that the handiwork of palæolithic man is more likely to show traces of his magical practices than of his monotheism. On the other hand Dr Koppers treats the question of the alleged cannibalism of palæolithic man somewhat arbitrarily: whether it was practised in palæolithic times (and the evidence does not seem by any means decisive) it cannot be disproved by the assertion that cannibalism made its appearance only late in the history of human culture. Such is merely begging the question since the practice may have originated more than once. In view, however, of the fact that this book is likely to be denounced as no more than a product of clerical obscurantism (and the author is by no means wholly free from obscurantism) it may be worth while to

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point out that Dr Koppers's views have some affinity to a writer as free from clericalism as the American psychologist, William James. James in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* finds as a common characteristic of all religions a sense 'that there is *something wrong*' with us as we stand on a belief basically similar to that in a lost paradise. Dr Koppern seems to be one of those men whose learning is greater than his wisdom. When he has a good case he damages it, or at least runs the risk of so doing, by overstatement, while his didactic manner sometimes verging on pedantry is calculated to put off readers whom he might otherwise have benefited.

HUMPHREY J. T. JOHNSON

The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages by Beryl Smalley. Pp. xxii + 406 (Oxford, Basil Blackwell) 37s. 6d.

FROM a chance remark of Luther, talking at random in a moment of singular forgetfulness, grew the legend that the Bible was hardly ever read in the Middle Ages. There can be few left to-day who believe it; but modern biblical scholars and exegetes have tended to look back with little interest and less favour at the efforts of their medieval predecessors. In the last half century the students of medieval religion and culture have been remarkably active in reconstructing the framework of medieval theology and intellectual life; and inevitably there have been some among them who have turned aside to blow the dust off the medieval bibles which cluster in such profusion in the libraries of Europe. But it was not until 1941 that there appeared the first attempt to put together what was known of medieval biblical scholarship, Miss Smalley's *Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*. In 1952, there appeared a revised and enlarged edition of this important book.

The author does not set out to view medieval bible study from every possible aspect: there is little attempt to expound the content of medieval glosses and commentaries as a literary form, to work out the subtleties or the significance of medieval allegory, or to set medieval exegesis in its theological setting. Nor would the book gain from any attempt to be more comprehensive. By confining the limits of her theme, Miss Smalley has preserved the unity of her work and enabled it to reveal throughout the fullness of her understanding and sympathy with the subject. She is a scholar and teacher writing about scholars and teachers, and she writes with charm and sympathy of her fellow-workers. With the more extravagant medieval exegetes she is less sympathetic: and Joachim of Flora and his followers are severely trounced. But these personal impressions are not defects in the work, for it is the combination of personal insight and friendly, familiar criticism with exact and thorough scholarship which lends the book its delicacy and grace.

Miss Smalley is primarily concerned with biblical scholarship and with the literal interpretation of the Bible: she therefore places Andrew

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f St Victor, the twelfth century apostle of the literal sense and the pupil of the Rabbis, in the centre of the picture; and much of the later part of the book is concerned with Hebrew scholarship and relations with contemporary Jews, since it was to the Jews that medieval scholars turned in the first instance for advice on the literal meaning of the Old Testament. The principal insertion in the revised edition is a study of the newly discovered commentary on the Psalter by Herbert of Bosham: a man already known for his life of St Thomas Becket (a diffuse and rollicky work, but yet a masterpiece), and now revealed as one of the foremost Hebrew scholars of the Middle Ages and Andrew's most brilliant pupil.

Round this central theme the author has grouped the chapters of her story—the development of medieval exegesis from 800-1300. A brief but valuable account of patristic theories is followed by an investigation of the fortunes of the seminal ideas of Augustine, Jerome and the best among the exegetes of the high Middle Ages who were their pupils. The story develops through the media of Bible study—monastic *scriptoria*, cathedral schools and university lecture rooms—and the literary forms—gloss, commentary and postill—through the authors of the *Glossa Ordinaria* and the Victorines, to Stephen Langton and the Friars. The text is not overloaded with footnotes, but there is sufficient to reveal the immense labour which has gone into the making of the book; and many refer to the technical studies of Miss Smalley herself. A remarkable proportion of this synthesis is based on her own research into the gloss from which she has cleared away the dust and cobwebs of centuries of curious tradition), Andrew (virtually her discovery), Stephen Langton and a host of other names and topics.

The new edition contains some corrections and precisions and references to recent literature; but the bulk of the new material is the fruit of further study: with the exception of Herbert of Bosham, the author's chief work over the last decade has been on thirteenth century scholars, especially among the Friars. It is sufficient to say that the additions enhance the value of the book without detracting from its atmosphere of pioneer discovery. *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* is one of the finest fruits of English medieval scholarship which has appeared in recent years.

C. N. L. BROOKE

Thomas Becket of Canterbury by Alfred Duggan (Faber) 12s. 6d.

It was a good idea to write a kind of simple monograph which might supplement the rather dreary text-book surveys which our schools have usually to make do with. To write history on this level, however, is perhaps the most difficult task a historian can undertake. It requires extreme accuracy of fact and a rare discretion in interpretation, which will allow for the simple black and white terms in which schoolboys

have to be given their history. Unfortunately, Mr Duggan is insufficiently equipped for this admittedly, herculean, labour. Errors in fact abound: some of them, e.g. the premature canonization of St Anselm (p. 16) are not serious, others, e.g. the horrible confusion between the Chancery and the Exchequer enrolments (p. 62) are important but pardonable since it is to Mr Duggan's credit that he has attempted to cope with this administration at all. Much more serious, however, are the profound errors of interpretation which colour almost every page of the book. The Normans are supposed to have brought civilization to England which 'was only civilized in the last century' (p. 16): feudalism is used in an extremely wide and rather perverse sense. Mr Duggan is so romantic as to suppose that fealty counted for more than military strength in twelfth century Europe and in consequence the Angevin Empire is placed fourth in the hierarchy of powers, to the French kingdom's third. There are stale Whiggish echoes: 'The twelfth century believed in a controlled economy, though no one trusted the King's government to administer the controls' (p. 31). The Church receives no better treatment from Mr Duggan. His opinion (p. 83) that perhaps the dying Archbishop's threat to excommunicate Thomas was intended only as a joke, defies comment. Thomas himself is forced to appear as a kind of knight *manqué*, which leads Mr Duggan as far as blasphemy (p. 79). The captions to the well-chosen illustrations are a little absurd.

It is a pity that this book cannot be wholeheartedly recommended for Mr Duggan has a talent for lucid exposition and his style is clear and vigorous. It remains, however, a most unsuitable book to put into the hands of schoolboys.

ERIC JOHN

St Benedict Joseph Labre by Agnes de la Gorce. Pp. 213 (Sheed and Ward) 10s. 6d.

IN the life of St Benedict Joseph Labre we are presented with the archetypal pattern of the rejected man who is brought to nothing in the most complete sense of the word. He is the Wild Man of the Middle Ages transformed into real holiness. He is first rejected from all of the normal calls of a respectable life, that of the student for the priesthood, of the Carthusian, of the Trappist and Cistercian. At last he discovers that it is his vocation to be a homeless vagabond, wandering largely in foreign countries, unknown, despised and rejected by those whom he passes by the wayside. He seems to be blown like an autumn leaf here and there, trampled under foot, left as a good-for-nothing by all normal and sensible men, branded as a lazy ne'er-do-well.

Yet this Saint almost seems to be the special patron of our own age—an age when whole peoples and classes have lost their way and wandered in waterless places, dispossessed and displaced, caught up by an aimless and godless mechanical age. Well may the men of the industrial era

consider that holiness or even religion is not for them; is even an impossibility and therefore untrue for them in their utterly uprooted condition. And then before their eyes is shown the portion of the poor man who found his vocation and sanctity in conditions often so closely resembling their own and clearly prepared by Divine Providence to be the antidote to the pride and self satisfaction of the age of Enlightenment and of the machine, rejecting, as does this archetypal man, all the artificial and hygienic props which modern man considers as the essential mark of culture.

St Benedict Joseph Labre presents us with a life which is completely abandoned to the action of God as it comes to him in the conditions of nature—in rain, storm, heat and cold, and in the behaviour of men towards him, whether well, or more often ill. He accepts all that happens to him without question or resistance and in this acceptance attains the heights of mystical holiness so striking that we find this beggar and tramp raised by popular acclaim to the highest honours open to man.

There is no need to say more to recommend this quite excellent life, built up from the very scanty records found in the canonization process, which nevertheless manages to rescue a real portrait of the man from the few shreds left to us.

DOM OSWALD SUMNER

The Coasts of the Country, edited by Claire Kirchberger, with an introduction by Godfrey Anstruther, O.P. Pp. xiv + 226 (Harvill Press) 15s.

THE book is comprised almost entirely of extracts from the works of English spiritual writers from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. It divides into two parts. The first part consists in what are in effect meditations on God the Father, Our Lord, Our Lady, prayer, etc. and is drawn from MSS that are either unpublished or difficult of access. In the section on liturgical prayer, it is interesting to see that the author of *The Chastising of God's Children* (written before 1400), already has the old idea that liturgical prayer is true prayer acceptable to God—'though we understand no word that ye say'—solely on the grounds that it is ordered by Holy Church (p. 54).

The second part is chiefly drawn from the works of Rolle, Hilton, Dame Julian of Norwich and from the *Cloud of Unknowing*. It aims at setting out their teaching on contemplative prayer. The arrangement of these authors is convenient for the reader, but it is doubtful whether these early English writers can really be made to fit into a plan of the development of the life of prayer which did not receive its classical expression till a century or two after their death. For instance, all extracts from Dame Julian, save three, are grouped under the final section of part two, 'Union'; and all the passages from the *Cloud of Unknowing* come in the 'Work of Contemplation—(section) II.' Further quotations from

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the *Doctrine of the Heart* would have been welcome. There are no extracts in Latin, and there is a useful glossary of English words.

The note on the responsory 'Libera' (p. 245), is not quite correct. The versicle 'Burning Souls' is to be found in the Sarum Breviary in the ninth Responsory of the third Nocturn of Mattins for the Dead in the Office for All Souls' Day.

DOM DOMINIC GAISFORD

The School of the Lord's Service. Vol. III. By Bernard Sause, O.S.B., PH.D., J.C.D. Pp. vi + 575 (The Grail, St Meinrad, Indiana) \$4.00

THIS is the third and last volume of a work which bears the subtitle : 'Meditation, Particular Examen, and Practical Application for every day of the year, Based on the Rule of St Benedict'. An English translation of the Rule is followed by four main subjects for consideration, one for each of the last four months of the year. Under each of these headings is a meditation for every day of the month. The subjects chosen are : ninth month : Spirit of Detachment (Poverty) ; tenth month : Good Zeal ; eleventh month : Practices, Interpretations, and Attitudes that have grown from the Rule ; twelfth month : Intimate Union with God. Finally there is a bibliography of over a hundred works.

It is perhaps unfortunate that Dom Bernard has chosen to present to his monastic brethren and to the general public his reflexions on the Rule of St Benedict and its practical implications for the monastic life of to-day in the form of meditations for every day of the year. I hope I do not stand self-condemned as a tyro in the religious life when I say that under this guise I would never have read the book had I not been asked to review it—I am still unacquainted with the two preceding volumes—and my loss would have been considerable. I am sure the number of those who would derive both profit and enjoyment from the book taken simply as spiritual reading far exceeds that of those who could use it for the purpose for which its author intends it to be used, namely as the subject matter of discursive prayer. For those who cannot the material itself is excellent. But the author, so it appears to me, addresses himself chiefly to religious who have been professed for some years, and who will therefore in their prayer have passed beyond the stage at which they can make any effective use of this kind of thing. Taken as spiritual reading, in which case one would get through at least half-a-dozen meditations in the half-hour, the book in its present form will be found tiresomely repetitive. It would be an ideal book for a Benedictine Tertianship ; but this practice of the Society of Jesus is not as far as I am aware the custom in any Benedictine Congregation. If it were, the book would offer a splendid plan of operations, providing as it does a focusing-point for each day's effort during the year's campaign. Similarly one or other of the main subjects, or a month's meditations, might be found useful to concentrate upon during an eight days' retreat. The

author himself offers a selection from each month's considerations for use during a day of recollection. But it is one thing to make the informal, out-of-prayer-time though prayerful, meditation, with or without the help of books, which we all do during retreats, and quite another to expect professed religious who are no longer beginners in the spiritual life to be able, in the perhaps limited time which their work allows them to devote to mental prayer, to pray in the discursive manner which the apparatus of this book seems to imply. Moreover such a big range of subjects—it would be hard to think of any aspect of Benedictine monachism not covered by at least one meditation—each with its examination of conscience and practical resolutions, seems to make for a 'multiplicity' undesirable for beginners and wholly stultifying for the more advanced.

There is a welcome variation of treatment in the second section, devoted to 'Good Zeal'. This virtue, the subject of the beautiful seventy-second chapter of the Rule, is illustrated from the life and works of monks and nuns from every period of Benedictine history. By no means all of them were saints. The brief sketches which are all that Dom Bernard can give us in the compass of a short meditation stimulates desire for further knowledge of some of the less well known, such as Blessed Richard of St Vanne. Members of the English Congregation will be glad that Dom has been found for their own Fr Augustine Baker. They will also sympathize with the author's difficulty in reading *Holy Wisdom* as a device. He writes: 'I had concluded that he was a most boring author (may he now forgive me!) . . .' It is not for finding *Holy Wisdom* heavy-going that Dom Bernard needs forgiveness, but for having supposed that the book as we have it is from the pen of Fr Baker. Those who have read the Baker manuscripts or his published *Life of Dame Gertrude More* know that his writing is anything but boring. What makes *Holy Wisdom* difficult reading is the somewhat desiccated legal style of Fr Erenus Cressy, who made the 'digest' from several of the Baker manuscripts.

The convent of Cambrai is described in a note as 'in reality a restoration', and the present Stanbrook Abbey as a 'lineal descendant of the Cambray foundation'. It would be a kindness to the Stanbrook community if in future editions both these statements were corrected. Cambrai was in fact a new beginning, but that community, after the many vicissitudes of the French Revolution, came to England and settled at Stanbrook, where it keeps brightly burning the flame first kindled by the teaching of Fr Baker and the life of his favourite and much favoured disciple, Dame Gertrude More.

This is not a work of superficial piety, and the author does not spare his reader. He delves deep down into the roots of monastic behaviour and reveals a knowledge of human nature as it is to be found in the monk who, no longer enjoying the 'fervor novitii', is in the midst of the life-long struggle not to make ends of all that the monastic life offers him

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as the means to spiritual perfection. Such a book could only have been born of experience, and it is not the least part of the author's achievement that, whilst never failing to get to grips with the particular problem, he so rarely fails to transcend the differences of spirit and tradition to be found in the many Benedictine Congregations and individual monasteries. One of the reasons for his success is undoubtedly the extensive use which he has made of his bibliography. Although he has plenty to say on his own account, there is hardly a meditation in which he does not quote from his wide reading. I hope he will forgive me for saying that one of the reasons for my own unflagging interest in this book, and for my hope that it will be widely read, is that it provides an admirable anthology of all the classical commentaries on almost every subject treated in the Rule, and many others besides. May we hope that the conclusion of this work, and the success which it deserves, may encourage its author to embark upon what, unless I am mistaken, the Monastic Order still awaits from the New World, namely a Commentary on the Rule?

Our Lady of Fatima by the Most Rev. Finbar Ryan, O.P., Archbishop of Port of Spain. Pp. 260 (Browne and Nolan Ltd, Dublin) 7s. 6d.

PERHAPS the best recommendation of this book lies in the fact that it has called for five editions since it was first published in 1939. Many books have appeared since that date which give the story of the Apparitions and the lives of those concerned in them with a greater wealth of detail than does that of His Grace the Archbishop of Port of Spain. But we venture to think that none tells the story more beautifully, and none has done more, if we may be allowed to quote a message from the Holy Father to the author, 'to provide for the English-speaking world a concise and interesting explanation of the significance of the "message" of Fatima.'

This book, translated into Portuguese, was read and approved by Lucia, the sole survivor of the three privileged children of Fatima; a fact which not only adds to its interest, but gives assurance to the reader. We hope that the author has succeeded in his desire to set forth the facts of Fatima 'objectively and without exaggeration.'

An appendix gives an account of the Silver Jubilee of Fatima celebrated in 1942, written by the Very Rev. P. H. O'Sullivan, O.P., an eye-witness. There are also the two Addresses broadcast by His Holiness in October 1942, and May 1946, respectively.

The compactness of this little volume with its good clear type and seven illustrations (the stained-glass window and Irish monstrance might for aesthetic reasons have been omitted) make it an admirable bedside book for the ever growing multitude of clients of *Our Lady of Fatima*.

DOM ALBAN BROOKS

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

The Blessed Virgin by Jean Guitton. Pp. 190 (Burns Oates)

ONE would expect that a book on our Lady by such a distinguished apologetical writer as Jean Guitton, even though written mainly for Protestants, would be destined for the shelf on which we keep the books we want to read again and again. However, it does not belong to that category. The present reviewer read it twice, each time finding it tedious, and neither time feeling that it came to grips with the subject. For example, Zundel in his book on the Blessed Virgin (though, in all fairness, his book has different aims).

The lists of hypothetical questions, the 'reflexions' (sometimes rather odd) and the descriptions of what people must have felt, etc., must be especially tiresome for those to whom the book is primarily addressed—unless they happen to be exceptionally unprejudiced.

But the book, if one is able to cope with the style (or is it the way in which it is translated?) is not all hard going. Part Two, 'The Development of Thought Concerning the Virgin', shows that the author can write and there are many 'good things' scattered throughout. There is no doubt that a reading of the book will provide a fairly comprehensive knowledge of contemporary Catholic thought on the subject, though one feels that it is not always of the best type.

DOM CHRISTOPHER LEYNE

The Little World of Men by J. B. Bamborough. Pp. 187 (Longmans)

BACKGROUND' has long since been found a most useful source of raw material in the American research factories, and few investigators of the 'history of ideas' will nowadays omit to invoke such formidable but delightful-sounding deities as Professor Lovejoy or Miss Hoxy Fairchild. Mr Bamborough's book on Elizabethan psychological theory is an English treatment of what seems a typically transatlantic 'research project'. Indeed, the subject has already been treated in Miss M. L. Anderson's *Elizabethan Psychology and Shakespeare's Plays* (Iowa, 1927). The contrast is indeed interesting. Miss Anderson's book is a card-index, used without very much percipience of its potentialities or of its limitations. Mr Bamborough's book is a card-index used with intelligence, *flair*, and above all, modesty.

Mr Bamborough deals with the Elizabethan (or Renaissance) ideas of the Body, the Soul, and their influences on each other. Of the relative value of his findings to the study of Shakespeare's plays he is refreshingly under-optimistic: 'This book is an attempt to set out the psychological theory that was current when Shakespeare wrote. It is not an attempt to re-create or re-interpret Shakespeare's characters, nor is it a study of Shakespeare's methods of characterization' (p. 11) . . . 'A knowledge of Renaissance psychology will not explain all of Shakespeare's characters, nor all of any one of them' (p. 13) . . . 'Hamlet is certainly a melancholiac,

but it cannot be too much emphasized that his melancholy is Elizabethan and not Romantic ; nor is it very profitable to attempt to justify from contemporary psychology what critics have inferred about his nature (p. 113). We are offered no hidden key to the interpretation of Shakespeare, and no character analyses. Indeed, Mr Bamborough is so careful in avoiding contentious Shakespearian issues that by the end of the book the reader may begin to wonder what *is* the connexion with Shakespeare. The answer is that the book provides, in a most concise and economical form, an illuminating source of reference on innumerable Shakespearian cruxes. *Omne quod ignotum pro magnifico*: expressions which were hitherto surrounded by a haze of mystery now come into focus. Gloster's death, for instance:

'his flaw'd heart . . .

Twixt two extremes of passion, joy and grief,

Burst smilingly'

is now seen to be a technically exact diagnosis within the terms of Elizabethan psychology.

Mr Bamborough also provides some extremely useful ammunition for use against the sentimental-Romantic interpretation of Shakespearean tragic heroes. Othello, for instance, is unhesitatingly grouped with Lear and Timon as a 'mad' hero, and on the romanticizing of *Antony and Cleopatra* the remarks are particularly acute: 'To the Renaissance Passion could never be its own justification, as to some extent it has become since the Romantic period. Antony's is a case of perverted will which knows it is pursuing evil, but cannot draw back . . . *Antony and Cleopatra* is perhaps more 'the tragedy of Antony' than we think, and perhaps in a slightly different sense. It is not till the Restoration that we come to '*All for Love: or the World Well Lost*' (pp. 48-9—Mr Bamborough persistently uses the spelling 'Anthony').

The account given of Elizabethan terminology prompts the contrast and comparison with later developments. By 'Wit', for instance, the Elizabethans understood the passive power of the rational soul to attain to Truth (cf Langland's concept of 'Wit'). But by the eighteenth century 'Wit' had deteriorated into 'Nature to advantage dressed, What was thought but ne'er so well expressed'. 'Common sense' shows a similar kind of deterioration from the technical *sensus communis* to present day meaning. The eighteenth century concept of 'Enthusiasm' however, owes more to its Elizabethan signification: Mr Bamborough classifies it as 'the desirable form of melancholy'.

The book has a very useful subject index for cross-reference, but it would have been a great benefit to the layman if there had been some account of the personalities and works of the Renaissance psychologists considered in themselves, and not merely the summary of their views on particular topics. Although there is a group of Englishmen among them including Timothy Bright, Thomas Hill and Thomas Wright, the major

influences were from English translations of continental authors: 'Arcandam', Coeffetau, du Laurens, Ludvig Lemmens, and de la Primaudaye. Elizabethan interest in psychology is in itself a phenomenon that seems to require explanation, and a strictly philosophical approach might put the phenomenon in its true perspective. It would be interesting, too, to hear the comments from a member of the modern neo-Hippocratic school of psycho-somatic medicine on the practical value of the achievements of the Renaissance school. But that would require books other than the one Mr Bamborough has written. It says enough for *The Little World of Man* that it stimulates as much as it satisfies.

English Casuistical Divinity during the Seventeenth Century by Thomas Wood. Pp. xxx + 158 (S.P.C.K.) 12s. 6d.

THIS short book is another sign of the growing interest in Anglican theology of the seventeenth century. The scope is less ambitious than that of Canon McAdoo's *The Structure of Caroline Moral Theology* (1949), and Mr Wood confines himself to a sketch of the chief characteristics of the Anglican literature of 'cases of conscience'. Indeed, the book is somewhat in the nature of a *ballon d'essai*, for in the introduction the reader is promised a fuller treatment of the subject at a later date, and in the appendix an outline is given for a possible anthology of Anglican casuistry.

After opening with an indication of the important part played by the science of casuistry in Anglican religious life of the seventeenth century, Mr Wood brings out at many points the indebtedness of the Anglican casuists to the medieval schoolmen, especially in the idea of natural law and of economic morality. The idea of a 'medieval' seventeenth century is, however, such a fashionable commonplace (and half-truth) nowadays, that we are grateful for the stress that is laid on the differences as well as on the similarities between the schoolmen and the Anglican divines.

The conscious opposition of the Anglican casuists to the 'Jesuit' teaching is also discussed. It is largely admitted, indeed, that what was opposed was not so much Jesuit teaching itself as Pascal's version of Jesuit teaching. The Jansenist influence among the Anglicans was considerable, and Mr Wood rightly stresses the importance of the appearance of an English translation of the *Lettres Provinciales* in 1657. The seriousness, however, with which Mr Wood takes the seventeenth century Anglican discussion on equivocation will seem a little unreal to twentieth-century speakers. He speaks of the 'horror inspired by the practices of equivocation and mental reservation in the minds of the English casuists', and quotes Jeremy Taylor as saying that the behaviour of Catholic priests in England during the reigns of Elizabeth, James I, and Charles I, had shown 'that in the Church of Rome it is publicly taught by their

greatest doctors that it is lawful to lie, or deceive the question of the magistrate, to conceal their name and to tell a false one, to elude examinations, and make them insignificant and toothless'. Taylor further complains that such practices are 'destructive of Christian society'. The casuists do not seem to have considered the question of the lawfulness of persecution for religion, or of the hunting-down and torturing of priests for the sole fact of their priesthood. The moral responsibility for the use of equivocation lay with the government, who demanded of their captive answers to questions which they had no right to ask. There is no doubt that under persecution a certain amount of equivocation was certainly used, though indeed Fr Parsons, the Jesuit, strongly and publicly advised against it. But for the Anglican divines to quote this as a slur on the moral characters of victims of a ruthless persecution is merely a further proof of the diabolical power of Elizabethan propaganda. As for equivocation being 'destructive of Christian society'—tell that to the Resistance Movement, or to someone living in Eastern Europe to-day.

Our incursion into polemics on a hoary theme should not detract from the value of Mr Wood's book as a survey of the subject-matter of the Anglican casuists, and in all fairness we should stress his considerable acquaintance with Catholic sources. The idea of conscience and doubt and of law and obligation are dealt with, and also questions of economic conduct, though here it is to be noted that the Puritans Ames and Baxter have more to offer than the Anglicans (Bunyan's *Mr Badman* has the tradition of Puritan casuists behind it). The treatment of mortal and venial sin and of repentance is of course bound up with the Anglican attitude to confession.

We will certainly concede that the works of the seventeenth century Anglican casuists make more edifying reading than the handbooks of moral theology to-day, which are, as Mr Wood aptly quotes from H. T. Slater, S.J., 'books of moral pathology'. The tendency to exalt conscience over prudence is a general post-Reformation phenomenon. But with the inevitable decline of its sacramental and mystical theology, conscience becomes the hinge of the Anglican system. To the Anglican casuists of the seventeenth century we owe (and it is a great debt) the sobriety and *pietas* of the English moral tradition. The line runs from the seventeenth century, through Bishop Butler, to Newman.

It is to be hoped that Mr Wood's future projects in this field will come to a speedy fruition. We would only suggest that in his future work he might distinguish more sharply the Puritan tradition of Perkins, Ames and Baxter, from what can be truly called the 'Anglican' tradition, and also that he might consider the omission of Bishop Barlow's work from his future anthology on the grounds of the wide discrepancy between Barlow's principles and his practice—indeed to justify Barlow's public life would need the sort of casuistry which is vulgarly associated with the epithet 'jesuitical'.

T. A. BIRRELL

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Monastic Sites from the Air by David Knowles and J. K. S. St Joseph. Pp. xxviii + 283 (Cambridge University Press) 55s.

MORE than a hundred aerial photographs of England, Scottish and Welsh monasteries have been gathered together in this, the first volume of the *Cambridge Air Surveys*—a series designed to illustrate the uses of aerial photography in various fields of study. The book is admirably planned: each photograph is accompanied by a concise description, concerned mainly with the site as it now exists, with historical and architectural notes kept to a minimum, and references are given to reliable monographs, plans and the like in each case. The body of the work is preceded by a dissertation, illustrated with several plans, on the development of the medieval monastic building plan, and is followed by a map and the necessary indexes.

Most of the views are of admirable quality, and integrate in a remarkable way what to the observer at ground level may be no more than disjointed fragments of masonry. But the quality is far from uniform, and it is small consolation to know that the 'large building nearest to the camera' at Notley is 'substantially mediaeval' when there is little, if anything, in the picture to distinguish Notley from any other farmhouse.

The selection of views might also be open to criticism. Some sites, as explained in the preface, could not be photographed; while some others could not possibly be omitted from any such work as this. Thus Westminster fails to appear, while such notable sites as Tintern, Fountains and Glastonbury are fully treated (but did Glastonbury ever even have a western range?). But on p. 270, Lantony *secunda* is rather apologetically introduced as an example of a monastery whose remains have suffered from their proximity to an industrial site (and on the same page occurs the hybrid spelling Llantony). Moreover, while Margam's admittedly remarkable chapter-house and celebrated (post-reformation) orangery are shown, the extensive and not uninteresting remains of Neath are omitted. And the general tone of the descriptive notes throughout the book makes one feel that perhaps the industrialized surroundings are in some way responsible for this. Yet surely the honest desolation of Neath and Lantony is preferable to the aura of ritualistic procession and bogus legend that has accumulated around Glastonbury.

Another site whose omission we may regret is Caldey (like Neath it occurs in the list of monastic views in the Cambridge collection), where ancient and modern monasteries are to be seen in juxtaposition; it would have been particularly appropriate in this collection, which includes a number of purely modern monasteries, and some that have lately returned into monastic or religious hands (e.g. Pluscardin).

A few plates showing some not strictly monastic (but by no means irrelevant) sites conclude the collections of views, and the last view of all shows Cambridge. And here it must be said that the notes on p. 274 will surely lead many readers to mistake New Court of St John's, with

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its prominent cloister, for Magdalene. More remarkable is the claim made on the same page, that 'the colleges of the two universities were the only religious communities of the medieval world to escape the Tudor bonfire, and to remain, almost within living memory, the only bodies of celibate clergymen in England with a status recognized by authority'. The first of these statements is scarcely fair to the Syon House nuns, who have lost their buildings twice over, but retained what Oxford and Cambridge lost once and for all; and as to the second, one has but to think of a man like Perne of Peterhouse to realize that any surviving resemblances have for centuries been no more than superficial. 'Celibate' and 'Monk' are not convertible terms any more than 'College' and 'Monastery'—though monasteries are 'collegia' and their inmates celibate.

DOM BENEDICT SANKEY

Woman To-day by John Fitzsimons. Pp. ix + 192 (Sheed and Ward) 8s. 6d.

FATHER FITZSIMONS has obviously given much care to summing up the problems facing women in modern life. He offers no solution to these problems, saying, very wisely, in his introduction: 'They must discover themselves, with their latent powers and possibilities as well as their obligations . . . and work out their own solutions . . .'

In the first two chapters, Fr Fitzsimons contrasts woman's life and influence before and after the Industrial Revolution, and describes the efforts made by women to adapt themselves to modern conditions. While obviously in favour of the results of their efforts, better education for girls, franchise and a wider sphere of influence in society, he bewails the loss of femininity in the great pioneers who fought for women's rights. He has to admit, however, that there is a movement of revolt against this obvious growing pain of modern womanhood.

It is possible that Fr Fitzsimons gets his depressed view of women's future from the fact that he seems to study only one type and mainly one age of the species—young girls who, having been unwillingly dragged through some years of mediocre schooling, emerge inarticulate, with a false standard of values and an infantile knowledge of their religion. Small wonder that they accept degrading repetitive work in factories where they are of far less value than the machines they mind. They are but one section of the community, and it is not from them that progress will come, but from their more intelligent sisters, who will win their battles for them as their mothers have done in the past, and whom Fr Fitzsimons insults by saying 'Talk of work as a vocation' (to the average girl) 'or of service to the community would leave her quite unmoved . . .'

Fr Fitzsimons must not expect mature judgment from adolescent, ill-educated girls. Let him cheer himself up by reading some reports of the fine work done by Catholic women's organizations, the care of the old and the sick, marriage guidance, the help to refugees, the careful watch

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kept on such bodies as Unesco, and the war of attrition carried on in social, political and educational circles to wear down the stubborn brutality of godless councils. It's unnecessarily depressing to stand with one's back to the dawn and deplore the length of the night.

Fr Fitzsimons devotes a chapter each to a study of women's intelligence, emotions and love—has, in fact, tried to find out what makes her tick; he's not the first, nor, I suppose, the last man to break up woman into her component parts and still not understand that she is a human being, made in God's image, and that each one is unique. What woman would ever commit the folly of writing a book on Man?

Having disagreed with the author (and I could go on much longer), it is only fair to say that this book holds much of value. There is an admirable chapter on the theology of woman, and one which discusses with understanding (but with a touch of an old-fashioned contempt) the case of the spinster. There is an alarming curriculum for modern education of girls. Modern dangers and failures are made apparent, and much of the advice is sound and will prove useful to those whose social conscience needs arousing; even if useful in the same way as I find a cookery book invaluable: I read the advice given and go and do otherwise.

But lest this study of modern conditions for women in industry, with its sad submissiveness to such appalling threats as that the home has ceased to be the centre of men's lives, or that woman, should she fight for her rights, will lose her femininity, should push the ill-treated industrial worker still deeper into the slough of despond, let me remind her that woman's weapons are not man's weapons (that is why, as Fr Fitzsimons so often regrets in his book, girls do not like joining Trades Unions); that she has, in the last hundred years, made, and is still making remarkable progress against modern evils.

In the last resort let her remember the proverb men rule the world, women rule men.

EMMI SHEPPARD

Love is My Vocation. An Imaginative Study of St Thérèse of Lisieux by Tom Clarkson. Pp. 232 (Allan Wingate) 10s. 6d.

AN imaginative study must always run the risk of appealing to some and repelling others: Mr Clarkson does both in turn. He draws a faithful and most probable picture of the Martin family at Alençon in their button boots, busy at painting or lace-making while M. Martin turns the pages of *L'Année Liturgique*, all waiting for the birth upstairs of the missionary who is to fulfil her destiny in such an unexpected way; and conjures up many other scenes for us with a skill only exceeded by that great authoress and Saint with whose life he deals. Yet it must be confessed that there are times when this picture is clouded

by strained language and far-fetched metaphors—‘a thin sweet wail’ is surely a contradiction in terms as a description of Compline; and did the autumn sunset really flow over the Carmel ‘like thick Normandy cider’? These, however, are momentary irritations, and his love of St Thérèse can be felt beneath this veneer of slightly stilted simile and *outré* epigram; and he has done what every good interpreter should hope to do in turning his readers irresistibly to the Saint of whom he writes.

DOM DENIS AGIUS

COMMENTARY

Amongst a great multitude of Catholic movements in France, a new one has recently come much before the public eye. *Pax Christi* was given a special importance when the Pope chose to deliver to it his allocution on the unification of Europe, with its emphasis on the need for political and economic unity, last September.

The popularity of *Pax Christi* arose out of the need for a peace movement which Catholics could join, in the embarrassment caused by the circulation of peace petitions by Communists. In the event the movement has become a focusing point for the specifically Christian contribution to the cause of European peace and unity, of the more popular sort. In September last the pilgrimage and congress at Assisi were the occasion for a meeting, for praying and studying together, of people from many European nations. Three hundred foot pilgrims from many nations provided an impressive witness, and the whole event was clearly a starting point for the groundwork of any real peace in Europe, the actual friendship of people from different nations.

Liturgically the events at Assisi were impressive. As many as a thousand people took part and soon grasped the simple Latin Gregorian chants which were proposed for their use. One of the most frequently used was the *Ubi caritas* from the Maundy Thursday liturgy. The first occasion for this was when the foot pilgrims left the church of St Francis into which they had processed directly on their arrival in the town. After a series of reports from each group delivered impromptu from the altar steps, we left the church in rows of four, alternating groups of men and women, hand in hand, and singing *Ubi caritas*.

Mgr Feltin, the Archbishop of Paris, is the international president of *Pax Christi*. The movement is a typical broad continental movement; whilst taking up no particular positions itself as an established movement of the Church, it includes, amongst others, members of

COMMENTARY

movements committed to a refusal to take part in any modern war. Mgr Feltin answered a carefully put question on the subject at a press conference at Assisi. A little international group of such members also were received at the Vatican later and asked that the Church should clarify its position still further on the subject. The need for such clarification will appear from the quotations below from two English Catholic papers.

The French organ of *Pax Christi*, bearing that title, is published every other month from 5 Rue Mabillon, Paris, 6e. The most hopeful side of the movement is that which was manifest in the young foot pilgrims. It seems likely that *Les Routes de la Paix* will be heard of again travelling across Europe. On the official side, a German Bishop, Mgr Schoeffer of Eichstädt, and an Italian Bishop, Mgr Rossi of Biella, are encouraging the movement in their own countries, as national presidents of it.

* * *

Stella Maris. July 1952. Answers to correspondents: 'Is a Catholic justified in being a conscientious objector to military service?' No. We are bound to obey the State in the legitimate exercise of its authority . . .

Catholic Herald. 7th November 1952. Answers to your questions: 'May a Catholic be a conscientious objector?' Most certainly.

It may be said that the danger of such direct contradiction is a risk that must be run in trying to give brief guides in answer to questions about immediate moral problems. But it is a risk that can also be avoided in most cases. The second answer above is the traditional answer of the Church in her concern for the integrity of the individual Christian's conscience. The first answer is obviously one that the Church allows a theologian to give; theologians who to-day promulgate a precisely opposite opinion, that a Catholic to-day ought to be a conscientious objector, are not censured. The matter is one of 'indifference'. However, it seems rather a doubtful practice to answer a question thus unconditionally without indicating that the answer is only an opinion and not the traditional teaching of the Church. When the result is mutual contradiction between theologians in answering the problems of the faithful, it is obviously something to be avoided as being harmful to the true education of conscience and harmful to the Church as a whole which is made to appear not to know its own mind. The answerer in the first case appeared to be unaware that the conscientious objector in England can attain a legal status. On being called up for service the conscript may register in the ordinary way, or he may register as a conscientious objector. In England, then, it would seem to be an extraordinary interference with the judgment of the individual conscience to deny this right of objection to the Catholic.

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IN *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* for the third quarter of 1952, Fr Walter Croce, S.J., traces the development of the Advent Masses of the Roman Missal to the time of Gregory the Great. He suggests that it was no part of Gregory's intention that the form then adopted should remain fixed and firm during the following centuries; there is need for a study of what was lost through this conservatism and of what changes might yet be introduced. With a view to clarifying thought on the Mass, Fr E. Gutwenger, S.J., discusses the sacramental unity of Christ and the Eucharistic species: not enough attention, he thinks, has been given to the distinction between the two levels of existence, physical and sacramental; thus the whole Christ is physically present, but the body alone is sacramentally and really under the species of bread and the blood under the species of wine.

In *Scholastik* for the fourth quarter of 1952, Fr Piet Fransen, S.J., examines the discussions at Bologna in 1547, on the possibility of divorce after adultery in the light of earlier tradition and as preparing the way for Canon seven of Session twenty-four of the Council of Trent. There was never any doubt of the absolute indissolubility of marriage, but some of the Fathers were not convinced that this was definitely settled for the Church by our Lord's own words.

E.Q.

HAGUE

AND SON

A. J. PAYNE, F.B.O.A., F.S.M.C.

assisted by

N. MARSHALL, F.S.M.C.

D. H. BRIGNALL, F.B.O.A., F.S.M.C.

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